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INTRODUCTION 
A. Statement of the problem 
In the appendix to Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
Kierkegaard writes: 
I here would beg the reader's attention to a 
remark I have often desired to .make. Let no one 
misunderstand me, as though I imagined I were 
the devil of a thinker who might transform 
everything. Such thinkers are as remote from 
me as possible. I cherish a respect for Hegel 
which is sometimes an enigma to me; I have 
learnt much :rrom him, and I know on return1~g 
again to him I could still learn much more. 
The problem of the relation between Hegel and Kierkegaard 
arises out of the foregoing statement. An exact account of 
its nature involves Kierkegaard•s meaning, "I cherish a re-
spect for Hegel which is sanetimes an enigma to me; I have 
learnt much from him." As it will appear more fully later, 
Kierkegaard points out constantly why Hegel is an "enigma 
to me," but he does not explain exactly the nature of the 
"much" learned from him. Yet the two thinkers speak o.ften 
the same language, and in spite of decisive differences, 
there are suggestive similarities within divergent systems. 
The problem is to deter.mine as far as possible what is the 
relation between them. The relational aspect of the study 
1 
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involves the .following questions: How are Hegel and Kierke-
gaard related? What is to be inferred from similarities be-
tween them? What is the importance of differences in their 
thinking? To this problem the study turns. 
B. Previous literature 
Kany American and European writers on Kierkegaardts 
thought recognize a relation between him and Hegel, but 
there is no full agreement as to how they are related. The 
basic result has been conflicting claims of thought. Douglas 
Steere discusses the relation between the two thinkers in 
ter.ms of admiration for Kierkegaard followed by opposition 
to Hegel. In the article, "Kierkegaard in English, " Steere 
recognizes the fact that Kierkegaard saved the individual 
from the absolutism of Hegel's system: 
Kierkegaard conducts a ruthless polemic 
against Hegel for obliterating the individual 
by swallowing him up either in society or in 
the historical world process; .for slacking 
off the tensions and discontinuities in ex-
istence by the device of his treble collapses 
and smooth progressions, so that the individ-
ual no longer senses the breathless farnest-
ness of his personal responsibility. 
The foregoing view is an oft-repeated note in the works 
of R. M. Pope, Paul Tillich, 0. F. Kraushaar, H. A. Rein-
hold, Philip Merlan, w. H. Auden, P. L. Holmer, D. G. 
1. Douglas Steere, ''Kierkegaard in English," Journal of 
Religion, 24 (Oetober, 1944), 276. . 
MacRae, and M. Channing-Pearce.1 Particularly characteris-
tic is this position in other thinkers. In 1953, James 
Collins published the book, The Mind of Kierkegaard, which 
sought to assess the facets of Kierkegaard' s thought. Con-
cerning the problem of Kierkegaard's relation to Hegel, 
Collins makes a clear statement of his views. He points 
out that Kierkegaard, by offering the crumbs of philosophy 
in contrast to the fashionable system, subjected Hegelian-
ism to one of the most thoroughgoing refutations it has at 
any time received. 2 His treatment is very much like that 
of Kurt F. Reinhardt's article, "A Cleavage of Minds: 
Kierkegaard and Hegel." Reinhardt states in a very general 
way that there is an unbridgeable chasm between the two 
thinkers.3 
Marjorie Grene holds the opposite view. There is the 
favorable cla~ made for Hegel followed by an unfavorable 
opposition to Kierkegaard. In Dreadful Freedom, she sets 
forth the opinion that as critic of the system Kierkegaard 
uses bad Hegelian logic. 
1. 
2. 
One finds in the lDrks and papers,interspersed 
betweenbrilliant insights and moving para-
cr. Bibliography. 
James D. Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Chicago: 
Regnery, 1953). 
Kurt F. Reinhardt, "A Cleavage of Minds: Kierke15aard 
and Hegel," Commonweal, (October, 1936), 523-524• 
3 
bles, page after page of childishly bad logic--
and, what is worse in a critic of the 'System,• 
bad Hegelian logic; of pure word-juggling and 
of paradoxes, nicely pointed, indeed, but mean-
ingless or more frequently simply untrue.l 
4 
Robert c. Whittemore's view is similar. In his article, 
"Pro Hegel, Contra Kierkegaard," he seeks to reveal Kier-
kegaard•s relation to Hegel in a striking way: 
To nudge Kierkegaard from his privileged 
position as the knight of faith, and to ex-
gmine his position vis a vis speculative 
philosophy for what:rt rs-r:n fact is--an 
antiphilosopbical philosophy, but a philos-
ophy nonetheless.2 
In the views of Grene and Whittemore there is the sugges-
tion that Kierkegaard misinterpreted Hegel. 
David F. Swenson and E. L. Allen maintain a signi£i-
cant view of the problem. They stress that Kierkegaard 
was influenced by Hegel, but he later broke with the German 
philosopher. Neither Swenson nor Allen defines clearly the 
nature of the influence, since their stress is upon the 
point of departure of Kierkegaard from Hegel. In Something 
about Kierkegaard, Swenson points out that Kierkegaard had 
been a student of Hegelianiam and the latter had been in-
fluenced by the German thinker in style and terminology. 
1. Marjorie Grene, Dreadful Freedom: A Criti ue of Existen-
tialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19 1 
PP• 32-33. 
2. Robert c. Whittemore, "Pro Hegel, Contra Kierkegaard," 
Journal of Religious Thought, (September, 1956), 132. 
Kierkegaard read Hegel, or course, and with 
great avidity. He translated the hardest pas-
sages into Danish, in order to make them clear-
er to h~self, and he read and re-read the Logic 
over and over again. Both his philosophical 
style and his terminology show the influence 
of Hegel, but be was never able to aefnowledge 
the validity of Hegel's central idea. 
The statenent, "he was never able to acknowledge the valid-
ity of Hegel's central idea," is used by Swenson to point 
out further that Kierkegaard 
was destined to give to the world the most 
thorough-going and absolutely destructive 
criticism that the Hegelian phi~osophy has, 
to my knowledge, ever received. 
Allen's view is not different from Swenson's. Speaking of 
the metaphysical basis of Kierkegaard's ethics, he writes 
in Kierkegaard: His Life And Thouget: 
It is clear that in all this Kierkegaard 
is not expressing his O\m view, but is adopt-
ing a standpoint which has much in common with 
the Hegelian, though mQdified by the emphasis 
placed on personality.j 
5 
Though he criticizes Kierkegaard•s position, Allen concludes 
that Hegel was the abstract thinker, and Kierkegaard was the 
existential thinker.4 
1. 
2. 
3. 
David F. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard (Minneapo-
lis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1941), p. 11. 
Ibid. 
E. L. Allen, Kierkegaard: His Lire And Thoug1lt (London: 
Stanley Nott Ltd., 1935) 
Ibid. 
-
WT. S~. Moore, in the English speaking-world, is among 
the first to establish that a positive relation exists be-
tween Hegel and Kierkegaard in spite of differences. In 
his article, "Kierkegaard and His Century," Moore observes, 
"The major share in what is reputed to be Kierkegaard's 
discovery of existential thinking is seen to be Hegelian. 111 
The weakness of Moore's treatment is that he confines him-
self to only two basic aspects of Kierkegaard•s thinking, 
dialectic and truth. 
There are some excellent works, not translated in-
to English, which give serious attention to the problem of 
this study. One of the ablest works in German literature 
is Emanuel Hirsch's Kierkegaard-Studien.2. In this three 
volume work, Hirsch describes in detai1 Kierkegaard's de-
velopment in Hegelian studies. k counterpart in the Fre~ch 
literature to Hirsch's work is Jean Wahl's Etudes Kierke-
gaardiennes.3 In the views of Hirsch and Wahl there is 
an evolution of Kierkegaard's thought in relation to 
. - .. 
Hegel. Though W.ahl links Hegel and Kierkegaard with con-
temporary existential thinking, neither Hirsch nor Wahl . 
1. 
2='. 
. -
Wi. s:. Mool:'e, ""Ia.erkegaard and · His Century," Hibbert 
Journal, 36 (July, 1938), 513· 
Erila.nuel Hirsch, Kierkegaard-Studien (Gutersloh:; c. 
Bertelsmann, 1933), III, 451-827. 
Jean WahJ., Etudes Kierkegaardiennes (Paris:: J. Vrin, 
1938), II, 136-155. 
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connects the two thinkers with the general contemporary 
metaphysical systems. It is the view.- of' this study that 
relevant similarities and dif'f'erences between the two 
systems need to be seen in light of' contemporary thought. 
Karl L8with admits the thesis of' Hirsch and Wahl to 
the extent of' characterizing Kierkegaard generally as one 
of' the young Hegelians in Von Hegel bis Nietzsche.l The 
weakness of' this view is that to characterize Kierkegaard 
as a young Hegelian does not do justice to his revolt 
against the system. 
As this survey of' contemporary literature has shown, 
there is a relation between Klerkegaard and Hegel, but 
there is not full agreement as to just what that relation 
is. The result is that the main views of'f'ered out of' 
the wealth of' the literature on Kierkegaard do not agree. 
Yet in spite of' dif'f'erences, there is generally the tendency 
of' thought that suggests a possible influence of' Hegel on 
Klerkegaard, which will serve as the point of' departure f'or 
this study. 
c. Method of' procedure 
The method of' this study is threef'old: historical, 
comparative, and critical. These three distinct methods 
1. Karl L8with~ · von Hegel bis Nietzsche (Stuttgart: Europa 
Verlag A. G., 1941), PP• 65-179. 
7 
wall be used together as related and interdependent. The 
historical-comparative-critical method may be defined by 
its basic principles for this investigation: 1) The attempt 
w~ll be made to give a historical exposition of Hegel's and 
Kierkegaard's systems in accordance with th~ir predecessors, 
immediate setting, and contemporary thought. 2) The study 
will seek to compare leading ideas of the respective 
8 
systems for similarities and differences. 3) A. careful effort 
will be made to evaluate critically Kierkegaardts polemical 
writings to disclose limitations in light of Hegelrs view. 
There are two possible _objections tha~ may arise against 
the procedure of this study.. First, comparative studies of 
Hegel's and Kierkegaard 1 s philosophies a~e useless, since 
Kierkegaard had no system, only a method. But this view is' 
philosophically untenable, since Kierkegaard states in The 
Point of View that his entire publication was a unity which 
can be described systematically.1 
A, second view is that general similarities and differ-
ences are necessary for any philosophical discourse whatso-
ever. How much ~portance can be given to likenesses and 
differences in the determination of the degree of relation 
1. s·. Kierkegaard, The Point of View, · trans • ·Walter Lowrie (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), PP• 5-6, 12, 
139. 
9 
£or the purpose of this study? So that likenesses and dif-
ferences may be considered relevant, Hegelian and Kierke-
gaardian trends are compared within the broad background of 
contemporary thought. 
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter I 
will seek to compare Hegel's and Kierkegaard's interpre-
tations of philosophical predecessors. Only general con-
siderations will be given to problems raised in these areas. 
The aim is not to relate Kierkegaard to all his predeces-
sors. Chapter II will attempt to provide a preliminary 
study. of Kierkegaard's general relations to Hegel. Chapter 
III will deal with Kierkegaard 1s attempted refutation of 
Hegel's position. Specifically, it will attempt to de-
termine to what extent Kierkegaard's refutation is success-
ful. Chapter IV will determine the basic Hegelian tenets 
retained by Kierkegaard. In Chapter V Kierkegaard's and 
Hegel's views will be compared with contemporary schools 
of thought. A final estimate and summary will constitute 
Chapter VI. 
D. The meaning of the term relation 
In Webster's New International Dictionary, the ter.m 
relation is defined to mean a kind of connection. "The 
mode in which one thing stands to another, or the mode in 
which two or more things stand to one another; as, the 
relation of father to son." In this study the term relation 
w~ll mean primarily two things: 1) some possible inrlu-
ences or Hegel on Kierkegaard, and 2) the presentation, 
in some detail, or similarities and difrerences between 
the two thinkers. 
The term "relation," as defined in this investi-
gation, has direct bearing on the following questions: 
Did Kierkegaard learn from Hegel? Is there any real dis-
tinction between the two? Do they have any insights in 
common? This study will seek to answer these questions. 
10 
CHAPTER I 
A COMPARISON OF KIERKEGAARD'S AND HEGEL'S INTERPRETATIONS OF 
THEIR PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS 
A. Hegel's philosophical development 
Georg WilheLm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1830) was revealing 
at the age of seventeen a highly philosophical interest. A 
paper, "On the Religion of the Greeks ani Romans, 111 evidences 
the direction his genius was later to fully develop. Another 
paper is even more indicative. It was entitled, "On the 
JUdgment of Cammon Sense about Objectivity and Subjeetivit,r 
of Ideas."2 
Hegel studied at the theological seminary at the Uni-
versity of Tdbingen from 1788 to 1793. Two famous classmates 
were to be the poet Friedrich H8lderl1n and the philosopher 
F. w. J. Schelling. The story of Hegel's student days is a 
half romanticized portrait. With H8lderlin and Schelling, 
Hegel read deeply the works of Kant and Schiller. He started 
an exploration into Greek poetry and philosophy that made ~ 
the leading spirit in the revolt against the other-worldly 
orthodoxy of his professors, who were members of the Wolf-
fian school. Filled with the ideas of the French revolution, 
1. 
2. 
Hegel, Earl{ Theological Writin~s, trans. T.M.Knox with 
an Introdue ion, and Fragments rans. Richard Kroner 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 1. 
Ibid. 
11 
12 
Hegel, Schelling, and other friends planted a liberty tree in 
a field near Tfibingen. After receiving in 1790 a "Master or 
Philosophy" at Tttbingen, Hegel stayed there three more years, 
and passed the theological examination, which made him a re-
cipient for ministerial orders. On Hegel•s diploma was writ-
ten these words, "Philosophie multam operam 1mpend1t," which 
means, says Caird, that he ~ad bestowed no attention what-
ever on philosophy."l 
TWo important factors stand out clearly in the develop-
ment or Hegel•s thought from his tutorship in Bern and Frank-
fUrt (1793-1880) to his professorship at the University of 
Jena (1801-1807), where he published his first great work, 
Phinomenologie des Geistes in 1807. The first factor is 
Hegel's vivid recognition or what is considered the existen-
tial motivation or life,2 especially involving for him the 
primacy or life over thought, and religion over philosophy. 
Richard Kroner has raised the problem in Hegel• s Early Theo-
logical Writine! that the root or Hegel's philosopbr was a 
personal religious experience. This view has round further 
support in Hegel's Positivity of Christianitz, and The Spirit 
of Christianity. This development within Hegel's thought 
raises the issue of the relation between Hegel and Kierkegaard. 
1. E. Caird, Hegel (London: Blackwood and Sons, 1888), p. 12. 
2. Hegel, Early Theological Writings, p. 46. 
13 
Richard Kroner's statement is justified as follows: "Not 
Kierkegaard, but his great master, Hegel, was the. inaugau-
rator of' existential philosophy. rrl 
The second factor is the various philosophical inf'lu-
ence:s upon Hegel's intellectual development. Four major 
strands are revealed in Hegel's background: his adoration 
of' the Greek culture, the influence of' Kant's critical 
philosophy, the influence of' Schelling's romantic ideals, 
and vast readings in the Christian tradition, art, and 
politics. The blending of' these various intellectual in-
f'luences gave an order, tone, and color to Hegel's final 
metaphysical system. 
The final, mature system of' Hegel represents the re-
sult of' thinking after leaving Jena, and becoming director 
of' a Gymnasium in N~nberg (1808-1816). A very important 
writing coming in this period was the Wissenschatt der 
Logik. Hegel spent the years (1816-1818) as professor of' 
philosophy at Heidelberg. The Eneycl8pad1e was published 
in 1817. In 1821, Hegel published his last great work, 
Grundlinien der Philo sophie des Rechts. During the years 
(1817-1830), Hegel's influence held uncontested sway as 
professor of' philosophy at the University of' Berlin. These 
later works throw light upon Hegel's contention that the 
dialectical conception of' philosophy represents a solution 
l. Ibid. 
-
to the basic tension between the existential and rational 
aspects. Hegel believed that in his final system the con-
flict between life and thought had been overcome in the 
Absolute Geist, Who retained identity in difference and 
overcame division through synthesis. 
14 
Although Hegel's final system is a thoroug~oing ration-
alistic structure, his early writings reveal existential in-
sights. It is important for the nature of this study to 
deal with both Hegel's early writings and the writings of 
his mature system, in order to trace his positive and nega-
tive links with Kierkegaard. 
B. Kierkegaard's philosophical development in relation 
to Hegelianism 
II S'oren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) was born in ~n age, to 
use his own phrase, when "everything here at home bore the 
1 Hegelian stamp." Hegel's idealism dominated philosop~cal, 
religious, and political circles in Germany and Denmark. 
Kierkegaard studied at the University of Copenhagen for 
more than ten years, where Hegel was the mode of thought, 
as he was expounded by the Danish Hegelians, Johan L. 
Heiberg and Hans L. Martensen. Kierkegaard was for a time 
fascinated by Hegelianism. In support of the view of the 
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 34. 
15 
dominance of Hegel's influence during his student days, there 
are his works, Concerning Andersen As A Romanticist, and his 
thesis for the "Master of Arts, H· The Concept of Iron;,y:. These 
early works reveal in style and terminology consideraDie in-
sights of Hegel, which is not surprising, since Kierkegaard 
had been a student of Hegelianism. The extent to which Kier-
kegaard was well acquainted with the writings of Hegel can be 
seen in these two early works. Kierkegaard's :first book, 
"which one of his acquaintances claimed to have translated 
out of the original hegelian,"1 was full of "difficult hegel-
ian expressions, and it was said that only Kierkegaard and 
Andersen had read the book through."2 The dissertation, 
The Concept of Irony, is considered by one of his biograph-
ers an expression of Hegel's style and world-view. E. L. 
Allen writes in Kierkegaard: His Life and Thought: 
It is clear that the writer is still domi-
nated by the Hegelian thought-forms, though he 
is free to appreciate elements which lie out-
side the Hegelian world-vieW: •••• The study of 
Socrates was evidently a source of great sat-
isfaction to him, for he was himself spirit-
ually akin to the Greek. Using the Hegelian 
language, he speaks of Socrates as occupying 
i .n history the pla§e .filled in the •system • 
by the •negation.• 
1. Kierkegaard, J'ournals, PP• XXIX 
2. Ibid,,p. XXX. 
3. E. L. Allen, op. cit., PP• 36-38. 
The influence of Hegel and many others had their part 
in Kierkegaard's intellectual development. He said, "I 
have had recourse ~o the writings of the philosophers, of 
Hegel among others. nl Recent scholarship on Kierkegaard 
has traced the development of Kierkegaard•s thought in re-
lation to Hegel's writings. Swenson points out that 
Kierkegaard read and re-read Hegel's Logic.2 In Kierke-
gaard-Studien, Emanuel Hirsch has dated Kierkegaard•s de-
velopment in Hegelian studies in the following way: 1837, 
- -
Lectures on Esthetics; 1838-1841, History of P~losophy, 
Philosophy of History, and Philosophy of Right; .. after 18liJ_, 
Science of Logic, and Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences.3 Kierkegaard's numerous references to Hegel and 
16 
his writings support the view that Kierkegaard was well-versed 
in Hegelianism. Though other authors made an impact on him, 
Kierkegaard's cumulative references to Hegel in both a nega-
tive and positive mode reveal that the Hegelian influence 
was predominant. 
The precise point of Kierkegaard's disenchantment with 
Hegel is di~~icult to ~ix. It is interesting to note that 
in the year o~ 1841-1842, after breaking his engagement to 
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unsc~entific Postscript, p. 558. 
2=. ·E. L. Allen, op. cit., p. 11. 
3. Emanuel Hirsch, op. cit., 451-827. 
Regina and graduating from the University of Copenhagen, 
Kierkegaard went to Berlin to study. There Schelling was 
leading the revolt against Hegel's philosophy. At first, 
Schelling fired Kierkegaard 1 s enthusiasm. He wrote to his 
intimate friend, Emil Boesen, "I am so pleased to have 
heard Schelling's second lecture-indescribably. ttl Later 
Kierkegaard turned from Schelling in disgust and wrote to 
his brother that "Schelling drivels on quite intolerably 
•••• I am too old to attend lectures and Schelling is too 
old to give them."2 Nevertheless, Kierkegaard's Berlin 
visits inspired his revolt a gainst Hegel, which led to his 
publication of two philosophical masterpieces, The 
Philosophical Fragments ~n 1844 and The Concluding Unscien-
tific Postscript in 1846. 
Many passages in these two philosophical works show a 
striking parallelism to Hegel's theme in his early writings 
before the ending of the Jena period, especially since the 
. . -- . . 
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task to which Kierkegaard applied himself was predominan~ly 
the tension between reflective thought and the inner con-
flicts of life. Kierkegaard 1 s solution is to turn the Hege-
1ian dialectic inwardly to the extreme of despair, and out-
wardly to extraordinary literary act i vity. More than Kier-
1. Kierkegaard, Journals, P• 102. 
2. ~·, P• 104. 
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kegaard perhaps recognized, Hegel's influence upon him was 
enormous. Thus Johannes Hohlenberg is not without reason 
in saying of Kierkegaard: "All his life he retained traces 
of Hegel's influence in his dialectic method and his ter.mi-
nology-."1 A tracing of Hegelian influence in Kierkegaard•s 
version of his philosophical forebears will be the task or 
the following chapter. 
C. Greek phUosoph:y 
1. Socrates 
In Hegel's interpretation, Socrates represented the 
negative principle of philosophy in Greek culture. Accord-
ing to Hegel, "The self-conscious thought that abrogates 
all that is determined, was real existence. 112 In the 
Geschichte der Philo sophie, Hegel saw So.crates as the iron-
ical representative of a new mode of subjective reflection, 
which destroyed the Greeks• morality. The following state-
ment is the picture which Hegel draws at length of Socrates: 
1. 
2. 
Socrates• premeditated irony may be called 
a manner of . speech, a pleasant rallying; there 
is in it no satirical laughter or pretence, as 
Johannes Hohlenberg, SBren Kierkegaard, trans. T. H. 
Croxall (London: Routledge & Kagan Paul Limited, 1954), 
p. 10. 
G. W. F. Hegel, Geschichte der Fhilos~e, trans. E. s. 
Haldane (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, · bner &: Co., Ltd., 
1892), I, 385. . 
though the idea were nothing but a joke. But 
his tragic irony is his opposition of subjec-
tive reflection to morality as it exists, not 
a consciousness of the fact that he stands -
above it, but the natural -aim of leading men, 
through thought to the true good and to the 
universal Idea.l 
19 
Implicit in the above quotation is Hegel's contention that 
Socrates is the embodiment of tragic irony in his opposition 
to customary morality. 
Another important idea, which is mentioned in Hegel's 
view, is Socrates' method. Hegel interpreted Socrates' 
method as having developed in the very way and manner of 
his philosophizing. It is directed not at the communica-
tion of a system, but at the leading of the individual in-
to philosophical thought and life. Hegel's essential point 
is that the method of Socrates is a dialec~ic art, which he 
applied in his conversations and teachings. Hegel said: 
"In this conversation Socrates.' philosophy is found, as also 
. - . 
what is known as the Socratic method, which must in its 
nature be dialectic."2 
Socrates' method has two prominent aspects, which Hegel 
described as negative and affirmative. In the first place, 
the negative aspect was the famous Socratic irony. That 
is, presenting himself as ignorant, Socrates asked questions 
1. Ibid., P• 402. 
2. Ibid., P• 397. 
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with an unusual mental cleverness as if the individual were 
to instruct him, while his real intention was to draw him 
out.1 The effect ar Socrates• irony was to inspire men to 
distrust their presuppositions.2 In this negative way, 
Socrates taught his associates, according to Hegel, "to 
lmow that they know nothing. n3 Furthennore, Hegel stated, 
"It may actually be said that Socrates knew nothing, for 
he did not reach the systematic construction of a philos-
ophy."4 However, Hegel admitted the importance of Socratic 
irony in the following statement: 
The irony of Socrates has this great ~ality 
of showing how to make abstract ideas concrete 
and effect their development, for on that alone 
depends the5bringing of the Notion into con-sciousness. 
This fundamental point will be seen from a different outlook 
in Hegel's following statements about the positive side of 
Socrates• method. 
In the second place, the affir.mative aspect of Socrates• 
method is the ''art of midwifery. "6 It means assisting into 
the world by the questioning attitude the thought of the 
1. Ibid.' P• 398• 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid.' P• 399• 
1+- Ibid. 
5. Ibid., p. 4oo. 
6. Ibid.' p. 402. 
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universal Good residing in the consciousness of the individ-
ual.1 This fact leads to the question of the nature of the 
Good. The Good is for Socrates, according to Hegel, "the 
affirmative, what Socrates develops in the consciousness."2 
Thus Socrates saw his task to be that of a midwife, so that 
the Good may be brought out of consciousness through 
incessant questions. Writing about Socrates' "Good," Hegel 
pointed out: 
The good does not come from without, Socrates 
shows; it cannot be taught, but is implied in 
the nature of mind. That is to say, man cannot 
passively receive anything that -is given from · 
without like the wax that is moUlded to a form, 
for everything is latent in the · frrl.nd of man, 
and he only seems to learn it •••• All that has 
value to men, the eternal, the self-existent, -
is contained -in -man himself, and has to develop 
from himself •••• The universal therein belongs 
to thought, not to the subjective and bad, but 
to the objective and true •••• Socrates opposed 
to the contingent and particular inward, that 
universal, true inward of thought.3 
In the foregoing quotation, Hegel's contention is that 
Socrates is saying "man as thinking is the measure of all 
things."4 Hegel maintained, however, that it remained f'or 
Plato to bring this theory to prominence through his doc-
trine of recollection.5 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p.4o6. 
3. Ibid., PP• ~l0-411. 
4. Ibid • 
.5. ~-
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The daimon was another essential idea in Hegel's view 
of Socrates. Hegel called it the "Genius of Socrates. nl 
Hegel did not see this "Genius of Socrates" in the much dis-
cussed point of a protective angel, spirit, or conscience. 
Hegel wrote: 
The Genius of Socrates is not Socrates him-
self, not his opinions and conviction, but an 
oracle which, however, · is not external, but is 
subjective, his oracle. It bore the form of a 
knowledge which was directly associated with a 
condition of unconsciousness; it was a knowledge 
which may also ap~ear under other conditions as 
a magnetic state. 
For Hegel, as the above passage indicates, the "Genius of 
Socrates" was not an instrument of the deity, but directly 
associated with a psychological state. It will be seen 
later that this interpretation of Socrates' daimon by Hegel 
was to serve as a basis for Kierkegaard's departure from 
Hegel in his view of Socrates. 
A further idea must be mentioned in Hegel's interpre-
tation of Socrates. This idea is developed in Hegel's 
version of the trial and death of Socrates. In Hegel's 
account, the right of the state and the right of Socrates 
are divided into two schools of thought. Two rights are in 
tragic conflict. Hegel described it in the following man-
ner: 
This was so with · Socrates. His is· likewise 
not merely a personal, individually romantic 
1. ~~, 421. 
2. Ibid., 422. 
lot; fr:Jr we have in it the universally moral 
and tragic fate, the tragedy of Athens, the 
tragedy of Greece. Two opposed rights cane 
into collisiot\J and the one destroys the other. 
Thus both suffer loss and yet both are mu-
tually justified; it is not as though1the one alone were right and the other wrong. 
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Hegel insisted, as the above statement indicates, that Soc-
rates• trial and death was a tragic situation in which 
both sides were equally without blame. The state was pro-
testing the establiShed morality, and was justified in 
bringing Socrates to trial for impiety and corrupting the 
youth. "For the first principle of a State is that there 
is no reason or conscience or righteousness or aqvthing 
else, higher than what the State recognizes as such. n2 
Socrates was equally just in maintaining the right of the 
individual's conscience to decide. 
Socrates was still the hero who possessed 
for himself the absolute right of the mind, 
certain of itself jOd of the inwardly decid-
ing consciousness. 
Furthermore, in Socrates• death, Hegel saw the nega-
tive principle of philosophy tully at work, a principle 
which the Greek world could not bear. Through the nega-
tive principle of subjective refl ect:ion, Hegel • s Socrates 
stands in contradiction to What had gone befor~.4 In 
l. Ibid., p. 446. 
2. Ibid., p. 443. 
3. Ibid., p. 444. 
4- Ibid. J p. 444· 
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killing Socrates, the individual was destroyed, but not the 
mgative principle of subjective reflection. For the spirit 
of the Athenian people did not in the removal of Socrates 
recover its old position. Rather Socrates• death served to 
create a higher synthesis. Hegel wrote: 
The Athenian people had come into a period 
of culture, in which this individual conscious-
ness made itself independent of the universal 
spirit and became for itself. This was per-
ceived by than in Socrates, but at the same 
time it was felt that it meant ruin, ani thus 
they punished an element which was their own. 
The principle c£ Socrates is hence not the 
transgression of one individual, for all were 
implicated; the crime was one that the spirit 
of the people committed against itself. 
Through this perception the condemnation of 
Socrates was retracted; Socrates appeared to 
have committed no crime, for the spirit of 
the people has now generally reached the con-
sciousness which turns back from the universal 
into itself. This maant the disintegration of 
this people, whose mind and spirit consequent-
ly soon di sappeared from the world, b~t yet out 
of its ashes a higher took its rise, for the 
world-spirit h~ raised itself into a higher 
consciousness. 
This statement of Hegel reveals that Socrates• ignorance, 
based upon the inwardness of the existing individual, was 
to win out over the customary morality of Athens. Socrates• 
death served to raise the people to a higher consciousness 
of the reality of self-aware reason. 
Turning to Kierkegaard, this study will proceed to 
indicate the implications of his view of Socrates. Kierke-
1 • Ibid • , I , 447 • 
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gaard's interpretation or Socrates has a dual nature, show-
ing the conflict between his classical leanings and the in-
rluence of Christian thought. The result is both a Hegelian 
and anti-Hegelian treatment of Socrates. First, Kierkegaard 
held to the notable Hegelian version of Socrates as the ab-
solute, infinite negativity. Here the inrluence of Hegel 
upon Kierkegaard is noted in his Master's thesis on Socrates, 
later published under the title, The Concept 6t Irony. For 
this early work shows Kierkegaard's dependency upon Hegel 
in thought-for.m and methodology. John Wild says: 
Kierkegaard made a serious study or the early 
dialogues o~ Plato, which resulted in a brilliant 
Master's thesis completed before he was twenty-
eight, -during a period, like most o~ philosoph-
ical contemporaries, he was more or less bound 
by the spell of Hegel. The conclusions to which 
he was led by his yout~ul study, however, de-
termined his view of the negative function of 
philosophy and this exerted a critical inrluence 
on the whole course of his later re~lections.l 
Wild's above statement o~ Hegel and Kierkegaard's re-
lationship is suggestive. For, in agreement with Hegel, 
Kierkegaard defined Socrates' irony in the following 
manner: "Irony as the infinite and absolute negativity, is 
the faintest and most evanescent indication of subjectivity."2 
Even in Kierkegaard's early writing, The -Concept of -Irony, 
1. 
2. 
John Wi1d! ."Kierkegaard a~d Classical Philosophy," 
Philosoph cal Review, 49 ~1940), 537. _ 
Reidar Thomte, Kierke aard's Philoso h 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 ! , 
The quotation comes rrom Kierkegaard 1 s ~S~a~mi~~e~d~e~~~~~ 
XIII, 100. 
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he criticizes Socrates' method in basically Hegelian termi-
nology.l Kierkegaard saw Socrates as lacking the objectivity, 
which enriches subjectivity. As Kierkegaard pointed out, 
Socrates faltered on the concept of totality with which Hegel 
triumphed. .According to Kierkegaard, this weakness was a 
judgment on Socratic individualism. For Socrates lacked a 
conception of the State in its highest form. 
Furthermore, Kierkegaard upheld an essentially Hegelian 
version of the trial and death of Socrates, although he dis-
agreed with Hegel's contention that Socrates' death brought 
about a higher synthesis. Hegel maintained that both the 
people and Socrates were right, but Kierkegaard held that the 
people and Socrates were wrong.3 The people were wrong, for 
as soon as men become a crowd, they become odious • . Socrates 
was wrong, since Socrates was guilty for the sake of truth 
of allowing himself to be put to death, and others to become 
guilty of murde~. In The Present Age, Kierkegaard said: 
1. 
2 
Henriksen, op. cit., p. 139. 
Ibid., p. 133. 
Wild, op. cit .• , p. 538. Wild argues with the sympathetic 
view of Kierkegaard that: "Unlike Hegel, Kierkegaard re-jects the conception of a higher synthesis, and fails to 
see in Socrates' trial and death a tragic situation in 
which there is justification on both sides. Socrates is 
right and his accusers wrong, for reason can get no fur-
ther than irony--which grasps everything as possibility 
and lives outside the realm of pure possibility." Wild 
fails to see, however, as Kierkegaard states clearly in 
The Present Age, trans. by A. Dru and W. Lowrie (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 114, that both 
Socrates and the people were wrong. 
The error in Socrates' conduct was that he 
was ironical, that, naturally, he had no notion o~ 
the Christian love which is recognizable precisely 
by the anxiousness of responsibility, responsibility 
with regard to others, whereas he conceived that he 
had no responsibility ~or his contemporaries but 
only towards the truth and towards himsel~. For 
was not this the element of truth in the Socratic 
de~inition o~ sin as ignorance, that as a Greek he 
thought only of the relation as between man and man? 
From a Christian point of view, the relation is 
between God and man, and therefore error is sin. 
But does this Christian conception hold as be-
tween man and man? And if it does not hold, if in 
the relation between man and man all error is 
ignorance, dare I let anyone become guilty o~ 
putting me to death for truth; is not this too 
cruel a punishment for ignorance?l 
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Along with Kierkegaard's Hegelian interpretation o~ 
Socrates, there is also his anti-Hegelian view. Kierke-
gaard attempted to reveal something in Socrates deeper than 
the negative in order to bring Socrates back into the 
religious category. Kierkegaard took his point of departure 
from Hegel's failure to see the divine mission of Socrates. 
As Hirsch says, "The divine mission of his, Hegel has not 
heeded, even though Socrates lays such stl .. ess on it. "2 It 
is basic, at this point, that Kierkegaard's interpretatio~ 
veers from Hegel. This important point is developed in the 
£ollowing exposition. 
1. 
2. 
Specifically, Kierkegaard 1s anti-Hegelian view of 
Kierkegaard, The Present Age, PP• 114-115. 
. . 
Hirsch, op.cit., II, 336-337, translated in Henriksen, 
op. cit., P• 136. 
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Socrates culminated in the identification of his own phil-
osophical position with Socrates on two important points. 
The two points are the maieutical method and the category 
of the individual. First, Socrates' maieutical method 
coincides in many respects with Kierkegaard's method of 
indirect communication. For Socrates, the maieutical 
method was the mental art of midwifery. Socrates in the 
learning situation played the role of the midwife in bring-
ing to birth latent truth within the learner. Kierkegaard 
did not define specifically the nature of indirect communi-
cation. In the Journals, he did state, "I began with the 
Socratic method. nl And it is suggested that indirect com-
munication is the self-concealing method of Socrates. 
Kierkegaard would hide his identity as author in his writings, 
and suggest in secrecy facts and views to the readers. In-
direct communication is necessary wherever the truth to be 
communic~ted is of the nature of inwa!dness _and essentially 
- 2 
a secret. In illustrating the nature of an essential 
secret, Kierkegaard went back to Socrates, since the latter 
had isolated himself from every external relationship by 
appealing to his daimon.3 The appeal to his daimon con-
1. Kierkegaard, Journals, P• 451. 
2·. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 73. 
3. I£!£., P• 74. 
atituted Socrates' God-relationship, which was a secret 
that could not be communicated. Hegel had failed, Kierke-
gaard maintained, to comprehend the God-relationship of 
Socratest daimon. Appealing to Socrates' religious dimen-
sion, Kierkegaard added that his pseudonymous works and 
indirect communication are "something Socratic about me. nl 
Kierkegaard insisted that:· 
The entire essential content of subjective 
thought is essentially secret, because it can-
not be directly communicated. This is the 
meaning of the secrecy. The fact that the 
knowledge in question does not lend itself 
to direct utterance.2 
The foregoing statement implies that indirect communication 
is necessary when truth to be communicated concerns the na-
ture of inwardness, and is essentially a secret. However, 
Kierkegaard sought to go beyo~d Socrates by emphasizing 
the facts of Christian truths, since the maieuticer must 
ultimately become a witness to Christianity.3 
Secondly, not only for a methodological reason, but 
for a metaphysical one also, Kierke gaard identified his 
1. Kierkegaard, Journals, P• 347. 
2. Kierkegaard, Concluding ~nsci~ntific Postscript, p. 73. 
3. Kierkegaard, Journals, p. 26o. 
view with that or Socrates. Socrates is, as Kierkegaard 
indicates, a unique embodiment of a truly individualized 
existence. In the Journals, Kierkegaard wrote: 
1The individual'; that category has b.een used 
once before and then by Socrates, in a dialec-
tical and decisive way, to disintegrate pagan-
ism. In Christianity it will be used once 
again--in 6fder to make men (The Christians) into 
Christians. 
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"The individual; that category," Kierkegaard, like Socrates, 
makes his own. Wbile Socrates used it to disinte~rate ~ag­
anism, Kierkegaard sought to use it to make men ihto Chris-
tians. Likewise, as Socrates was despise~ by the people of 
Athens, Kierkegaard considered himself equally despised by 
the people of Copenhagen. Finally, in Kierkegaard's anti-
Hegelian interpretation of Socrates, the wise sage of Athens 
was concerned with the alone and the personal, and Kierke-
gaard stressed S.ocrates' avoidance or all external specula-
tion. 
In the foregoing analysis, Hegel's and Kierkegaard's 
interpretations of Socrates are found to be both similar 
and at variance with one another. Kierkegaard, like Hegel, 
admits Socrates is the embodiment of the negative principle 
of philosophy, yet there is a basic disagreement between 
the two thinkers' interpretations. This fact is evident 
1. s. Kierkegaard, Journals, trans; A. Dru (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1938), p. 228. 
in Kierkegaard's anti-Hegelian version of Socrates, which 
stood in opposition to Hegel's failure to see the divine 
mission of Socrates. Wbile admitting with Hegel positive 
virtues in Socrates' ignorance, Kierkegaard held also in 
disagreement with Hegel that Socrates was an instrument of 
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the deity. Thus Kierkegaard is motivated to seek a view of 
Socrates bringing him back into a religious c~tegory, although 
he saw his view as going beyond even Socrates.l In this 
regard, Kierkegaard saw something more profound than irony 
in Socrates. But even here, the contrast between the two 
interpretations must not be overdrawn. For the basic Hege-
lian version of Socrates' negative principle in philosophy 
was to influence throughout Kierke gaard's life his view of 
the negative function of p~losophy. 
2. Plato 
Plato was the grand model of speculative philos?phy in 
Hegel's thought. Speculative philosophy, in this _account, 
means what the famous Ideas of Plato are. Hegel remarked: 
1. 
2. 
The Idea is nothing else than that which is 
known to us more familiarly by the name of the 
Universal, regarded, however, not as the forrool 
Universal, which is only a property of things, 
but as implicitly and explicitly exis~ent, as 
reality, as that which alone is true. 
s. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fra~ments, trans. D. F~ Swen-
son (Princeton: Princeton Univers1ty Press, 1936), P• 3. 
Hegel, HistorY of Philosophy, II, 29. 
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Hegel is convinced that "Plato's true speculative greatness ••• 
lies in the fuller determination of the Idea."l Speci.fically, 
the German philosopher felt that Plato was responsible for 
leading philosophy from the Socratic point of view to the 
scientific. Plato made concrete and objective Socrates• 
famous principle of the truth o.f self-conscious thought. 
Hegel saw Plato applying Socrates• principle to a uni.fied 
and intelligible structure in the sphere of science. Though 
Hegel treated Plato•s position as a necessary culmination of 
Socrates' view, yet he contended that Plato had extended the 
principle o.f his teacher by stripping it of its subjective 
character.2 
Hegel gave fur'ther information on Plato as a specula-
tive thinker by a serious discussion of Platonic dialectic. 
Hegel wrote, "This first branch of Platonic philosophy is 
the dialectic which moves _in pure Notions--the movement of 
the speculatively logical."3 Hegel explained, however, 
that: 
1. 
::r. 
3. 
We certainly do not find in Plato a ftill 
consciousness that this is the nature -of dia~ 
lectic, -but we find dialectic itself present; 
that is, we find absolute existence thus recog-
Ibid., 
- . 
II, 53. 
Ibid~, II, 54. 
Ibid.' II, 48-49. 
nized in pure Notions, and the representation 
or the movement of these Notions.~ 
33 
Hegel maintained that the basic meaning of Plato's dialectic 
is that the true is the universal. 2 In this connection, He-
gel saw the a~ of Platonic dialectic 
to contuse and resolve the finite ideas of men, 
in order to bring about in their consciousness 
what scie~ce demands, the consideration of that 
which is • .::S . 
The later dialogues, the SoEhist, Phiiebus, and Parmenides, 
bring out especially this Hegelian claim. They are serving 
the precise aim or Plato to confuse the particular, so that 
the Universal may amerge. An illustration of this fact is 
found in Hegel's treatment of Par.menidei, which he consid-
ered "the mast~rpiece of Platonic dialectic."4 Hegel wrote: 
Plato first comprehended the Absolute as .the 
Being of Par.menides, but as the Universal which, 
as species, is also end, i.e. which rules, pene-
trates, and produces the particular and manifold.S 
Here Hegel's essential points are that Plato apprehended 
the unity of being and non-being in the doctrine of end, 
and that the contradictions between the particulars and 
universal are superseded in the dialectics of thought. Hegel 
concluded his entire view of Plato as speculative thinker in 
1. Ibid., II, 50. 
-
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibi·d.·., 
-
II, 51. 
4· Ibid., II, 56. 
-5. Ibid. 1 II, 53. 
these words: 
Freedom exists only in a return into itself; 
the undistinguished is the lifeless; the active, 
living, concrete universal is hence what inward-
ly distinguishes itself, but yet remains free in 
so doing. Now this determinateness consists in 
the one being identical with itself in the other, 
in the many, in what is distinguished. This 
constitutes the only truth, and the only inter-
est for knowledge in what is called Platonic 
philosophy, and if this ii not known, the main 
point of it is not known. 
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In the foregoing statement, Hegel means that Plato's dialec-
tic is the speculative type, which seeks the unity of con-
tradictions in a concrete universal. 
Perhaps the most interesting part of Kierkegaard's in-
terpretation of Plato was its relationship to Hegelianism. 
Viewing Plato through Hegelian eyes, Kierkegaard saw him as 
a speculative thinker, who found reality in the world of 
Ideas, on the one hand. But, on the other hand, Kierke-
gaard asserted trat the world of Ideas was the most fully 
unintelligible and impersonal. Consequently, Kierkegaard 
treated Plato as representing the speculative model in op-
position to his point of view. 
Kierkegaard insisted also that Plato must be separated 
from Socrates. For Socrates was not a speculative thinker 
and story teller of myths. Kierkegaard wrote: 
Socratically, the eternal truth is by no 
means in its own nature paradoxical, but only 
1. Ibid., II, 67. 
in its relationship to an existing individual. 
This finds expression in another Socratic propo-
sition, nrunely, tibat all knowledge is recollec-
tion. This proposition is not for Socrates a 
cue to the speculative enterprise, and hence he 
does not follow it up; essentially it becomes a 
Platonic principle. Here the way swing,s off; 
Socrates concentrates essentially upon accent-
uating existence, while Plato forgets this, and 
loses himself in speculation. Socrates• infin-
ite merit is to have been an existing thinker, 
not a speculative £hilosopher who forgets what 
it means to exist. 
Thus Kierkegaard • s Plato is the "speculative philosopher" 
who "loses himself" in speculation." 
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Kierkegaard rejected constantly the speculative tra-
dition of Plato and Hegel, even though the former was influ-
enced by this tradition in many instances. A brief survey 
of Kierkegaardian literature will bring this point to a 
sharp focus. In writing his Master's thesis, The Concept 
of Irony, Kierkegaard returned frequently to the original 
works of Plato•s Dialogues to extract insights about Soc-
rates.2 Yet, as a thinker with poetic leanings, Kierke-
gaard was his own Plato. One of Kierkegaard•s earliest 
aesthetic works, Fear and Trembling, for instance, is a dia-
lectical lyric containing a philosophic myth analogous to 
Platonic myths. Concretely, for Kierkegaard, Abraham of ~ 
and Trembling is not the Abraham of the Old Testament, but 
a philosophic or poetic creation, which portrays a leaning 
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 184. 
2. Wild, op. cit., p. 537. 
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toward the comparable myths of' Plato. Furthermore, one of' 
the striking passages in Fear and Tremblin& portrays the 
inf'l~ence of a Platonic o~tlook. In this connection, Kier-
kegaard admired the emotional emphasis of divine madness 1n 
Plato's Phaedr~s. Kierkegaard said: 
Venerable Father AbrahamJ Thou who first 
wast sensible of' and didst first bear witness 
to that prodigious passion which disdains the 
dreadful conflict with the rage of the elements 
and with the powers of creation in order to 
strive with God; tho~ who first didst know 
that highest passion, the holy, pure and hum-
ble expression of the divine madness which 
the pagan admired--forgive him who would 
speak in praise of thee, if he does not do 
it fittingly.l 
This passage has an unmistakable similarity to Plato's 
PhB.edioua: 
And this which I am about to utter is the 
recantation of Stesichorus the son of' Godly 
man ( E~phemus) who comes from the town of 
Desire (Htmera~, and is to the following ef-
fect: '1 told a lie when I said' that the be-
loved ought to accept the non-lover when he 
might have the lover, because the one is the 
same, and the other is mad. It might be so 
if madness were simply an evil; b~t there is 
also a madness which is a divine gitt, and 
the source of' the cbiefest blessi~gs granted 
to men. For prophecy is madness. 
Still further, Kierkegaard's Stagea on Life's Way is 
in theological literature comparable to Plato's SzMposiWn 
in philosophical literature. Both Si!Posium and "Banquet 
1. 
2. 
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 30. 
B. Jowett, The Diaio,ues of Plato (New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1892 , I, 248-249. · 
Scene" of' the Stages reveal interesting similarities of' 
style. In the two works, the general theme is love. In 
the Stages, each of' the guests speaks on the subject of' 
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love, likewise in the Symposium. As the "Banquet Scene" of' 
the Stages is a convivial drinking party, so is the §impo-
sium. In the Stages, the drinking takes on an extreme 
f'or.m, and the password becomes the famous motto, ~In vino 
veritas, when wine vindicates the truth and the truth vin-
dicates the wine."l In the "Banquet Scene" of the Stages, 
Kierkegaard makes a specific reference to Aristophanes of 
Plato's Symposium. Kierkegaard maintained that the coher-
ence of speech must not be interrupted by hiccups, which 
was the plight of Aristophanes in the SymposiUm.2 
Another aspect of Kierkegaard 1 s thought is his compar-
ison of the nature of existence with Plato's Eros. Kierke-
gaard said in Concluding Unscientific Postscript: 
Existence itself, the act of existing, is a 
striving •••• This characteristic of existence 
recalls the Greek conception of Eros, as found 
in the Symposium, and which Plutarch in his 
work on Isis and Osiris interprets correctly. 
The parallel he draws between Isis, Osiris 
and Typhon does not interest me; but when 
Plutarch reminds us that Hesiod has assumed 
Chaos, Earth, Tartarus, and Love as cosmic 
principles, it is quite proper in this con-
nection to recall Plato.3 
1. Kierkege.ard, Stages on Life's Way, trans. W. Lowrie 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945}, p. 41. 
2. Ibid., P• 45. 
3. Kierkegaard, Concludins Unscientific Postscript, pp. 84-85. 
Kierkegaard indicated rurther inror.mation or this relation-
ship in these words: 
For Love is here evidently taken as identi-
cal with existence, or that, by virtue or 
which, lire is lived in its entirety, the lire 
which is a synthesis or the inrinite and the 
rinite. According to Plato, Wealth and Poverty 
conceived Eros, whose nature partook or both. 
But what is existence?l 
In answering the question "What is existence?", Kierkegas.rd 
identiried existence with Plato's Eros. 
Existence is the child that is born or the 
inrinite and the rinite, the eternal and the 
temporal, and is thererore a constant striving 
•••• It is ror this reason that Love is con-
stantly striving; or to say the same thing in 
other words, the thinking subject is an exist-
ing individual.2 
Kierkegaard is convinced in all the roregoing passages that 
the existence of the individual is similar to Plato's Eros. 
Kierkegaard's description or the change or the natural 
love impulse into a passion ror thought is in basic agree-
ment with the view or Plato and Hegel. A striking state-
ment or Kierkegaard to this erfect is found in his Repe-
tition. At the time or this work, Kierkegaard had de-
nounced his l ove ror Regina and had gone to Berlin. Kierke-
gaard wrote: 
I rum again myself. This self, which no 
one else would stoop to pick up ir it lay on 
1. ~bid. 
2. Ibid. 
the highway, I now possess again. The cleft 
which threatened to divide my nature is again 
elosed; ••• I am again where my soul yearns to 
be, where the ideas seethe •••• Now I belong to the 
Idea. When it beckons I follow, when it makes 
an appointment with me, I wait a day and a 
night; no one calls time. When the Idea calls 
me, I leave all, or rather, I have nothing to 
leave, I desert no one, I grieve no one by my 
loyalty to the Idea •••• Long live the flight of 
thought, long live the venture of one's life in 
the service of the Idea, long live the festive joy of victory; long live the dancer in the 
whirl of the infinite, long live the stor.m-wave 
that buries me in the depths, long live the 
storm-wave that hurls me above the starsll 
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This illuminating passage is comparable, on the one hand, 
to Diotima's emphasis upon the Idea in Plato's Sjmposium: 
1. 
2. 
He who has been instructed thus far in the 
things of love, and who has learned to see the 
beautiful in due order and succession, when he 
comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a 
nature of wondrous beauty (and this, Socrates, 
is the .final cause of all our former toils)-
a nature which in the first place is everlast-
ing, not growing and decaying, or waxing and 
waning; secondly, not fair in one point of view 
and foul in another •••• He who from these ascend-
ing under the influence of true love, begins to 
perceive that beauty, is not far from the end. 
And the true order of going, or being led by 
another, to the things of love, is to begin 
from the beauties of earth and mount upwards 
for the sake of that other beauty, using these 
as steps only, and from one going on to two, and 
from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms 
to fair practices, and from rair practices to 
fair notions, ~til from fair notions he arrives 
at the notion of absolute beauty, and2at last ~ows what the essence of beauty is. 
Kierkegaard, Repetition, trans. Walter Lowrie (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1941), PP• 144-146. 
B. Jowett, The Diai6,ues ot P1at6 (New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1892 , P• 335. . 
This statement of Plato agrees with Kierkegaard's view of 
his change from the physical love .for Regina to the spirit-
ual love for the Idea. 
Then, on the other hand, Kierkegaard's "thought" and 
"love for the Idea" reveal an interesting relationship to 
Hegel's Phl:lnomenologie des Geistes. Here Hegel traced the 
passion of thought from bare sense experience to the Abso-
lute Idea, or Absolute I~wledge. The important point is 
that Kierkegaard 1s "flight of thought" appears to place 
him, to use Kierkegaard 1s phrase, 11 in the service of the 
Idea," and to reflect the basic difficulty of his entire 
philosophy, which is to reconcil e his classical and Chris-
tian sympathies. 
The following factors are revealed in Hegel's and 
Kierkegaard's views of Plato. Hegel opposed the tradi-
tional interpretation of Plato, as "patron saint of 
enthusiasm. 11 Hegel was convinced that Plato was mainly a 
speculative thinker. It is significant to note that 
Kierkegaard 1 s interpretation of Plato as a speculative 
philosopher followed Hegel, rather than the traditional 
view. But what for Hegel was a positive evaluation of 
Plato's speculative merits, perhaps Kierkegaard takes an 
exception to and puts in a different light. Thus 
Kierkegaard's Plato represents ~he impersonal and ob-
jective standpoint of speculative thought similar to the 
abstract tradition of Hegelianism. Whereas Hegel saw Plato 
going beyond Socrates as a speculative thinker, Kierkegaard 
sought to separate Socrates fran Plato, since Socrates• in-
finite merit was not to have been a speculative philosopher. 
Though rejecting constantly the speculative tradition of 
which Plato and Hegel were to him the chief representatives, 
Kierkegaard was influenced by insights from speculative 
thou @lt throughout his philosophy. 
3. Aristotle 
In Geschichte der Philosophie, Hegel professed a pro-
found respect for Aristotle. Hegel said, "No one · is more 
comprehensive and speculative than he."1 
If we would be serious with philosophy, nothing 
would be more desirable than to lecture upon 
Aristotle, for he i~ of all the ancients the most 
deserving of study. 
Hegel remarked often that the desire of his contemporaries 
to return to Plato was characteristic of "the weaknesses or 
our time," but Aristotle's metaphysics and psychology "have 
neverbee~ surpassed."3 
According to Hegel's view, Aristotle's 1hou_:ght was · a 
fulfilment of Plato, as the latter had completed the thought 
1. Ibid., II, 117. 
2. Ibid., II, 134. 
3. Ibid. 
ot Socrates. Hegel held that Aristotle had given organic 
characteristics to what Plato had lett abstract. Hegel wrote: 
For Aristotle's empiricism is a totality 
because he always leads it back again immed-
iately to speculation; he may thus be said to 
be a perfect em~iricist, yet at the same time 
a thinking one. 
Again: 
Aristotle has further declared the chief 
subject of investigation, or the most essen-
tial knowledge ••• to be the knowledge of end; 
but this is the good in each thing and, gen-
erally speaking, the best in the whole ot 
nature. This also holds good with Plato and 
Socrates; yet the end is the true, the con-
crete, as against the abstract Platonic Idea.2 
Aristotle's conception of mind as natural organism of fUnc-
tion and activity, of nature as an organic, immanent, teleo-
logical process were, in Hegel's judgment, a fulfilment of 
Plato's thought. In the Physics of Aristotle, Hegel found 
what was to be a basic principle of his own philosophy; 
that is, the truth is the whole.3 
Hegel opposed the traditional views of these two 
thinkers, which h ad served to separate their thoughts into 
two opposing views. Hegel denied that Aristotelian and 
Platonic philosophies are directly opposed, since the first 
is realistic, and the second is idealistic. Hegel maintained 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Ibid., II, 133. 
Ibid., II, 135. 
J. Glenn Gray, He,el's Hellenic Ideal (New Yor~: King's 
Crown Press, 1941 , P• 84• 
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that the dif~erence between Plato's idealism and Aristotle's 
realism was non-essential to the extent that it was trivial. 
Hegel's basic statement is: 
There is a quite generally held opinion that 
Aristotelian and Platonic philosophies are di-
rect l y opposed, the one being- idealistic and 
the other realistic, and that, indeed, in the-
most trivial sense. For Plato is said to have 
made the ideal his principle, so that the in-
ward idea creates ~rom itsel~; according to 
Aristotle, on the contrary, we · are told that 
the soul is made a tabula ~' receiving all 
its determinations quite passively ~rom the 
outer world; and his philosophy is thus mere 
empiricism--Locke's philosophy at its worst. 
But l..Je shall see how little this really is the 
case. In fact Aristotle excels Plato in spec-
ulative depth, for he was acquainted with the 
deepest kind of speculation--idealism-and in 
this upholds the most extreme empirical devel-
opment.l 
What is Hegel saying in the fore going statement? Hegel's 
meaning is that Aristotle gave concrete expression to 
Plato's philosophy, and the two thinkers must be se~n to-
gether, rather than within separate schools of thought. 
Further i~ormation is given about the relation of 
Hegel to Aristotle in the conclusion of the EnclclopHdie •. 
Hegel concludes this work by quoting Aristotle 1 s passage 
in Book Lambda from chapter seven in the Metaphysics: 
And thinking -in itself deals with that ·which 
is best in itself, and that which is thinking 
in the fullest sense with that which is best in 
the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself 
because it shares the nature of the object of 
1. Hegel, HistoEl_Qf_Philoso h~, I I , 1 18-119 . 
thought; for it becomes an object of thought in 
coming into contact with and thinking its objects, 
so tlll. t thought and obj eet of t bought are the 
same. Fbr that which is capable of receiving 
the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is 
thought. But it is active when it possesses 
this object. Therefore the possession rather 
than the receptivity is the divine element whieh 
thought seams to contain, and the act of contem-
plation is what is most pleasant and best.l 
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Here Hegel saw in Aristotle's ftatement the highest idealism 
which means the universe is rational, and the thinker is one 
with the object of thought. 
One of the confusing poin~ s of Hegel' a view of Aria-
' 
totle is the conflict between the analytic and synoptic 
I 
I 
elements within the latter's thinking. Hegel is convinced, 
i 
on the one hand, that Aristotle's philosophy is a "totality 
, n2 
of purely speculative philosophy. On the other hand, 
I 
Hegel saw only the analytic characteristic of his thought. 
"A system of philosophy is what we cannot find in Aris-
totle."3 Hegel concludes: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4· 
And yet it cannot be denied that with Aris-
totle the object was not to bring everything to 
a unity, or to reduce determinations to a unity 
of opposites, but, on the , contrary, to retain 
each i~ its determination, and thus to follow 
it up.4 
Ct. J. G. Gray, op. cit., P• 85. This passage from 
Hegel is translated in his work. 
Hegel, Histor:y of Phiiosopb.'y. II, 117. 
Ibid'. 
-
Ibid., 
-
II, 133. 
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Hegel believed that Aristotle did not seek the unity of all 
things. This important point was to be what Hegel considered 
his advancement over Greek philosophy. 
Having indicated Hegel's view of Aristotle, the relation 
of Kierkegaard to Aristotle will be considered. Unlike Hegel, 
Kierkegaard dealt informally with Aristotle's main works. Of 
Aristotle's primary works, Kierkegaard quoted mer~ly a few 
isolated sentences from the Poetics and Rhetorics. In 
attacking Hegel's theory of motion in the Logik, Kierkegaard 
has no basic references to Aristotle's comprehensive work on 
motion and change. Wild suggests that Kierkegaard made no 
careful study of Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, De Anima, 
and Ethics.l This fact does not imply that Kierkegaard is 
without admiration for Aristotle. For the contrary is true, 
as it is attested in the Journals: 
It seems quite extraordinary to ·me to read 
Cap III of Book III of Aristotle's de anima. 
It is a year and a half since I began my little 
essay: de omnibus dubitandum est in which I 
made my first attempt to a bit of philosophical 
writirig. The motivating concept which I used 
was: error. Aristotle does so too. At . that 
time I had not read any Aristotle and only part 
of Plato. It is however the Greeks who are 
my consolation, the cursed · mendacity which came 
into philosophy with Hegel, that eternal hint-
ing and deceiving, and blustering and dilution 
1. Wild, op. cit., p. 5L~o. 
of some point or other in the Greeks. Trendelen-
burg be praised; one of the most honest thinking 
philologists I know.l · 
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In spite of the fact that Kierkegaard viewed Hegel in 
2 direct contradiction to the Greek spirit~ he interpreted 
Aristotle~ like Hegel~ as being both a speculative and em-
pirical thinker. First, concerning the spec~ative factor 
in Aristotle, Kierkegaard wrote: 
Let me here say merely a word, in case any 
one misunderstands many of rrry expressions, to 
make it clear that it is he who wishes to mis-
understand me, and that I am without responsi-
bility. All honor to philosophy, all praise 
to everyone who brings a genuine devotion to 
its service. To deny the value of speculation 
(though one might wish that the moneychangers 
in the forecourts of the temple could be ban-
ished as profane) would be, in my opinion, to 
prostitute oneself. It would be particularly 
stupid in one whose own energies are for the 
most, and in proportion to aptitude and op-
portunity, consecrated to its service; especi-
ally stupid in one who admires the Greeks. 
For he must know that Aristotle, in treating 
of what happiness is, identifies the highest 
happiness with the joys of thought, recalling 
in this connection the blessed pastime of the 
external gods in speculation.3 
In the above passage, Kierkegaard recognized the speculative 
ehars.eteristics of Aristotle 1 s thought. Kierkegaard said 
-
that to deny speculation is 'tto prostitute oneself. n 
Secondly, Kierkegaard was convinced also of the empir-
ical features of Aristotle's philosophy. Kierkegaard said: 
1. Kierkegaard, Journals, P• 136. 
2. Ibid·. 
3. Kierkegaard, concluding unscientific Postscript, P• 54. 
Abstract thought is disinterested, but for an 
existing individual, existence is the highest in-
terest • . An existing individual therefore has 
always a telos, and it is of this telos that 
Aristotle speaks.l 
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On the empirical side, Kierkegaard was convinced that Aris-
totle held a place for individuality which Hegel and modern 
thought do not admit. Kierkegaard said: 
But existence corresponds to the individual 
thing, the individual which even Aristotle 
teaches lies outside or at least cannot be re-
duced to a concept. For an individual animal, 
plant, or man, existence (to be or not to be) 
is of quite decisive importance; an individ-
ual man has not after all a conceptual exist-
ence.2 
In this passage, Kierkegaard is opposing modern philosophy 
for ignoring the individual existence. Kierkegaard in-
sisted that the individual, of whom Aristotle was aware, 
had slipped through the grasp of abstract, modern tendencies 
in a pantheistic haze.3 
Summarizing the thinking of Hegel and Kierkegaard on 
Aristotle, two salient factors stand out. First, both 
thinkers broke away from what Hegel considered the tradi-
tional view concerning Aristotle. Hegel and Kierkegaard 
maintained the view that there are both the empirical and 
speculative sides of Aristotle, whereas the traditional 
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 278. 
2. Kierkegaard, Journais, p. 358. 
3. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 277. 
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tendency stressed the empirical and realistic areas of 
Aristotle's thought. At this very point, Kierkegaard agrees 
with Hegel, rather than the traditional views of Aristotle. 
Secondly, Kierkegaard's view marks a point of departure, 
since he holds that Aristotle has a place for individuality 
which Hegelts pantheism lacks. 
Turning now to the two thinkers• interpretations of 
Greek philosophy as a whole, a basic statement of Wild may 
be included at this point: 
Kierkegaard's genuine philosophical in-
sights are certainly not inconsistent with 
the body of classic doctrine which began to 
be formulated by Plato ••• Where through a 
one-sided reaction against Hegel he did ac-
tually depart from the Greeks, he was led 
into difficulties and inconsistencies which 
consistent Hegelianism might have corrected.l 
D. Medieval philosophy 
1. Augustine 
Hegel gave only a brief amount of attention to Augus-
tine. Hegel remarked: 
All the Philosophy which we first encounter 
in the Middle Ages, when independent states be-
gin to rise; consists of bare remnants of the 
Roman world, which on its F~l had sunk in all 
respects so low that the culture of the world 
seemed to have come entirely to an end.2 
1. Wild, op. cit., p. 540. 
2. Hegel, History of Philosophy, III, 37. 
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Hegel considered the Latin Commentaries o~ Boethius and the 
De dialectica and De categoriis of Augustine as ~ost barren 
ccmpilations u·l and "the first make-shif·ts or expedients for 
carrying on Philosophy. 112 Hegel criticized these works be-
cause "in them the most external and most formal reasoning 
is applied. u3 
Hegel placed Augustine with Scholastic philosophy. He 
insisted, however, that "Scholasticism is not a ~ixed doe-
trine like Platonism or Scepticism, but a very inde~inite 
name which comprehends the philosophic endeavours o~ Cpris-
tendom. n4 11Tb.e name, however, properly speaking indicates 
a general manner rather than a system.."5 Hegel stated 
clearly, "It is not a philosophy."6 Although Scholastic 
philosophy occupied a history o~ a tmusand years, "it has 
ever occupied the same standpoint, and been grounded on the 
same principle. n7 Thus: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4-
5. 
6. 
7. 
It is the faith of the Church that we catch 
sight of, and a ~ormalism which is merely an 
Ibid. 
l"bid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., III, 38. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
eternal analysis and constant re-iteration with-
in itself •••• Here there is indeed a history of 
men, but speaking properly none of scientific 
knowledge; the men are noblei pious, and in all 
respects most distinquished. 
Hegel concluded: 
It cannot be expected of anyone to know at 
first hand this philosophy of the Middle Ages, 
for it is as comprehensive .and voluminous as 
it is barren and ill-expressed.2 
With this critical note, Hegel discussed certain general 
features of Scholastic philosophy without dealing specif-
ically with any of the men of this school. · 
Kierkegaard 1 s view of Augustine stands in marked 
contrast to Hegel's. It is noteworthy in this connection 
that Kierkegaard viewed the Augustinian philosophy as a 
genuine expression of Christianity in opposition to 
Pelagianism. Kierkegaard wrote: 
2. 
There is one main opposition: Augustine 
and Pelagius. The former seeks to break down 
everything in order to raise it up again; the 
other directs himself to man as he is. The 
1'irst system thus has three stages with ref-
erence to Christianity: Creation--the Fall 
and a state of death and impotence brought 
about thereby--and a new Creation, whereby 
man is placed in such a position that he can 
choose and then chooses Christendom. The 
other system turns to man as he is (Christian-
ity is adapted to the world).3 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
D. G. M. Patrick, Pascal and ' Kierkegaard (London: 
Lutterworth Press, 1947), II, 322. 
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In contrast to Hegel's interpretation o~ Augustinian 
philosophy as a "general manner" o~ life, Kierkegaard saw 
Augustinian philosophy as a system representing a genuine 
Christian position. Further, unlike Hegel, Kierkegaard 
a~~iliated himsel~ with the Augustinian Christian position 
in many respects. This fact is to have certain implica-
tions ~or the Kierkegaard-Hegel relation. In the ~irst 
place, as Augustine asserted in his Co~essions, "Thou 
hast made us for thysel:f, our heart is restless until it 
:finds its rest in Thee, 111 so Kierkegaard repeated Augus-
tine's search for inner existence and its relation to God. 
Kierkegaard analyzed with pro~ound penetration the Augus-
tinian restlessness of existence at the levels of anxiety, 
boredom, doubt, and despair. 
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Even so, in Kierkegaard's analysis of the human spirit 
in terms o~ his interpretation o~ Augustine, two dif~erent 
i~luences remained unreconciled. The first influence was 
~rom writers such as Luther, Pascal, and other devotional 
authors; the second in~luence was ~rom Hegel, and Hegelians, 
like Rosenkranz. Although Kierkegaard's personal inwardness 
depended heavily upon the first group o~ these authors~ 
yet his keen theoretical analysis o:f the inner existence 
portrayed the triumph of the tool o~ reason even in 
1. Augustine, Confessions, Bk. I ~ 1. 
rebelling against Hegel. For instance, the first section 
of The Sickness Unto neath, and passages in The Concept of 
Dread dealt with the nature of t he human spirit in familiar 
Hegelian terminology. Man is understood as a synthesis of 
soul and body supported by spirit. In spite of his in-
sistence that "spirit" was not merely tbe third moment in 
the dialectic of the soul, Kierkegaard still formulated 
the problem within the rationalistic framework of the 
Hegelian categories. 
It is interesting to note also that Kierkegaard empha-
sized the Augustinian strain of the accessibility of inner 
existence to God by faith, while holding also to a Hege-
lian position. Augustine had held to one consistent view of 
reason working with faith, and faith working with reason in 
a harmonious relationship.1 Though Kierkegaard's treatment 
of the problem of faith and reason was often suggestive of 
Augustine, this is so only at first glance. There is a 
clear distinction in the treatment of the problem by the 
two thinkers. In particular, unlike Augustine's consistent 
view, Kierkegaard held to three inconsistent views concern-
ing the relationship of faith and reason. In the following 
discussion, there is fUrther elucidation of this point. 
1. Frank Thilly, A Histor} of Philosop!ly, (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1914 , p. !48. 
First, along with Augustine, Kierkegaard held that 
both faith and rea son are necessary. On one occasion, he 
said, "Love stands in the smme relation to law as reason 
does to faith ••• there is no ••• conflict between the law 
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1 
and love.• The quoted statement would suggest that there 
is no conflict between faith and reason, since there is no 
conflict between law and love. Thus the harmonious rela-
tion of faith and reason is seen. 
Not for long is this harmonious relationship maintained 
by Kierkegaard. In the second view, Kierkegaard stressed 
the tensional opposition of faith and reason. That is, 
there is a faith which excludes all reason. In one instance, 
"Faith is the bighe•t passion in the sphere of human sub-
jeetivity."2 In another instance, the object of faith is 
the absurd, or faith is the paradox, contradiction, risk, 
and an irrational leap. Kierkegaard said in Fear .and 
Tremblili$: 
1. 
The dialectic of faith is the finest and most 
remarkable of all; it possesses an elevation, of 
which indeed I can for.m a conception, but nothing 
more. I am able to make from the springboard the 
great leap whereby I pass into infinity.3 
s. Kierkegaard, Works .ot Lovj_, trans. D. F. Swenson and 
L. Swenson {Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1946), P• 86. 
Kierkegaard, Concluding .Unscientitic Postscript, p. 118. 
Klerkegaard, Fear and Tremblie&, P• 49. 
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Again, in describing the tension of faith versus rea-
son, Kierkegaard wrote: 
While the understanding despairs, faith 
presses on to victory in the passion of its in-
wardriess. But when the believer uses all his 
understanding, every last desperate resource of 
thought, merely to discover the difficulty that 
the paradox presents, then there is indeed no 
part of his understanding left with which to 
explain the paradox--but for all that, there 
may still be a rich faith-content in the passion 
of his inwardness. Sitting quietly in a ship 
while the weather is calm is not a picture of 
faith; but when the ship has sprung a leak, en-
thusiastically to keep the ship afloat by pump-
ing while yet not seeking the harbor: this is 
the picture. And if the picture involves an 
impossibility in the long run, that is but the 
imperfection of the picture; faith persists. 
While the understanding, like a despairing pas-
senger, stretches out its arms toward the shore, 
but in vain, faith works with all its energy in 
the depths of the soul: glad and victorious it 
saves the soul against the understanding.l 
Kierkegaard added in this view that faith is opposed to 
reason, as well as the implication that faith is victorious 
over reason. 
Finally, Kierkegaard 1 s third view agrees with Hegel 
that faith rests upon reason.2 Hegel had held faith is 
reasonable; therefore, knowledge is possible.3 At this 
very point, Kierkegaard does not deny the importance of 
reason or underestimate its value. He stated in Works of 
1. 
2. 
). 
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
pp.201-202n. 
Ibid., P• 201. 
This view is Brightman's interpretation of Hegel in A 
Philosophy of Ideals (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1928), p. 24. 
Love: 
Truly it is not knowledge that deriles a 
man, tar from it; knowledge is like sheer trans-
parency, precisely then the most perfect and 
clear: just as the most perfect water is taste-
less.l 
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Kierkegaard means here that knowledge is a neutral factor, 
which may be used by man to comprehend the perfect and good. 
The same view is expressed in predominantly Hegelian phrase-
ology in Fear .and .Trembli4g: 
Faith is precisely 'this paradox, that the 
individual as the particular is higher than the 
universal, is justified over against it, is not 
subordinate but superior--yet in such a way, be 
it observed, that it is the particular individual 
who, after · he has been subordinated as the partic-
ular to the universal, now through the universal 
becomes the individual •••• And yet faith is this 
paradox--or else (these are the logical ded~~t1ons 
which I would2beg the reader to have in mente at every point) • -
At this point, faith seems to rest upon dialectical move-
ment and reason. Jolivet writes with reason of Kierkegaard: 
A Hegelian in spite of himsel~, the victim 
·of reason which was madly ambitious, an impen-
itent rationalist even in his defense of the 
'movement of the absurd,' he paid a heavy price 
for his speculative follies. With such conrlict-
ing themes he not only wrote heart-rending music, 
but rent his own heart.3 
Summarily, what are the issues at stake here for the 
Kierkegaard-Hegel relationship? Although Hegel gave a gen-
e~~l _ in~erpretation of Augustine's philosophy defining it 
1. 
2. 
Kie~kegaard, Works .of .Love, p. 188. 
Kierkegaard, Fear and TrembllAS1 P• 82. 
Regis Jolivet, tntroduction .to Kierke~aard, trans. by 
w. H. Barber (London: Muller Ltd., 19 0), p. 223. 
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as an attitude rather than a system, Kierkegaard interpreted 
Augustine's philosophy as a system, representing the genuine 
Christian position. In this context, Kierkegaard identified 
his position in many respects with his Augustinian interpre-
tation. But, in all of this, Augustianism and Hegelianism 
remain unreconciled in Kierkegaardts view. Specifically 
this fact appears evident in Kierkegaard's inconsistent deal-
ing with the problem of faith and reason. 
2. Aquinas 
Neither Hegel, nor Kierkegaard had a direct affinity 
with the philosophy of the Middle Ages. In both thinkers, 
knowledge of this period was gained through the reading of 
secondary sources concerning Scholastic authors. In Hegel's 
Geschichte der Philosophie, Aquinas was briefly mentioned, 
however, as the systematist of the period.l Hegel noticed 
that Aquinas' summa theologiae made theology widely philo-
sophic and systematic. But Kierkegaard's main works do not 
contain a single mention or Aquinas. However, it can be 
suggested in passing that Aquinas•, Hegel's, and Kierke-
gaard•s philosophies share in common a united admiration 
for Aristotle's approach to philosophy, in spite of many 
differences among the three thinkers. 
1. Hegel, op. cit., III, 71. 
3. Scotus 
Another important philosopher of' the .M:Iddle Ages re-
sponsible f'or developing philosophic theology, according 
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to Hegel, was Duns Scotus. "He wrote commentaries on the 
Magister sententiarum, which procured for him the fame of a 
very keen thinker. 111 In Hegel's eyes, Scotus helped the 
scholastic method of' disputation to reach its height by 
arranging materlals of' arguments and counter-arguments into 
syllogisms. Scotus, Hegel insists, was the originator of' 
the quodlibetan method, whiCh means the 
collection of'miscellaneous dissertations on 
individual objects in every-day manner of dis-
putation, which speaks of everything, but with-
out systematic order and without any 2onsistent 
whole being worked out and set forth. 
Hegel's treatment suggests also that Scotus• exceedingly 
barbarous style is well suited f'or exact philosophic ex-
pression. 
Even as Kierkegaard failed to include an interpretation 
of' Aquinas in his main works, also he omitted an interpreta-
tion of' Scotus. However, there are many aff'inities between 
Scotus and Kierkegaard. The existential m ture of be :1ng is 
tully stressed by the f'or.mer.3 Like Kierkegaard, Scotus 
1. Hegel, op. cit., III, 73. 
2. Ibid. 
3. E. Gilson, God and Pbiaosopby (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1948), P• 69. 
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held to the distrust of reason. A particular instance of 
this tact is found in Scotus• distrust of philosophy, which 
led h~ to put theology out of the reach or philosophic es-
sences. Scotus l~ited theology to the area of supernatural 
revel at ion. Thus God is unknowable to reason unaided by 
faith. 
Furthermore, Seotus emphasized existence within his 
theory of nominalism. Nominalism, for Scotus, was the in-
sistence that the universal has no priority over the indi-
viduals who embody it, but it is created along with them. 
Specifically, "The essence and its existence in creatures 
are to each other as a quiddity to its mode. 111 The implica-
tions of Scotus' view are: First, individual existence is 
necessary for the expression of essence. Secondly, the in-
dividual existence is a contraction of essence. Along with 
Scotus, Kierkegaard insisted that reality is the individ-
ualized. Kierkegaard•s critique of Hegel•s stress upon 
essences and abstract universals illustrates this point. 
Hegel's error, as Kierkegaard saw it, was the conceptualiza-
tion of' the dynamic principle of' reality into logical proc-
esses. Thus, for Kierkegaard, "The concept existence is an 
ideality and the difficulty is, of course, whether existence 
can be reduced to a concept. n2 Going beyond Scotus, Kierke-
1. Gilson, op. cit., p. 69. 
2. Kierkegaard, Journals, P• 358. 
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gaard rejected the contention that the individual's exist-
ence can be reduced to a contraction af essence. Kierke-
gaard• s nominalism is personal which means that existence 
is not reducible from a contraction of an essence, or a 
concept. 
To restate briefly, two comments can be made on this 
area of the argument. First, Hegel considered Scotus a 
keen thinker in the for.mal development of philosophic theol-
ogy and the quodlibetan method. Secondly, though Kierke-
gaard omitted an interpretation of Scotus in his main works, 
it is important to note a main affinity between the two 
thinkers. With Scotus, Kierkegaard would add that reality 
is the individualized in opposition to Hegel•s thinking on 
the Universal. Kierkegaard would deny, however, Scotus• 
contention that existence can be reduced to a o:>ntraction 
of an essence. 
4. Luther 
Luther, for Hegel, upheld the subjective factor of 
Christian existence, whereby existence became the inner 
appropriation of each believer in the certitude of faith. 
Hegel said in the Geschichte der Philosophie: 
This, then, is the Lutheran faith, in accord-
ance with which man stands in a relation to God 
which involves his personal existence: that is, 
his piety and the hope of his salvation and the 
like all damand that his heart, his subjectivity, 
should be present in them. His reelings, his 
raith, the inmost certainty or htmselr, in short, 
all that belongs to him is laid claim to, and 
this alone can truly cane under consideration: 
man must himselr repent from his heart and ex-
perience contrition; his own heart must be filled 
with the Holy Ghost. Thus here the principle of 
subjectivity, or pure relation to me personally, 
i. e. freedom, is recognized •••• The highest 
confirmation of the principle is that it alone 
has value in the eyes or God, that faith and the 
subjection of the individual heart are alone es-
sential: in this way this principle of Christian 
freedom is firit presented and brought to a true 
consciousness. 
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The influence of Luther is noted throughout Hegel's works. 
Continuously, Hegel insisted that in Luther's principle of 
inner certitude, there is in the believing soul the fUsion 
of subjective thought and the Absolute Being in freedom. 
Some additional insights of Hegel's view of Luther 
are: "It is only in communion and faith that I stand in 
relation to God."2 Thus: 
The distinction between the laity and the 
priests is by it removed; there are no longer 
any laymen, for in religion each by himself is 
enjoined to know personally what it is. Respon-
sibility is not to be avoided ; good works with-
out spiritual reality in tha~ are no longer of 
avail; there must be the heart which relates 
itself directly to God without mediation3 with-out t he Virgin, and wi ihout t he Saints. 11 
Luther , Hegel is insisting, believed that in communion and 
faith the heart ca n stand in a direct relation to God. In 
l. Hegel, qp. cit ., III, 149. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 150. 
this relation, the individual is free of all externalities 
and "estrangement of self.nl 
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Like Hegel, Kierkegaard sought to justify Luther's pas-
sionate, inner certitude of existence. Kierkegaard wrote, 
"Take away from the Christian determinations the factor of 
personal appropriation, and what becomes of Luther's merit? 112 
Further Kierkegaard held that the papacy had objectivity 
enough, but it lacked Luther's principle of the self-
appropriation, which was inwardness.3 But, in principle, 
Kierkegaardts interpretation is already contained in Hegel. 
In both Hegel's and Kierkegaard•s views of Luther, the af-
fir.mation of a subjective sentiment, or inwardness is domi-
nant. Hegel wrote: 
What Luther began in the heart only and in 
the feelings--the freedom of spirit which, un-
conscious of its simple root, does not compre-
hend itself, and yet is the very universal it-
self, for which all content disappears4in the thought that fills itself with itself. 
"What Luther began in the heart only and in the feeling" 
becomes, in Hegel's thinking, the view that God is fundamen-
tally only in subjective thought. This Hegelian interpreta-
tion of Luther becomes for Kierkegaard, "God is subject, and 
1. Ibid. 
2. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 327. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Hegel, op. cit., III, 38$ ..• 
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there exists only for subjectivity in inwardness."1 Or, as 
Kierkegaard wrote in the Journals: 
God only exists for an existing man, i.e. 
he can only exist in faith •••• When an exist-
ing individual has:not got faith God is not, 
neither does God exist, although understood 
from a~ eternal point of view God is eter-
nally. 
Kierkegaard is agreeing here with Hegel's Lutheran principle 
that the relation in which man stands with God involves his 
personal existence. 
The implications of Hegel's and Kierkegaard's accounts 
of Luther are: Hegel saw in the Lutheran principle of inner 
certitude this essential point; that in the eyes of God, 
faith and inwardness are alone essential. Christian freedom, 
Hegel insists, is the result of the awareness of the Lutheran 
insight of inwardness between man and God. Kierkegaard 
agrees with Hegel's view of Luther. In Hegel's account it 
is not difficult to see the germ of what was afterwards to 
develop into the main thesis of Kierkegaard that the God-
relationship of inwardness constitutes what personal existence 
is. 
E. Kant ian and Pre-Kant ian philosophy 
l. Descartes 
In .Hegel's thinking, Descartes was a bold spirit who 
l. Kierkegaard, 
. . 
cit., 178 • 0]2. P• 
2. Kierkegaard, Journals, p. 173. 
reformulated afresh the groundwork on whiCh philosophy is 
based.1 As a matter of fact, Hegel was quick to point out 
that Descartes started from original lines. For the spirit 
of his philosophy is clearly that knowledge is the unity of 
tbougpt and being. According to Hegel, Descartes maintain-
ed this point of view in his saying, nwe must doubt every-
thing."2 Descartes denied all hypotheses which were ac-
cepted as true in their immediacy, and began with thought 
alone.3 Hegel maintained that this was an Absolute begin-
ning, insofar. as Descartes began with thought alone. More-
over, Hegel insisted that Descartes• philosophy was no 
scepticism. Scepticism has no aim and doubts itself. But 
Descartes used doubt productively. The doubting of Descar-
tes led to something fixed and objective.4 Hegel asserted: 
But to Descartes nothing is true which does 
not possess an inward evidence in conscious-
ness, or which reason does not recognize so 
clearly and conclusively that a~ doubt regard-
ing it is absolutely impossible. 
Both Hegel and Kierkegaard recognized that Descartes• 
doubt was productive. Kierkegaard acknowledged that Descar-
1. Hegel, o;e. cit., III, 220. 
2. Ibid., III, 223. 
3. Ibid.' III 224. 
4· Ibid., III, 225. 
5. Ibid.' III, 227. 
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tes had the capacity to doubt, and yet he remained faithrul 
throughout his ordeal. Kierkegaard stated in Fear and Trem-
bling: 
Every speculative price-fixer who conscious-
ly directs attention to the significant march 
of modern philosophy, every Privatdocent, ·· tutor, 
and student, every crofter and cottar in phil-
osophy, is not content with doubting everything 
but goes further ••• Descartes, a venerable, 
humble and honest thinker, whose writings surely 
no one can read without the deepest emotion, did 
what he said and said what he did. Alas, alack; 
that is a great rarity in our times. Descartes, 
as repeatedly affirmed did not doubt · in matt-ers 
of faith ••• He did not cry, 1Firel' nor did he · 
make it a duty for every one to doubt; for Des-
cartes was a quiet and solitary thinker, not a 
bellowing night-~ratchman, he modestly admitted 
that his method had importance for him alone · 
and was justified in part .by the bungled knowl-
edge of his earlier years.l 
In the above passage, Kierkegaard confessed his admiration 
for Descartes, since the latter "did not doubt in matters 
of faith." 
Kierkegaard was later, however, te> find many discrepan-
cies in Descartes' position. Among other things he criti-
cized Descartes' idea of consciousness, and placed it side 
by side with the Hegelian mentality of his day. Kierkegaard 
pointed out: 
Descartes' proposition: · ·I think therefore I 
am, is logically speaking a play upon words be- _ 
cause 'I am' means logicall2 nothing else but 1 I 
am thinking, ' or 'I think. • 
1. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling1 ; pp. 3-4. 
2. Kierkegaard, Journals, p.131. 
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In a further negative emphasis, Kierkegaard admitted that 
from philosophical thinkers, like Hegel and Descartes, phil-
osophy has "required a long historical tail, ttl which means a 
curious long-windedness, in the formulation of a phil-
osophical system, and the added belief that doubt is the 
first necessity of thought. The weakness of Descartes and 
Hegel, Kierkegaard claimed is the failure to see that 
doubt has to be chosen, which is a personal act of freedom, 
rather than a principle of logical necessity. The true 
poi nt of finding the Absolute, as Kierkegaard viewed it, is 
not in doubt, but in the choosing of despair. Kierkegaard 
said: 
When one has willed despair, one has truly 
chosen that which despair chooses, i.e., one-
self in one's eternal validity ••• for I never 
despair by necessity but by freedom, and only 
thereby does one win the absolute.2 
A comparison of Hegel's and Kierkegaard's versions of 
Descartes reveals the following important point. Hegel con-
tends that Descartes' main thesis is that knowledge is the 
unity of thought and being. By beginning with thought only, 
as Hegel insists, Descartes made an absolute beginning. 
Hegel suggests further that Descartes' position was not scep-
ticism, since he used his doubt productively to lead to 
something fixed. Kierkegaard agrees with Hegel's opinion 
1. Ibid., P• 33. 
2. Kierkegaard, Either/Or, II, trans. by Walter Lowrie 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), 179. 
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that Descartes' doubt was pr oductive, since the latter had 
not only the capacity to doubt, but he retained his faith 
through this ordeal. However, in his total view of Descar-
tes, Kierkegaard saw many errors that were to him similar 
to the weaknesses of Hegel's abstract philosopbJ. 
2. Pascal 
Although Hegel made only a single mention of Pascal in 
the Geschichte der Philosophie, 1 historically considered, 
Pascal's reaction to Descartes is parallel to Kierkegaardts 
protest against Hegel. On one side of the parallel, Hegel 
was the logical fulfilment of Descartes' philosophy. Des-
cartes emphasized the necessity of starting with thought as 
the only certainty, and Hegel carried this view to its logi-
cal conclusion to the extent that logic was synonomous with 
metaphysics. 
Pascal and Kierkegaard represented the reverse side of 
this parallel. Both thinkers opposed the above mentioned 
position in similar ter.ms. Against the coherent and system-
atic tendency of modern philosophy, Pascal and Kierkegaard 
aff rmed the contradict ions of life. Pascal defined the 
pro~ound dichotomy of modern man caught within the cosmo-
logical anxiety involved in the universe of Newtonian physics. 
Pascal said in one of the Pens~es: 
1. Hegel, op. cit., I, 73. 
What is man in natural A cipher in relation 
to infinity, everything in relation to nothing ••• 
equally incapable of seeing the nothingness from 
which he bas sprung and the infinity in which he 
is engulfed.! 
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As the quotation suggests, Pascal revealed the dichotomy of 
modern man within the spatial and temporal infinities of the 
physical universe. But this outer condition of existence is 
at the same time analogous to man's inner condition. Even 
as there is lack of harmony between man and nature, so man 
is morally divided. He is suspended between human great-
ness and misery. Whereas Pascal illustrated mathematically 
the frightful contingency of man's life in terms of the in-
finite great and small, Kierkegaard described the dread at 
the core of human experience in terms of guilt, sin, ten-
sion, and the finitude of existence. 
Then, too, within the philosophies of the two thinkers, 
there is a similar stress upon the subjectivity of truth. 
Pa.scal spoke of knowing the truth by inward experience, or 
by the feeling of the heart. "We know truth, not only by 
reason, but also by the heart; it is in this latter way that 
we know first principies."2 This view is akin to Kierkegaard's 
insistence upon the subjectivity of tr1,1th and taking the risk 
of _faith. This latter term. has an affinity with Pascal's 
1. B. Pascal, Pens~es, trans. by w. F. Trotter (New York: 
Random House Inc., 1941), P• 72. 
2. Ibid., P• 282. 
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famous argument of the wager, which emphasizes the necessity 
of taking a chance and believing that God exists in spite of 
reasons to the contrary. In all of this, Pascal and Kierke-
gaard were opposing the current of intellectualism as found 
in Descartes' and Hegel's position. 
With Kierkegaard, Pascal stressed the inner crisis of 
human existence, while differing in one important respect 
from the former in his e~al emphasis upon the finite's 
mathematical relationship to the world of nature. In this 
latter regard, Pascal's mathamatical emphasis is closer to 
the systematic view of Hegel. Kierkegaard, unlike Pascal 
and Hegel, asserted the existence of man•s inner life at the 
expense of his relationship to the external world. 
The issues involved in this area of the argument are: 
Kierkegaard•s relationship to Hegel is comparable with Pas-
cal's to Descartes. Pascal's reaction against the system of 
Descartes was sfmilar to Kierkegaard•s rebellion against 
Hegelian idealism. As Hegel's philosophy is considered the 
logical outcome of Descartes' view that thought and being 
are one, even so Kierkegaard•s position is a logical outcome 
of Pascal's position concerning the problem of faith and rea-
son, and the crisis of human existence. However, Pascal's 
philosophy from one perspective can be seen as more compre-
hensive than Kierkegaard•s, since the former sought to ac-
count for the cosmological crisis of existence, as well as 
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the human crisis of existence. Kierkegaard emphasized human 
exi stence at the expense of cosmological existence. There-
fore, he has a view of the nature of individual existence, 
but there is a lack of a theory concerning the being of 
thi ngs. 
3. Hume 
In Hegel's interpretation of Hume, the latter is treat-
ed as starting directly from the philosophic position of 
Locke on experience. Hume's philosophy has the idealism 
of Berkeley as its object. While Berkeley allowed all ideas 
to hold good as they are,l Hume defined more concisely the 
antithesis of the sensuous and the universal. Hegel wrote, 
"Berkeley does not make any distinction as to whether in his 
sensations there is a necessary connection or not. "2 Not so 
in Hume, as Hegel said: 
All perceptions of the mind may be divided 
into two classes or species, that of impressions, 
i.e., sensuous perceptions, and thoughts or 
ideas; the latter are similar in content to 
the former, but less forcible and lively.3 
1. Hegel, op. cit., III, 370. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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From here, Begel went further to consider what for Hume 
was included under experience. Accordingly, there are cat-
egories of the understanding, and of universal necessity. 
At this point, Hegel considers Hume's category of cause and 
effect: 
The simple thought we have here is exactly 
what Locke says, that we must receive the concep-
tion of ca.use and effect, and thus of a necessary 
connection, .from experience; but experience, as 
sensuous perception, contains no necessity, has 
no causal connection. For in what we term such, 
that which we properly speaking perceive is mere-
ly the fact that something first of all happ ens 
and that then something else follows. Immediate 
perception relates only to a content of conditions 
or things which are present alongside of and in 
succession to one another, but not to what we call 
cause and effect; in time-succession there is thus 
no relation of cause and effect, and consequently 
no necessity either •••• Necessity is thus not justi-
fie d by experience, but we carry it into experience; 
it is accidentally arrived at by us and is subjec-
tive merely, This kind of universality which we 
connect with necessity, Hume calls custom. Be ca. use 
we h ave often seen results to follow we are accus-
tomed to regard the connection as a necessary one; 
the necessity to him is thus a quite contingent 
association of ideas, which is custom.l 
Hegel means, as the passa g e indicates, that Hume's cau-
sality was subjec t ive and based upon custom. Hume denied 
the existence of any necessary first cause, and undermined 
the c apacity of reason. The relationship between cause and 
effect is not discovered by reason, but by experience. Al-
though Hegel recognized Hume 1 s position to be an important 
1. Hegel, op cit., III, 371-372. 
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and acute observation or the relation between experience 
and knowledge, yet he insisted that it led to metaphysical 
scepticism. Hegel wrote: 
But where a universality is found, it does 
not rest in the matter in itself, but is simply 
a subjective necessity which is really mere cus-
tom. Hence the result which Hume arrives at 
is necessarily astonishment regarding the con-
dition of human knowledge, a general state of 
mistrust, and a sceptical indecision--which 
indeed does not amount to much.l . 
Finally, Hegel was critical of Hume's treatment of rea-
son and instinct. As Hegel saw it, the antagonism between 
the two was overdrawn as a result of leaning too heavily in 
the direction of instinct. For Hume, in Hegel's thought, 
reason had no criterion whereby the antagonism between it-
self and desires may be settled.2 Consequently, everything 
appeared in the form of an irrational existence devoid of 
t hought; even the true and right were not in thought, but 
in the for.m of an instinct, a desire.3 
Although Kierkegaard was closely in touch with the clas-
sic tradition in philosophy, in the list of authors quoted by 
him in the Journals, the name of Hume was not mentioned. How-
ever, Lowrie has suggested that the decisive influence bring-
ing about a change in Kierkegaard from a depressed to a 
1. Ibid., III, 374. 
2. Ibid., III, 375. 
3. 112!.Q_. 
religious attit ud e is the reading of Hamann's comment on 
Hume' s Essay on Hiracles. Lowrie says: 
So that upon the whole we may conclude, that 
the Christi an religion not only was at first at-
tended with miracles, but even to this day can-
not be believed by any reasonable person without 
them. Mere reason is not sufficient to convinca 
us of its assent to it, is conscious of a contin-
ued miracle in his own person, which subverts all 
the princi ples of his understanding , and gives 
him a determination to believe what is most con-
trary to custom and experience.l 
According to Lowrie, Kierkegaard would agree with Hume's 
sta tement that a person might believe what n-subverts all 
the principles of his understanding.n 
It is essential to note that an important argument 
of Kierkegaard's Fragments is similar to the position of 
Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature. Both Hume and Ki erke-
gaa rd denied tha t factual existence can be demonstrated, 
and that genuine knowledge is possible by rational proof. 
In Hume 1 s thinking, facts are not deducible, because there 
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is no necessary connection between the facts. Hume's state-
ment is: 
There is no object, which implies the exist-
ence of any other if we consider these objects 
in themselves, and never look beyond the idea 
which we form of them.2 
Hume is convinced that each fact is independent and atomic. 
1. W. Lowrie, Kierkegaard (Oxford University Press, 1938) 
PP • 165-167. 
2. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1949), pp. 86-87. 
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Turning to Kierkegaard, on this matter, perhaps 
there is a similar type of denial that a sufficient reason 
can be given for the facts. His Philosophical Fragments is 
intended to propose a new basis, faith, for accepting a 
fact, rather than a logical, rational ground. If God has 
existed in history, as Kierkegaard insists, then no rational 
proof by demonstration can be given of this fact. 
Whoever therefore attempts to demonstrate the 
existence of God (except . in the sense of clarifying 
the concept, and without the reservatio finalis 
noted above, that the existence emerges from the 
demonstrat i on by a leap} proves in lieu thereof 
something else. 
Kierkegaard is indicating, as Hume, that there is no suf-
ficient reason for factual existence.2 
Hegel's and Kierkegaard 1 s views of Hume may be summa.-
r i zed as follows: Hegel held that Hume 1 s philosophy began 
with Locke's empiricism, yet Hume's position went beyond 
both Locke and Berkeley, since Hume defined more concisely 
the antithesis of the sensuous and the universal. Though 
convinced that Hume 1 s view is a necessary observation of 
the relation between experience and knowledge, Hegel added 
that it led to metaphysical skepticism, which was a state 
of metaphysical distrust. Hegel is critical of Hume 1 s 
treatment of reason and instinct, since the latter ends 
with the primacy of instinct and a form of irrational exist-
1. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 34. 
2. Ibid., pp. 32-33n. 
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ence devoid of thought. Kierkegaard's major works do not 
contain a single reference to Hume, but one of his biogra-
phers, Lowrie, has held that a decisive influence bringing 
about a change in Kierkegaard was Hume' s argument that be-
lief is irrational. It was at this very point that Hegel's 
view was critical of Hume, but the irrational element is the 
link of K1erkegaard 1 s agreement with the British thinker. 
In this particular regard, Kierkegaard was maintaining a 
· position that was in opposition to Hegel's rationalism. 
Kierkegaard saw Hegel's philosophy as metaphysically remote 
and abstract. However, the evidence in the case indicates 
that Kierkegaard, like most of Hegel's critics, errs in the 
failure to see that Hegel could be considered the first 
outstanding empiricist; that is, a dialectical empiricist, 
in opposition to Hume, a mechanistic empiricist. This view 
will be discussed fully in a later chapter. 
4• Kant 
Hegel was of the opinion that critical philosophy took 
its name from the fundamental Kantian thesis that thought 
can and must investigate how far it has the capacity of 
knowing, and in this way become critical of itself. 
Whereas critical philosophy assumes that experience 
is the only foundation for cognition, it goes beyond the 
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empirical view by insisting that universality and necessity 
are equally as essential to the particular datum in consti-
tuting experience. In this latter regard, Hegel interpreted 
t he critical philosophy of Kant as having two fundamental 
points of merit. First, it emphasized the independence of 
reason. Secondly, it insisted that the categories of the 
understanding are finite. Hegel wrote: 
Now, according to Kant, Reason is not cap-
able of procuring reality for its Ideas--other-
wise it would be transcendent, its .. limits would 
be overstepped; it produces only paralogiims, 
antinomies, and an ideal without reality. 
A paralogism means, in Hegel• s thinking of Kant, a "syllo-
gism false in its form. 112 
But Kant's basic weakness, according to Hegel, was the 
affirmation that the false or inadequate in knowledge was 
solely because or the limitation of our mental faculties. 
Hegel said: 
Kant shows here too much tenderness for 
things: it would be a pity, he thinks, if they 
contradicted themselves. But that mind, which 
is far higher, should be a contradiction--that 
is not a pity at all. The contradiction is 
therefore by no means solved by Kant; and since 
mind takes it upon itself, and contradiction is 
self-destructive, wind is in itself all derange-
ment and disorder.j 
1. Ibid., 446. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 451. 
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Kant, as Hegel insists, showed that the soUrce of contradic-
tion was the human mind. Hegel sou gpt to go a step beyond 
Kant by insisting that all the antinomies and paradoxes of 
thought can be aufgehoben by the speculative reason as it 
rises to higher and higher manifestation of the Absolute 
Geist. 
Moreover, Hegel was critical of Kant's distinction be-
tween conception and existence. Kant sought to discredit 
the ontological proof for this existence of God by maintain-
ing that nthere is no transition from the Notion to Being. nl 
Kantrs criticism is that it is impossible to go from the 
thought in the mind to the actual existence of the object 
of that thought outside the mind. He illustrated th:!Js tamous 
distinction by showing that a hundred imaginary dollars in 
my mind is not a hundred actual dollars in my pocket. He-
gel said of Kant, "Existence remains for him something 
absolutely different from a Notion."2 Hegel's criticism of 
Kant places the argument in a very different perspective. 
According to Hegel, Kant did not comprehend the synthesis 
of conception and existence in the Absolute. A hundred 
imaginary dollars are subjective, while a hundred actual 
dollars are objective. "Every action," Hegel wrote, "aims 
at setting aside a subjective conception and making it into 
1. Ibid.' 452. 
2. Ibid.' 452. 
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something objective. nl Specifically, "What is merely imag-
inary is untrue; the hundred imaginary dollars are and re-
main im.aginary."2 Hegel stated with great force: 
One possesses a hundred dollars, when they 
are real only; if a man has therefore so great 
a desire to possess a hundred dollars, be must 
put his hand to work in order to obtain them: 
i.e. he must not came to a standstill at the 
imagination or them, but pass out beyond it. 
This subjective side is not the ultimate or 
the absolute; the true is that which is not 
merely subjective. If I possess a hundred 
dollars, I have them actually, and at the same 
time I form a conception of them to myself.) 
In a s~ilar vein, Hegel remarked in his attack upon Kant: 
There is no man so foolish as that philos-
ophy; when a man feels hungry, he does not 
call upon the imagination of1,food, but sets 
about satisfying his hunger.~ . 
In the foregoing statements, Hegel is implying that the ne-
cessity of thought is that it does not remain subjectively 
in the imagination only, but actually lays hold of the 
object in existence. 
Because Kantts distinction leaves a deadlock at the 
difference between a hundred actual dollars and a hundred 
imaginary dollars, Hegel recognized that dualism is ultimate 
in this view.5 "Each side has independent validity as an 
1. Ibid.' 453. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 454. 
5. Ibid., 453. 
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absolute. 111 Hegel maintained that dualism may hold true in 
the philosophy of finitude. 2 But of the idea of God, the 
concept and being are one and the same. In the idea of God, 
tbe opposition between conception and existence does away 
with itself "absolutely and ent i rely. 113 
Basically, Kierkegaard was in disagreement with Hegel's 
interpretation of Kant. Instead of Hegel's critical treat-
ment of Kant, Kierkegaard saw Kant following the '~honest 
path." He stated in the Journals: 
Philosophy has become fantastic, particular-
ly since it abandoned Kant's 'honest• paths, and 
gave the well-known (honest) 100 Rd. in order to 
become theocentric. Note: the '100 Rd.' is the 
well-known Kantian example4or the difference be-tween thought and reality. 
Kierkegaard is criticizing Hegelian and Post-Cartesian phil-
osophy far fail~ng to discriminate conceptual existence and 
empirical existence. Concretely Kierkegaard said: 
What confUses the whole doctrine about 
•being' in logic is that people do not notice 
that they are always operating with the 'con-
cept• existence. But the concept existence 
is an ideality and the difficulty is, of course, 
whether existence can be reduced to a concept. 
So that Spinoza may be right: essentia involvit 
existentiam, namely conceptual existence, i.e. 
faeal existence. But from another point of 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., 454. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Kierkegaard, Journals, p. 330. 
view Kant is right that with 'existence no new 
measurement is added to the concept.• Kant is 
evidently thinking honestly of existence as ir-
reducible to a concept, empirical existence. In 
ideal relationships it is always true that essen-
tia is existentia--if one may use the concept ex-
istentia at all in that case.l --
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Insofar as Kierkegaard divorced existence from essence, 
he agreed with Kant's distinction of thought from reality, 
while he attacked Hegel's position. Post-Cartesian ration-
alism and Hegelian idealism committed the fallacy of assum-
ing a mere conceptual existence. This misconception led to 
the confusion that pure thought could reach being, but the 
consequences were only "being in thought." Thus, Hegel ab-
sorbed existence into a concept. In using his interpreta-
tion of Kant in opposition to Hegel, Kierkegaard claimed 
to be walking, to use his phrase, ''Kant's honest paths," 
which involved the separation of conception and being. 
But neither Kant nor Kierkegaard escapes the logical 
pitfall of metaphysical skepticism. Kant's thought is fun-
damentally skeptical. In the Kritik der Reinen Vernunrt, 
he conceives the noumenal realm, which thought cannot em-
brace. With Kant, Kierkegaard arrives at a metaphysical 
skepticism. Kierkegaard 1 s skepticism is situated in his 
over zealous attack upon Hegel's identification of thought 
with being. If it is impossible for thought to know the 
1. Ibid., PP• 357-358. 
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real, as Kierkegaard insists, then metaphysical skepticism 
is the only logical outcome of his position. A basic state-
ment of Clowney is ~portant at this point: 
When system is given up, when it is admit-
ted that the union of the irrational and the 
real cannot be expressed, but must be •existed,• 
a man has, strictly speaking, no right . to talk 
about it but only to exist it. Skepticism, in 
other words, if it is to be consistent, must 
not only shun •paragraphs' but also sentences.1 
As to their teachings on Kant, Hegel's and Kierkegaard•s 
positions may be understood as follows: Hegel considers two 
important points of Kant•s philosophy. First, it stresses 
the independence of reason. Secondly, it considers the 
categories or understanding as finite. Hegelts basic criti-
cism or Kant is his failure to see that reason can overcame 
all contradictions in a higher Begriff. Kierkegaard recog-
nizes Kant to be the modern thinker, who followed the "hon-
est paths" in opposition to Hegel. In Kant•s distinction 
between one hundred dollars in my pocket and one hundred 
imaginary ~ollars in my mind, Kierkegaard adds that this is 
the difference between empirical existence and conceptual 
existence. The former contains reality, the latter is only 
a "being-in-thought" existence. Although all of Post-
1. E. P. Clowney, "A Critical Estimate of Kierkegaard•s 
Notion of the Individual," Westminister Theological 
Journal 5 (1942), 58. 
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Cartesian philosophy, with the exception of Kant, had missed 
the distinction of thought and being, Kierkegaard added that 
Hegel was the chief representative of the error of abstract 
being in thought. 
F. An evaluation and summa.cy 
Hegel•s many-sided philosophy casts its spell on those 
who move toward the right or left • . Particularly, this seems 
to be true in the foregoing discussion of Hegel•s and Kier-
kegaard•s views of their philosophical predecessors. Kier-
kegaard•s interpretation contains the positive impact of 
Hegelianism as well as the divergent trends. Though Kier-
kegaard went so far towards · the Hegelian view, there is~ 
however, a marked point of departure or the former from 
the latter. But the coincidences between the thinkings 
or the two philosophers are often too striking to be passed 
up as mere independent similarities in thought and aim, 
especially since Kierkegaard differs rundamentally with 
the classical tradition only where he overlooks his Hege-
lian insights. 
The important points of this chapter may be stated as 
follows: 
1. Kierkegaard agrees with Hegel that Socrates is the 
embodiment or the negative principle in philosophy. 
Kierkegaard•s contrast with Hegel's view or Soc-
rates is supplied by the former seeing Socrates 
as an instrument of the deity. Thus Kierkegaard 
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is motivated to seek a view of Socrates in accord-
ance with a religious category. 
2. Kierkegaard opposed with Hegel the traditional in-
terpretation of Plato as patron saint of enthusiasm; 
both were convinced that Plato was mainly a specula-
tive thinker. But what for Hegel was a positive 
evaluation of Plato•s speculative merits, Kierke-
gaard inverts so that Plato represents the imper-
sonal and objective standpoint of speculation sim-
ilar to Hegel's abstract view. 
3. Hegel and Kierkegaard broke away from the tradition-
al interpretation of Aristotle, since the tradition-
al tendency stressed the empirical and realistic 
areas of his thought. Hegel and Kierkegaard empha-
sized equally the idealistic and empirical sides, 
even though Kierkegaard saw in Aristotle's view a 
place for individuality, which Hegel's system 
lacked. 
4. For Hegel, Augustine•s philosophy is an attitude, 
whereas Kierkegaard analyzes his view as a philo-
sophical system representing the genuine Christian 
position. Kierkegaard agrees in many respects with 
Augustine's position, while holding also to a He-
gelian view. Concretely, this fact appears in 
Kierkegaard's dealing with the problem of faith 
and reason • . 
5. Along vlith Duns Scotus, Kierkegaard asserted that 
reality is the individualized, while objecting to 
Hegel's concern for the concrete universal. But 
Kierkegaard rejected Scotus r contention that indi-
vidual existence can be reduced to a contraction 
of essence. 
6. Aquinas', Hegel's, and Kierkegaard' s philosophies 
share in common their admiration for Aristotle's 
approach to philosophy, in spite of many differ-
ences ~~ong the three thinkers. 
7• In Hegel's version of Lu~~er, it is easy to see the 
link with the famous view of Kierkegaard, which is 
that the God-relationship of inwardness constitutes 
the nature of personal existence. 
8. Kierkegaard agrees with Hegel's position that Des-
cartes' doubt was useful, especially since the lat-
ter had the capacity to doubt and maintain his 
Christian faith. Though giving recognition to Des-
cartes, Kierkegaard was to see many errors in his 
position similar to the weakness of Hegel's ab-
stract philosophy. 
9. Kierkegaard's relationship to Hegel is comparable 
with Pascalls to Descartes. What Kierkegaard re-
acted to in -Hegel, Pascal rebelled against in Des-
cartes. As Hegel's philosophy is the logical out-
come of Descartes' view that thought and being are 
one, even so Kierkegaard's philosophy is analogous 
with Pe.scal' s. Though Pascal is more comprehen-
sive, including a theory of human existence and 
cosmological existence, Kierkegaard maintained the 
former at the expense of the latter. 
10. Hegel is critical of Hume 1 s treatment of reason and 
instinct, for the latter ends with the pr~acy of 
instinct and a for.m of irrational existence devoid 
of thought. The irrational element is the bond that 
ties Kierkegaard's interest to the British thinker. 
11. Kierkegaard recognizes Kant to be the modern think-
er, who followed the "honest paths." In Kant's 
distinction between one hundred dollars in my -pock-
et and one hundred imaginary dollars in my mind, 
Kierkegaard holds that this is the difference be-
tween existence and essence. The one hundred 
dollars in my pocket imply existence, while the 
one hundred imaginary dollars are a being-in-
thought, or essence. Kierkegaard was convinced 
that Hegel's concept or being implies a being-in-
thought, rather than actu~.lly existing. 
CHAPTER II 
KIERKEGAARD t S GENERAL RELATIONS WITH HEGE:LIANIS:M 
A. Preliminary considerations 
In the present chapter, the aim is to present a pre-
liminary comparison of Ki arkegaard • s salient points with 
Hegel's in the areas of methodology, logic, epistemology, 
metaphys~s, ethics, and religion. A selective account of 
Hegel's philosophy is placed side by side with a corres-
ponding Kierkegaardian point of view, so that camnon ideas 
may become clearer, though main differences will be pointed 
out. In the following discussion, a wider base will be 
sought for an explanation of the extent of Hegel's rela-
tion to Kierkegaard. 
B. Philosophical methodology 
The dialectical method is one of the most disti~ish­
ing features of Hegelian philosophy. The term dialectic is 
derived etymologically from the two combined Greek words: 
~ and legein, which together mean discourse. By no means 
was Hegel the first to use the term dialec.tie. He stated 
that dialectic was not his creation. 
Dialectic, it may be added, is no novelty in 
philosophy. Among tba ancients Plato is tanned 
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the inventor of Dialectic; and his right to the 
name rests on the fact, that the Platonic phi-
losophy first gave the free scientific, and thus 
at the same time the objective, form to Dialectic. 
Socrates, as we should expect from the general 
character of his philosophising, has the dialec-
tical element in a predominantly subjective shape, 
that of Irony •••• In modern times it was, more 
than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name 
of Dialectic, and restored it to its post of 
honor.l 
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Here Hegel implied that dialectic had employed many dis-
guises from its usage by Socrates, Plato, and Kant. 
But it was Hegel who first used the term dialectic as 
an inclusive, synoptic method. For a dialectician like 
Hegel, the dialectical method became an attempt to tran-
scend the contradictions in the areas of nature, experience, 
values, and action. Hegel explained his meaning of dialec-
tic as process in the following statement: 
It is of the highest importance to ascertain 
and understand rightly the nature of Dialectic. 
Wherever there is movement, wherever there is 
life, wherever anything is carried into effect 
in the actual world, there Dialectic is at work. 
It is also the so~l of all knowledge which is 
truly scientific. 
Hegel summarized this view clearly in the Philosophie des 
Rechts: 
The concept's moving principle, which alike 
engenders and dissolves the particularizations 
of the universal, I call dialectic, though I · do 
not mean that dialectic which takes an object, 
1. Hegel, The Logic of ;Hegel, trans. by W. Wallace (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1892), p. 148-149. 
2. Ibid. 
proposition, etc., given to feeling or, in 
general to immediate consciousness, and ex-
plains it away, confuses it, pursues it this 
way and that, and has as its sole task the de-
duction of the contrary of that with which it 
starts--a negative type £f dialectic commonly 
appearing even in Plato. 
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Hegel means in the foregoing statement that process is the 
nature of dialectic. Hegel's phrase, "concept's moving 
principle," implies this fact conclusively. 
Hegel analyzed further tl:e nature of dialectic as the 
organic development of reason. 
Moreover, this dialectic is not an activ-
ity of subjective thinking applied to some 
matter externally, but is rather the matter's 
very soul putting forth its branches and 
fruits organically. The development of the 
Idea is the proper activity of its rationality, 
and thinking, as something subjective, merely 
looks on it without for it~ part adding to it 
any ingredient of its own. 
Hegel's usage of such words as "dialectic ••• is ••• the mat-
ter's very soul putting forth its branches and fruit organ-
ically" reveals the organic characteristic of the dialect!-
cal method. It implied for Hegel the principle of identity 
as mediated through difference. Thought and being follow a 
triadic process of development and reconciliation. Since 
reality is found to be organic, the process implied that at 
every point short of the Whole there emerged the opposite 
l. Hegel, Philosophy o~ Right, trans. by T. M. Knox (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 19 2), pp. 34-35. .. 
2. Ibid. 
of the previous stage, .followed by a higher union in the 
next stage. Thesis, antithesis, and synthesis are alike 
the movement o.f thought md being. According to Hegel, 
this triadic process is the three moments o.f "every notion 
and truth whatever. nl 
Having considered Hegel's dialectic, the argument now 
turns to Kierkegaard•s view. In methodological structure 
Kierkegaard' s dialectic is like Hegel's. The Danish phil-
osopher held a dialectic of opposition and reconciliation 
in spite of his emphasizing that the .former was against the 
latter. In his dialectic of opposition K~erkegaard held 
that contraries are not reconciled. Thus the dialectic o.f 
either/or was opposing the both/and method of Hegel•s phil-
osophy. The both/and view of Hegel, in Kierkegaard•s 
thinking, had made dialectic into a necessary movement o.f 
transitions and hierarchical syntheses. Kierkegaard main-
tained that rightly Hegel ha:l comprehended the contradictory 
nature or life which the dialectic reveals. Yet Hegel, as 
Ki erkegaard pointed out, had formulated wrongly a system o.f 
pure thought by using the dialectic as a triadic design to 
overcome contradictions, and to import movement into logic 
under the nSlJle of ne diation. 2 Kierkegaard' s essential 
1. Hegel, The Logic o.f Hegel, p. 143. 
2. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 207. 
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objection is that this usage o~ dialectic by Hegel leads to 
the logical bankruptcy of experience. In Concluding Unscien-
~~ic Postscript, Kierkegaard wrote: 
The scientific movement of thought is from 
lower to higher, and thought is designated as 
the highest stage. In the interpretation of 
the historical process there is similarly a 
movement from lower to higher; the stages of 
imagination and feeling have been le~t behind, 
and thought as the highest stage is also the 
last. Everywhere it is decisively concluded 
that thought is the highest stage of human 
development; philosophy moves farther and 
farther away from contact with primitive ex-
istential impressions, and there is nothing 
left to explore, nothing to experience.l 
In this criticism of Hegel, Kierkegaard appeared to be 
following in the ~ootsteps o~ Trendelenburg's Logische Un 
tersuchungen.2 According to Trendelenburg, the dialectic 
process o~ Hegel had no re~erence whatsoever to experience, 
but took place .in pure thought, considered apart ~rom any-
thing else. In line with this reasoning and dialectic o~ 
opposition, Kierkegaard insisted that Hegel's dialectic of 
logical concepts was a neat ~ormulation o~ logical systems, 
smooth transitions, ~alse movements, and an abstraction 
~rom existence. But genuine dialectic, in Kierkegaard's 
thought, was subjective, which implies the discontinuity 
of living with movements secured by leaps. That is, there 
1. Ibid., P• 307. 
2. Ibid., P• 100. 
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is no logical transition or rational explanation for the 
movement from one stage to another, but the "leap is the 
category of decision."l "For the leap is neither more nor 
less than the most decisive protest possible against the 
inverse procedure of the Method."2 Against Hegel's stress 
upon aufgehoben, Kierkegaard asserted that the dialectic of 
either/or arises out of existence, and does not seek to rec-
oncile two contraries.3 Kierke gaard noted that the real 
conflict between Hegel and himself was in the difference 
between a quantitative and a qualitative dialectic. 
Everythi ng depends upon making the difference 
between quantitative and qualitative" dialectic 
absolute. The whole -of logic is -quantitative or 
modal dialectic, since everything is and every-
thing is one and the same. Qualitative dialectic 
is concerned with existence.4 
Here Kie r kegaard means that logic considers only thought 
and not existence. Since all thought is of the same ~ual­
ity of being, Hegel's dial ectic is quantitative. But true 
dialectic, according to Kierkegaard, deals with differences 
of quality as man and God, or thought and being. Thus Kier-
kegaard's dialectic is ~ualitative. 
Kierkegaard 1 s distinction may be considered a gross 
1. Ibid., P• 91. 
2. flli·, P• 96. 
3. ~., P• 199. 
4· Kierkega~rd, Journals, p. 156. 
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misinterpretation of Hegel's position.1 Hegel's dialectic 
is most of all a dialectic of experience, passion, and life. 
A massive amount of support of this argument can be found 
throughout Hegel's works: rn the Encyclopedia, Hegel wrote: 
At first we became aware of these contents 
in what we call experience •••• as it is only 
in form that philosophy is distinguished from 
other modes of obtaining ~ acquaintance with 
actuality and experience. 
Again, Hegel said: 
The relation of speculative science to the 
other sciences may be stated in the following 
terms. It does not in the least neglect the 
empirical facts contained in the other sciences 
but recognizes and adopts them: it appreciates 
and applies towards its own structure the uni-
versal element in these sciences, their laws 
and classifications; but besides all this, into 
the categories of science, it introduces, and 
gives currency to, other categories. The differ-
ence looked3at in this way is only a change of categories. 
Kierkegaardts contention that Hegel produced the dia-
lactic process by mere reflection on the nature or pure 
thought in abstraction seams contrary to the evidence. 
Neither can the Hegelian dialectic be understood conclu-
sively with Kierkegaard as ~quintessence of the a priori, 
1. Wbdttemore, op. cit., p. 41. 
2. Hegel, Encyclopedia, sees. 47-49, trans. John McTaggart 
in Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic (Cambridge: .Univer-
sity Press, 1922), p. 36. 
3. McTaggart, Loc. cit., p. 36. 
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logical, and metaphysical method. It seems closer to the 
evidence to speak of Hegel's dialectic as dialectical empir-
icism. Dialectic, instead of being an abstraction apart 
from life and experience, is based upon a more immediate 
living experience. Murdoch suggests that: . 
Hegel is sometimes wrongly thought of as 
remote, airy, and metaphysical in the purely 
pejorative sense of that word. He could more 
justly be considered as the first great mod-
ern empiricist; a dialectical empiricist, as 
opposed to, say, Hume who might be called a 
mechanistic empiricist. What Hegel teaches 
us is that we should attempt to describe 
phenomena. That he casts the laws governing 
phenomena in logical terms is neither here 
nor there insofar as the value of the method 
is concerned. In fact he set about patiently 
describing a vast quantity of human experience, 
experience of individuals and of societies.l 
In a similar vein, Eucken states that there is the conflict 
in Hegel between a more immediate living intuition and sys-
tem which is intellectualistic and logical. Eucken points 
out further in Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker 
that experience is the basis of Hegel's dialectic.2 
Here the argument has been to show that perhaps Kierke-
gaard held to a dialectic of unreconciled contraries 
resulting in an inaccurate criticism of Hegel's position. The 
1. Irish Murdoch, "The Existentialist Political Myth," The 
Socratic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), PP• 52-53.---
2. Cf. George P. Adams, "Mystical Elemen~s in Hegel's Early 
Theological Writlngs,'! Universitff of California .Publica-
tion in . Philosophr, Vol. 2, No. (September 24, 1916}, 69. 
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attempt is now to reveal that Kierkegaard agreed also with 
Hegel that dialectic is a triadic process in which contraries 
are reconciled. 1 Kierkegaard•s clear statement revealing 
Hegel's triadic design is _as follows: 
Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit 
is the self. But what is the self? The self 
is a relation which relates itself to its own 
self, or it is that in the relation which ac-
counts for it that the relation relates itself 
to its own self; the self is not the relation 
but consists in the fact that the relation re-
lates itself to its own self. Man is a syn-
thesis of the infinite and the finite, of the 
temporal and the eternal, of freedom and ne-
cessity, in short it is a synthesis. A syn-
thesis is a relation between two2factors. So regarded, man is not yet a self. 
Robert Bretall makes this appraisal of the quoted passage. 
"Here we have S .K., almost w1 th tongue in cheek, expressing 
himself with great precision in the terminology of that He-
gelianism which he hated above all else. u3 Without doubt, 
1. Julius s. Bixler, "The Contribution of Existenz-Philos-
ophie," Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 33 (January, 
1940), 38. The author writes: '~lerkegaard is concerned 
with life as a dialectical process in which opposites 
meet and fuse to part and meet again •••• It must be ac-
cepted and put into life and inner experience, then pro-
jected and externalized, nnly to be absorbed once more. 
The truth is absolute, but our experience of it is in-
conclusive, and infested always with restless and dy-
namic quality which attends all human experience." 
2. Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, p. 17. 
3. Robert Bretall, A Kierkegaard Anthology (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 340. 
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Kierkegaard owed much to Hegel in method and ter.minology.l 
A further elucidation of this part of the argument is 
found in Kierkegaard 1 s three stages, which challenge a com-
parison with their dialectical counterpart in Hegel's Logik. 
Here a general comparison will be made prior to an extended 
discussion in the following paragraphs. Hegel's Sein, the 
stage of sensuous immediacy, bears a close resemblance to 
K1erkegaard 1 s aesthetical stage. Wesen, the stage of ex-
ternal relations, reveals perhaps an interesting similarity 
to the ethical stage of Kierkegaard. Begriff, the stage 
of internal relations, shows a broad resemblance to the 
religious stage of Kierkegaard. 
Moreover, since the dialectical method is so funda-
mental to the two thinkers, the three stages must be dis-
tinguished further. In the first place, both Hegel and 
Kierkegaard held that the first stage of the dialectical 
process is characterized by immediacy. For Hegel, imme-
diacy was the simple and undifferentiated. It may be de-
fined "simple identity," "Pure indeterminateness," and 
1. David Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg Publishing House, 1948), p. ll. Swenson says: 
"He translated th.e hardest passages into Danish, in order 
to make them clearer to himself, and he read and re•·read 
the Logie over and over again. Both his philosophical 
style and his terminology show the influence of Hegel." 
"vacuity." Hegel wrote: 
Simple immediacy is itself an expression of 
reflection, and refers to its distinction from 
the mediated: properly expressed, this simple 
immediacy is therefore Pure Being. Just as 
pure knowledge is to mean nothing except purely 
abstract knowledge, as such, so Pure Being is 
to mean nothing except Being in general. Being 
and nothing else, without any further determi-
nation or filling.l . 
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With Hegel, Kierkegaard agreed that in the first stage, 
aesthetic, the aesthetician aims at the immediate romantic 
interest, or he loses himself in successive sensations. "The 
most adequate expression for the aesthetic existence ••• is 
in the moment."2 The aesthetician remains forever in the 
area of immediacy, because he is always within the moment. 
In this sphere, there is thoughtlessness, and the abstract 
pure forms take precedence over the concrete reality. These 
facts are in line with Hegel 1 s saying that "·simple immediacy 
-is therefore pure being."3 Likewise, Hegel said, "Pure 
Being is to mean nothing: except Being in general, n4 while 
Kierkegaard stated, "The moment is everything, and in so far 
again essentially n?thing."5 . This abstract existence of 
1.. Hegel, Science -or Logic, trans. W. H. Johnston and L. G. 
Struthers (New York: Macmill,an Company, 1929), I, .Ba. 
···- . 
2. Kierkegaard, Either/Or, II, 393. 
3. Hegel, Science of Logic, I, B~. 
4• Ibid. 
5. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific ·Postscript, P• 265. 
the aesthetic level, Kierkegaard compared with a pebble 
skimming over the waves and suddenly sinking in complete 
forgetfulness. 
95 
Kierkegaard 1 s ethical stage is very close in appear-
ance to the Wesen book of Hegel. Kierkegaard defined the 
ethical stage as ".that of requirement, nl which is the need 
of the inner revealing itself to the outer. This stage is 
not an enjoyment category like the first, but a universal-
ethical sphere, which aims to realize the universal human. 
"Ethics is as such the universal, and as the universal, it 
is valid for all.2 Kierkegaard is: convinced that the 
ethical stage is the life of relationship in mutual re-
quirement to family, community, and world. 
He ••• who chooses himself ethically 
chooses himself concretely as this definite 
individual •••• This self which is the aim 
is not merely a personal self but a social, 
a civic self.) 
Here Kierkegaard is showing the need of the internal and ex-
tarnal stability, for the individual to realize himself fully 
1. Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, p. 430. 
2. Kierkegaard, Fear and Tremblins, p. 141. 
3. Kierkegaard, Either/Or, II, 210, 220. 
in social relationships. 
In the foregoipg analysis, Kierkegaard 1 s position is 
very close to Hege~ 1 s Wesen stage, especially concerning 
1 
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the relation of the individual with the universal. Hegel's 
Wesen book of the ~ogik deals with the external relations in 
accordance with the problems of the part and the whole, the 
inner and outer, and man and God. Hegel said: 
Essence,-which is Being coming into media-
tion with itself through the negativity of 
itself--is self-relatedness, only in so far 
as it is relation to another.l 
To this Hegel added: 
As a man is outwardly, that is to say in 
his actions (not of course in hi·s merely, 
bodily outwardness), so is he inwardly: and if 
his virtue, morality, •••• are only inwardly his, 
--that is if they exist only in his intentions 
and sentiments, and his outward acts are not 
identical with them, the one half of him is 
as hollow and empty as the other.2 
Kierkegaard agreed with Hegel that the inner reveals 
itself to the outer. 
When the ethical becomes more concrete it 
passes over into the definition of morals and 
customs •••• He who lives ethically expresses 
the universs.l in his life, he makes himself 
the uni verss.l man. 3 
Kierkegaard's statement is not unlike Hegel's concern ror 
social morality, as developed fully in the PhilosoPhy of 
Right. But Kierkegaard has a double attitude. In 
1. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, p. 207. 
2. Ibid., P• 253. 
3. Kierkegaard, Either/Or, II, 214. 
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his later writings, Hegel•s identification of inner and outer 
is a part of the anti-Hegelian polemic of Kierkegaard.l 
Both thinkers used the third stage or their dialectic 
as a synthesis of the two preceding stages. In Hegel's 
thought, the third stage in his Logik is the Begriff. Hegel•s 
Begriff book deals with internal relations. It is the realm 
or wholeness. In this stage of development, there is the 
meaning or Hegel's phrase, "The truth is the wbole. 112 In 
Hegel•s Logik, Sein is thesis; Wesen is antithesis; and 
Begriff is synthesis. The term Hegel used for synthesis is 
aufgehoben, which has basically a double meaning. First, it 
means that something has been deprived of its independent 
existence, and is for all practical purposes lost and gone. 
Secondly, what has disappeared is retained as an element or 
factor in the result to which it has led.3 
Thus the seed is aufgehoben in the plant 
which grows !rom it: it has perished and 
disappeared as a seed, but it is transfig-
ured ap.d retained in the existence of the 
plant.LJ. 
Hegel•s dialectic was a synthesizing process, not only as the 
basis or the entire universe, but also as the modus operandi 
1. Kierkegaard, Concludung Unscientific Postscript, p. 263 n. 
2. Hegel, Hegel's Phenomenology ofMind, p. 81. 
3. 
4-
Wallace, Prolegomena (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1874), 
p. 178. 
Wallace, Prolegomena (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1874), 
p. 178. 
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of the Absolute Spirit. Specific instances of this fact 
are to be found, not only in the Geschichte der .Philosophie, 
but also in the Logik, where Abs.olute Spirit continues 
through one dialectical stage to another, revealing itself 
as subjective mind, objective mind, and Absolute Mind. 
Klerkegaard 1 s third stage, in which subjectivity is 
realized through suffering, is the religious sphere. 
While aesthetic existence is essentially 
enjoyment, and ethical existence, essentially 
struggle and victory, religious existence is 
essentially suffering, and that not as a 
transitional moment, but as persisting.l 
Kierkegaard has designated suffering as the essential rela-
tion of the religious life. The absence of suffering signi-
fies "the absence of religiosity."2 In the doncltidirig .Un.;. 
scientific Postscript, Kierkegaard divided the religious 
sphere into two parts, Religious A and Religious B. Re-
ligious A is the religiousness of immanence, which means 
that God is immanent in everybody, and every man stands in 
direct relationship with the divine.3 Basically, Religious 
A can exist in paganism, and in Christianity it can be the 
religiousness of everyone who is not decisively Christian. 
An ~portant passage may be included at this point: 
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientif'ic .Postscript, p. 256. 
2. Ibid., P• 391. 
3. Ibid., P• 506. 
In religiousness A there is rellow-reeling ror 
all men, because this religiousness is related 
to the. eternal which every man is assumed 
essentially to be able to be, and because the 
eternal is in every place, so that no time is 
involved in awaiting.l 
Kierkegaard 1 s position makes clear that Religious A in-
cludes the adoration for the universal law. 
The second type, Religious B, is the religion of par-
adox. God comes down to man's level in Christian revela-
tion, which is an Absolute Paradox. Kierkegaard claimed 
that this stage implies giving up of thinking, and believing 
on the paradox. 
The paradoxical religiousness defines 
the distinction absolutely by accentuating 
paradoxically what it is to exist. For as 
the eternal came into the world at a moment 
of time, the existing individual does not 
in the course of time come into relation 
with the eternal and think about it (this 
is A), but in time it comes into relation 
with the eternar:fri time; so that the rela-
tion is within time,-and this relationship 
conflicts equally with all thinking.2 
Kierkegaard's statement indicates that Christian revelation 
comes only in Absolute Paradox, which is in opposition to 
reason. 
Kierkegaard 1 s triadic position is not basically differ-
ent from Hegel's in spite of the fact that he said, "There 
are three ~t~ges, a~d yet and Either/Or."3 Kierkegaard's 
1. ~., p. 518. 
2. Ibid., pp. 505-506. 
3. Kierkegaard, Stages of Life, p. 10. 
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third stage of religion involves the synthesis of the aes-
thetical and ethical levels .1 It must be remembered that 
Kierkegaard remarked, "If there is a religious sphere, that 
2 
which is suspended is not lost, but remains preserved." 
In agreement with this quotation, it would seem that the 
aesthetic sphere and the ethical dimension are not completely 
left when the religious stage is reached, but the religious 
category is only the fulfilment of these two early stages. 
"The aesthetic sphere i s that of immediacy, the ethical is 
that o f requirement, the religious sphere is that of :f'Uli'U-
ment. u3 In Hegei • s terminology, the relationship among the 
three may be expressed as "the innnediate, '' "the mediate," 
and the "synthesis of the two."4 
Kierkegaard is aware of the problem of a developmental 
view in his position: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4-
There are two i'actors in the Christian lii'e 
which must be harm:>nized. It is first of all 
a 'conviction, a certainty, both unshakeable, 
E. L. Allen, Kierkegaard: His Life and Thou~ht (London: 
Stanley Nott, Ltd., 1935), p. 122. The aut or points 
out that Kierkegaard•s third stage involves a synthesis 
in the Hegelian fashion: "Aesthetic lire,_ ethical life, 
and religious-represent the third form, the last member 
_in a Hegelian triad which is the synthesis of the two · 
lower types." 
Kierkegaard, PhilosoEhical Fra~ents, p. 47-
Kierkegaard, stases oi Life, p. 430. 
Kierkegaard, Concludins Unscientii'ic PostscriEt, p. 261. 
or our relationship to God •••• Secondly, it 
is an empirical development.! 
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Although Kierkegaard admits, as the statement indicates, the 
problem of empirical development, his solution is contradic-
tory. In his either/or dialectic, as stated earlier in this 
section, Kierkegaard maintained unreconciled contraries, and 
the movement from one stage to another involves a radical 
leap or unrelated movements. But when the Hegelian inrluence 
on Kierkegaard is dominant, the movements rram the different 
stages involve smooth transitions. Within the three ex-
istence-spheres, Kierkegaard recognized two boundary zones: 
There are thus three spheres or existence: 
the aesthetic, the ethical, the religious. 
Two boundary zones correspond to these three: 
irony, constituting the boundary between the 
aesthetic and the ethical; humor, as the 
boundary that separates the ethical from 
the religious.2 
As boundary zones, irony and humor are clearly two transi-
tiona! spheres. This point will be elucidated further in 
the following paragraph. 
What then do irony and humor mean for Kierkegaard? 
Irony means a contemplative attitude, or a "culture of the 
spirit"3 existing as a transitional state between the aes-
thetic and the ethical levels. Irony is pole~cal in its 
1. 
2. 
Kierkegaard, cf. Journal, 18)8, .!I .A 252, trans. in R. 
Jolivet, Introduction to Kierkegaard (London: Frederick 
Muller LTD., 1950), P• 213. 
Kierkegaard, c6ri6iuding unscientific ·Postscript, P• 448. 
Ibid. I P• 450. 
102 
mood toward the aesthetic life, while its object is to seek 
the ethical. Although the ironical attitude has been emanci-
pated tram the aesthetic life, it has not entered into the 
ethical. Humor, like irony, is a passive attitude of conte.m-
plation. It means the awareness of the nothingness and tem-
perality of the selr.l "Humor is not yet religiosity, but 
lies on the boundary."2 It is a transitional zone between 
the ethical and the religious areas. 
This portion of the argument on Hegel and Kierkegaard 
may be restated briefly. In Hegelian fashion Kierkegaard•s 
dialectic is a developmental dialectic and the lower stages 
prepare the way for the higher. This Hegelian strain in 
Kierkegaard•s view would imply that he is opposed to any 
succession of completely unrelated steps. But in his anti-
Hegelian moods, Kierkegaard would insist that each stage is 
a radical break with the preceding one, and there is no or-
derly transition from one stage to the other. 
C. Epistemology 
Hegel's and Kierkegaard•s epistemological theories 
illustrate the conflict of idealism and realism, subject 
and object, and dualism and monism, notwithstanding the 
blending of these different views at times. In the 
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 242, 
4.51. 
2. Ibid., p. 447. 
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Phino.menologie des Geistes, Hegel admits a distinction be-
tween subject and object in the area of the undeveloped un-
derstanding with a view toward demonstrating their fundamental 
unity in Absolute Knowledge.1 He traces the flight of thought 
dialectically through sensuous consciousness, self conscious-
ness, reason, spirit, and religion to the truth of the kn9w-
ing experience in the Absolute Idea. Conversely, Kierkegaard 
is convinced of the position of epistemic realism, which 
means that sense experience reveals a direct and faithful 
knowledge of the actual world. In Kierkegaard•s thought, 
"Only immediate sensation and immediate cognition cannot 
deceive."2 Kierkegaard denied the possibility of rational 
knowledge, since "the speculative result is a delusion,"3 
and only the immediately perceived is non-deceptive.4 With-
out doubt, Hegel is opposed to a~ view that holds that the 
real is found in sense-perception, especially since the real 
is the result of the mediating process of thought. The mind 
is the interpreter of experience. 
In spite of wide and basic epistemic disagreements be-
tween Hegel and Kierkegaard, both formulated the problem of 
1. Hegel, Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, p. 38. 
2. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 67. 
3. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 280. 
~. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 67. 
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knowledge in accordance with the subject-object relation. 
The nature of this problem is: are subject and object numer-
ically distinct from each other, or one and the same fact? 
Epistemic dualism is the view that subject and object are 
numerically distinct from each other, while epistemic monism 
means that subject and object are numerically identical. 
Hegel is concerned with the foregoing problem: 
The Logie gives us no insight into that fun-
damental problem of epistemology, namely, the 
significance of the subject-object relation ••• 
The exposition for which we sfek is to be found 
in the Phenomenology of Mind. 
The "exposition," for which Hegel sought, is apparently to 
be found in his treatment of dualism and monism. In the 
lower levels of experience subject and object seem more 
opposed than united. It appears that Hegel holds to epis-
te.mic dualism on the finite level or experience, while main-
taining the view of epistamic monism on the infinite leve1.2 
Hegel claimed that one of the distinguishing features between 
what he called finite and infinite thought is that the lat-
ter destroys the opposition between subject and object, 
which the .former never transcends. Hegel pointed out that 
finite thought is subjective arrl accidental, while infinite 
l. 
2. Hegel, Phenomenology -or Mind, p. 1.5.5. 
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thought is what alone can get really in touch with the 
supreme and true. 
At this point several comments on Hegel's theory o£ 
knowledge will illustrate this meaning. Hegel pointed out 
clearly the distinction between subject and object on the 
£inite level o£ experience: 
The object, which I at once distinguish 
£ram mysel£, is independent. I have not made 
it, it did not wait £or me in order to exist, 
and it remains although I go away £rom it. I 
and the object are there£ore two independent 
things.l 
I£ "I and the object are there£ore two independent things," 
epfstemic monism is impossible £or Hegel on the £inite level 
o£ experience. It is interesting to note that Hegel main-
tained this view in his Phanomenologie des Geistes. Here 
it appears that only in the area o£ Absolute knowledge is 
the dualism of subject and object surmounted. 
With absolute knowledge, then, Spirit has 
wound up the process o£ its embodiment, so 
far as the assumption of those various shapes 
or modes is a£fected with the insurmountable 
distinction which consciousness implies (i.e. 
the distinction o£ consciousness £rom its ob-
ject or content) •••• While in the Phenomen6i6gy 
o£ Mind each moment is the distinction o£ 
knowledge and truth, and is the process in 
which that distinction is cancelled and tran-
scended, Absolute Knowledge does not contain 
this distinction and supersession o£ distinc-
tion. Rather, since each moment has the for.m 
1. Hegel, Philosophy o£ Religion, I, 107. This passage 
comes £rom J. E. Turner's article, "The Essentials 
o£ Hegel's Spiritual Monism," The Monist 44, (Jan-
uary-July, 1934), p. 62. 
of truth and the knowing self in an immediate 
unity.l 
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Hegel's statement woqld suggest here that only within Abso-
lute knowledge there is the identification of subject and 
object, while every other level of experience is dualistic. 
Mackintosh affirms, "Hegel may tell us that the mind sees 
double in one region and single in a higher region."2 
As for Hegel, the problem of Kierkegaard was the epis-
temological aspect of the subject-object relation. Unlike 
Hegel, Kierkegaard formulated the solution to the relation-
ship of subject and object in accordance with his theory of 
subjectivity.3 According to Kierkegaard, subjectivity is not 
opposed to objectivity, rather subjectivity represents an 
area of experience where the distinction of subject and ob-
ject has not been raised. Kierkegaard remarked on this 
point: 
Objectively we consider only the matter at 
issue, subjectively we have regard to the sub-
ject and his subjectivity; and behold, pr~cisely 
this subjectivity is the matter at issue.4 
To this statement, Kierkegaard added "passion is subjectiv-
1. Hegel, Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, p. 804-805. 
2. R. Mackintosh, Hegel .and .Hegeiianimn (New York: Scrib-
ner's Sons, 1903), p. 2oo. · 
3. Dane (London: 
The Epworth Press, 19 0 , P• • The wr ter says: Kier-
kegaard was a realist. For him objectivity meant the 
method of conceiving reality as an object of thought. 
4. Klerkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, P• 115. 
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ity, and does not exist objectively.nl Kierkegaard opposed 
the objective tendency. 2 Objective knowledge belongs to the 
realm of logic and necessity; subjective knowledge is the 
realm of freedom. 
Kierkegaard is criticizing Hegel's view that knowledge 
is based upon coherent evidence of objective facts and rea-
sons. Kierkegaard held that knowledge is found in passion, 
since "subjectivity is truth,"3 and the nature of subjectiv-
ity is passion.4 Kierkegaard said: 
The way of objective reflection makes the 
subject accidental, and thereby transforms 
existence into something indifferent ••• all 
interest, like all decisiveness, is rooted 
in subjectivity.5 
By emphasizing subjective knowledge, Kierkegaard did not 
analyze the nature of the object or formulate a basis for 
knowing the other self.6 But Kierkegaard agreed with Hegel 
that in the eternal realm of God, there was the oneness of 
subject and object.? Kierkegaard agreed with Hegel's claim 
1. Ibid., p. 117. 
2. Ib:i.d., P• 118. 
3· Ibid., P• 278. 
4· Ibid., p. 33. 
5. Ibid., p. 173. 
6. Ibid., p. 377. 
7. ~., P• 296. 
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that in the Absolute Idea, subjective and objective are one. 
Hegel's idealistic theory of knowledge appears far more 
adequate than Kierkegaardts realistic view of ~ediate in-
tuition. Hegel's position gives adequate consideration to 
both immediate experience and thought. Although Hegel 
maintains a variance of epistemic dualism of finite exper-
ience, his total view appears monistic, especially since he 
identified reality with thought which translates the whole 
of experience into the single embodiment of the Absolute 
Spirit. Kierkegaard claims that subjective knowledge is 
not the object of cognitive experience, in so far as it is 
merely inner, personal, immediate experience. However, He-
gel and Kierkegaard agree that the subject-object relation 
is removed within the Absolute, since the object which the 
Absolute Spirit knows is HXmself. 
D. Logic 
Logie, for Hegel, is not the formal art of reasoning 
in the Aristotelian sense. Rather logi.c is the science of 
reality. Specifically, Hegel defined it in the following 
manner: 
Logic might have been defined as the science 
of thought, and of its laws and characteristic 
forms. But thought, as thought, constitutes 
only the general medium, or quali:tying circum-
stance, which renders the Id ea distinctively 
logical. If we identify the Idea with thought, 
thought must not be taken in the sense of a 
method or form, but in the sense of tbe self• 
developing totality of its laws and peculiar 
terms. These laws are the work of thought 
itself, and not1a fact which it finds and must aubmi t to. 
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Consistent with the definition of Logic as "the self-
development of totality," Hegel identified the logical with 
the actual. It is the logical, dialectical yet coherent 
thinking about reality which contains the understanding 
of being and reality. Hegel's metaphysics grows out of 
his logic. 
Logic therefore coincides with Meta-
2bysics, the science of things set and held 
in thoughts,--thoughts accredited able t~ 
express the essential reality of things. 
Against this later statement of Hegel, Kierkegaard 
aimed his hardest blows. Kierkegaard observed that one 
of the most fascinating things about life is its sublime 
lack of logic. 
All logical thinking employs the language 
of abstraction, and is sub specie aeterni •••• 
It is impossible to conceive existence with-
out movement, and movement cannot be con-
ceived sub specie aeter.ni.3 
Kierkegaard ridiculed Hegel's identification of thought with 
reality. In fact, Kierkegaard presented the following thesis 
in the for.m of a protest, "A logical system is possible and 
1. Wallace, Logic of Hegel, PP• 30-31. 
2. Ibid., P• 45. 
3. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 273. 
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unexistential system is impossible."! Unlike Hegel~ Kierke-
gaard is convinced that logic cannot account ~or becoming~ 
or process. The ~undamental view o~ logic is this Eleatic 
doctrine, "Nothing comes into being~ everything is."2 Con-
sequently~ Kierkegaard thought that Hegel's introduction o~ 
movement in logic was a "sheer confusion."3 
Hegel's unparalleled discovery~ the sub-
ject of so -unparalleled an admiration, namely~ 
the introduction ot movement into logic~ is 
a sheer confusion o~ logical scienc~to say 
nothing of the absence, on every other page~ 
of even so much as an effort on Hegel's part 
to persuade the reader that it is the~e. 
And it is surely strange to make movement 
fundamental in a sphere where movement is 
unthinkable; and to make movement explain 
logic~ when as a matter of fact logic can-
not explain movement.4 . 
As stated above~ Kierkegaard sided against Hegel's iden-
tification of rationality with reality~ yet it is not sug-
gested that Kierkegaard refuted Hegel. Did not Kierkegaard 
misinterpret Hegel's meaning at this point? For example, 
when Hegel identified thought with being, he did not intend 
by the use of a magic wand to close the door to all existen-
tie.l reality. The contrary seems to be true that Hegel 
1. Ibid., P• 99. 
2. Ibid., P• 272. 
3. Ibid., PP• 99-100. 
4· Ibid.. 
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sought to reveal the multi-dimensional passions or the human 
soul, not "a ballet of bloodless categories. 111 In speaking 
of the unity of thought and being, Hegel insisted upon an 
identity in difference. This viewpoint is evidenced in the 
following statement by Hegel: 
If we say that the Absolute is the unity 
of subjective and objeQtive, we are undoubted-
ly in the right, but so far, one-sided, as we 
enunciate the unity only and lay accent upon 
it, forgetting that in reality the subjective 
and objective ~e not merely identical, but 
also distinct. 
As the preceding quotation seems to suggest, Hegel's iden-
tification of thought with being does not mean an abstract 
identity of formal logic; rather his doctrine maintains a 
concrete identity, which involves the enrichment of experi-
ence, life, passion, will, thought, and the particulars. 
Kierkegaard, in accusing Hegel's identification of logic 
and metaphysics as an abstract identity, not only misinter-
preted Hegel, but failed to see that an abstract identity 
was nonsensical to Hegel, as it was to h±m. 
E. Metaphysics 
1. Philosophy of being 
1. F. H. Bradley, Principles of Logic, (London: K. Paul, 
French and Co., 1883), p. 553. 
2. This passage is translated by Cunningham from the smaller 
Logic in ''The Significance of t~ Hegelian Conception or 
Absoiute Knowledge," Philosophical Review 17 (1908), p. E4o. 
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The main metaphysical problem both ror Hegel and Kierke-
gaard is based upon the traditional distinction between ex-
istence and essence. This problem was a nemesis in ancient 
and medieval philosophy. Essence was considered the concep-
tual idea of a thing, or what a thing is as a definite class, 
while existence is the empirical being of a thing, or that 
a thing is. Kierkegaard developed a critical attitude to-
ward Hegel's rationalistic views of reality tram this tra-
ditional distinction between essence and existence. The lat-
ter term was used by Kierkegaard to combat what he considered 
to be Hegelian panlogism, which means that reality is logic. 
Kierkegaard identified existence with irrationality, im-
mediacy, and subjectivity, while essence was associated with 
rationality, mediacy, and Hegel's objectivity. Opposing 
violently what he considered Hegel's emphasis upon essence, 
-
Kierkegaard atrir.med the priority of existence over essence.l 
In spite of the fact that Klerkegaard attacked Hegel's 
metaphysics of being as a doctrine of essence, yet Hegel 
tried to place both existence and essence within the struc-
ture of being. Specifically, Hegel's doc~rine of being is 
a view or essence, which posits the ground or existence. 
Essence is existence. Hegel said, "Essence necessarily 
1. Kierkegaard, Journals, P• 175. 
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appears."1 "It transf'onns itself' into existence. Existence 
is the being of essence, and theref'ore existence can be cal-
led 'essential being. rtt 2 
Coupled with these state~ents is the proposition in He-
gel's Philosophie des Reehts that reason is real, and reality 
is rational.3 The rational, critical thought of' experience 
gives an adequate version of actuality. Although experience 
is considered by Hegel to be the source of' all knowledge and 
being, yet this experience must be mediated through the ra-
tional faculty of' man. Thus Hegel wrote: 
The phrase 'Existence' (derived f'rom existere) 
suggests the fact of' having proceeded f'rom some-
thing. Existence is Being which has proceeded 
f'rom the ground, and been reinstated by annulling 
its intermediation. The Essence, as Being set 
aside and absorbed, originally came bef'ore us as 
shining or showing in self and the categories of' 
this reflection are identity, dif'ference and 
ground.4 
Against this central theme of Hegel, Kierkegaard raised 
his protest. As Kierkegaard saw it, Hegel's philosophy of' 
being makes exist~nce only a step in the process of' pure 
1. These passages are taken f'rom Hegel's Logik, ed. Lasson, 
II, 103, 105, and translated by Paul Tillich,. "Existen-
tial Philosophy," Jotirnal of' History of' Ideas V ( 1944), 
48-49. 
2 • Ibid. 
3. Knox, op. cit., PP• 14-15. 
4. Wallace, The Logic of Hegel, P• 230. 
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being. Stating ·his case from the traditional distinction 
between essence and existence, Kierkegaard insisted that 
reality was not .the object o£ cognitive experience, but 
existence was the personal, inward character of the indi-
vidual's immediate experience. Kierkegaard wrote: 
The only reality to which an existing indi-
vidual may have a relation that is more than 
cognitive, is his own reality, the £act that he 
exists; this reality constitutes his absolute 
interest. Abstract thought requires him to be-
came disinterested in order to acquire knowledge; 
the ethical demand is that he become in£initely 
interested in existing.l 
In brief, the opinion quoted above resolves itself into 
the contention of Kierkegaard that Hegel developed an ab-
stract doctrine of being. But is not Hegel saying in his 
doctrine of being that the existence o£ thought requires 
the existence of something given? To think, tor Hegel, 
involves something to think about.2 Although the given of 
Hegel's philosophy is pure being in its immediacy, yet ex-
perience is the irreducible element of all being. Hegel 
saw logic, art, natural science, religion, and philosophy 
as different areas of interpretation of experience. Hence 
in both Hegel and Kierkegaard, there is an agreement with 
Baillie's view, ttTo be real is to be absorbed in our 
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific .Postscript, p. 280. 
~. John McTaggart, op. cit., P• 114. 
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direct living eXperience. 111 While Hegel does not stop here. 
this interesting view strikes at the very core of Kierke-
gaard•s notion of Hegel as an abstract thinker with only a 
pure notion of being. 
2. Philosophy of nature 
Hegel's account of nature includes the development of 
three main divisions: Idea, Nature, and Spirit as put forth 
in the EncyclopRdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. In 
the conclusion of his section on Logik, Hegel develops the 
theory that the mind as it is manifested at this point is 
Idea. But mind actualizes itself through the sphere of 
Nature. "We began wl t h Being, abstract Being: whe.l."e we now 
are we also have the Idea as Being: but this Idea which has 
Being is Nature. 112 To this conception, Hegel added more 
fUlly in the Wissenschaft der Logik: 
1. 
2. 
For the Idea posits itself as the absolute 
unity of the pure Notion and its Reality, and 
gathers itself into the immediacy of Being; 
and in doing so, as totality in this form, it 
is Nature.--But in this determination is not 
a perfected becoming or a transition ••• The 
transition here therefore must rather be taken 
to mean that the Idea freely releases itself 
in absolute self-security and self-reposes •••• 
In so far as this externality is only in ac-
cordance with the abstract ~ediacy of Being, 
J. B. Baillie, The Ori,in and Significance of Hegel's 
Logic (New York: Macm1 lan & Go., 1961), p. 337. 
Hegel, The Logic at Hegel, p. 379. 
and is comprehended by consciousness, it exists 
as mere objectivity and external life; but in 
the Idea it remains, in and for itself the total-
ity of the Notion, and Philosophy related to 
Nature as divine knowledge.! 
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Hegel's implication in the foregoing statement is clear-
ly that "in nature ••• mind actualizes itself only as its own 
other, as mind asleep. n2 To develop its own essence, mind 
has to go through its externalized "other", which is Nature. 
Nature, as mind's "other", reveals three dialectical stages: 
mechanics, physics, and organics. Mechanics contains the 
categories of space, time, and motion. The antithesis of 
mechanics is physics, which includes matter that has particu-
larized itself into a body. Under this stage are included 
inorganic nature and its reciprocal relations. The sphere of 
organics represents the synthesis of the two previous stages 
in living beings. 
Hegel's interpretation of nature is fundamentally teleo-
logical, which means that nature has its end in the Absolute 
Mind. "Mind is the existent truth of matter-the truth that 
matter itself has no truth."3 Hegel reveals that nature and 
all previous stages have their reasons for being in the Mind 
of the Absolute: 
1. Hegel, The Science of Logic, II, 485-486. 
2. Hegel, The PhilOSOE~ of Right, p. 279. 
3. Hegel, Hegel's PhilosoEby of Mind4 trans. W. Wallace (Oxford: The -Clarendon Press, 189 ), sec. 389. 
The Absolute is Mind (Spirit)--this is the 
supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this 
definition and to grasp its meaning and burthen 
was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all ed-
ucation and all philosophy: it was the point to 
which turned the impulse of all religion and 
science: and it is this impulse1that must ex-plain the history of the world. 
11 ·7 
Thus Logic and Nature find their synthesis in the Absolute 
Mi nd, Who is Subject rather than subtance. 2 
Kierkegaard agrees with Hegel that the world of nature 
is the handiwork of the Absolute, and embodies a spiritual 
meaning for life. "Nature, the totality of created things, 
is the work of God."3 In the Journals, Kierkegaard eluci-
dated further the teleological meaning of nature: 
)(an steps forward as the lord of nature, 
but he also reels that there is something 
higher which manifests itself in nature and 
before which he must bow down; he feels the 
necessity of giving b±mself up to the power 
which directs all things. (I cannot be bathe :r-
ed with thpse who see in nature nothing but 
quantity. )q. 
In the words, ''I cannot be bothered with those who see in 
nature nothing but quantity," Kierkegaard is protesting 
against anJ view that holds that nature is merely con-
ditioned by the Procrustean rigor of mechanical laws, 
rather nature is an expression of a spiritual reality. 
Kierkegaard adds: 
1. Ibid., sec. 384. 
2. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, pp. 87, 91. 
3. K1erkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 220.. 
4. Kierkegaard, Journals, p. 14. 
The works of God are too great for me; I in-
evitably lose myself in the details. That is 
also why people's expressions when they look at 
nature: it is lovely, magnificent etc. are so 
insipid, for they are all too anthropomorphic, 
they stay at the outside; they cannot express 
the depths within. In that connection it also 
seems very notable to me that the great geni-
uses of poetry (like Ossian and Homer) are rep-
resented as blind. It is naturally a matter 
of indifference to me whether they really were 
blind or not; I am only concerned with the fact 
that people have thought of them as blind, for 
that seems also to show that when they sang the 
beauties of nature, they did not see what they 
saw with the outward eye but that_ it revealed 
itself to an inner intuition. How curious it 
is that one of the best, if not the best, 
writer about bees was blind from childhood up; 
here once again, where one would have thought 
that observation was so important, everything 
goes to show that he had found that archimedean 
point and, by a purely spiritual activity, had 
inferred all the details from it and recon-
structed them in analogy with nature.l 
Kierkegaard 1 s conception of nature is basically teleo-
logical. As Hegel says, ~The truth is that Nature is 
118 
the creation of Spirit, and it is Spirit itself which gives 
itself a pre-supposition in Nature."2 In the thought of 
Hegel and Kierkegaard, nature is the embodiment of a _ 
spiritual reality which cannot be understood apart from 
the Absolute. 
Although recognizing the teleological vie~ of natUre, 
Kierkegaard rejects any position that would make of nature 
1. Ibid., PP• 1-2. 
2. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, P• 377. 
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an object of thought. As an object of thought, God is in 
nature an "elusive author. 111 Why is God elusive? He is 
elusive because "He nowhere sets down his result in large 
type, or gives it to the reader beforehand in a preface. u2 
In the last quoted phrase, Kierkegaard appears to be attack-
ing Hegel's philosophy. Kierkegaard is convinced that God 
can be so unnoticeable in nature that a man could live his 
entire life without having discovered him. In Kierkegaard's 
thinking, this position is analogous to a man writing one 
huiidred and sixty-six folio volumes, and "a reader read and 
read, just as people look and look at nature."3 As the read-
er does:nct "discover that the meaning of this tremendous lit-
erature lay in himself; for astonishment over the many vol-
ume s , n4 yet a similar relation is the "astonishment over the 
vastness of nature"5 without seeing its inward meaning. Kier-
kegaardts argument is 1hat nature has no meaning as an object 
of t hought, but in the 'truth as inwardness, n6 God is revealed 
in it. Speaking of God, Kierkegaard says: 
1. Kierkegaard, Concludi~ Unscientific PostscriEt, p. 218. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 221. 
4- Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., p. 218. 
He is in the creation, and present every-
where in it, but directly He is not there; 
and only when the individual turns to his 
inner self, and hence only in the inwardness 
of self-activity, does he have his fttention 
aroused, and is enabled to see God. 
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Kierkegaard•s approach to nature is through the experi-
ence or the inwardness of man•s relationship to God. Hegel 
maintains that nature is one stage in the manifestation of 
the Absolute Mind, which is God 1 s nature externalized. Al-
though Kierkegaard objected to Hegel's position concerning 
nature indirectly, the former would agree with the latter 
that nature serves as a medium which reveals the working 
of the Absolute. 
3. Psychology 
Kierkegaard appears to be one of the most remarkable 
psychologists of all time, in depth, if not in breadth, com-
parable to Hegel. Like Hegel's PhHnomenologie des Geistes, 
Kierkegaard•s Either/Or, Stages on the Way of Life, 1h! 
Concept of Dread, and Sickness Unto Death reveal the com~ 
potentiality of the human soul. Hegel's psychology is a 
part of the basic triad of his philosophy of Mind: the 
subjective, the objective, and the Absolute Spirit. The 
1. Ibid. 
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subjective stage illustrates the triad of anthropology, 
phenomenology, and psychology. Hegel expresses his essen-
tial view on psychology in the following statement: 
Psychology, like logic, is one of those 
sciences which in modern times have yet de-
rived least profit from the general mental 
culture and the deeper conception of reason.l 
Hegel seeks to interpret psychology so that it will profit 
from the "general mental culture and the deeper conception 
of reason." 
Hegel objects to the treatment of mind in terms of the 
"distinction between the intelligence and will, "'2 since he 
holds to the need for the unity of intellect and will. 
The possibility of a culture of the in-
tellect which leaves the heart untouched, as 
it is said, and of the heart without the in-
tellect--of hearts which in one-sided way 
want intellect, and heart-less intellects--
only proves at most that bad and radically 
untrue existences occur.3 
By separating intellect and will philosophy misses the essen-
tial nature of these two existences. Hegel rejects the 
division of the mental life into "faculties, like power or 
force,"4 because a faculty psychology makes mind "a skele-
tonlike mechanical collection."5 
1. Hegel, Hegel's Phiiosophy of Mind, sec. 444. 
2. ~., sec. 445. 
3. Ibid. 
4· ~· 
5. Ibid. 
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Although dividing the mental life into three areas, 
theoretical mind, practical mind, and free mind, Hegel's 
main position is to show the mind's "organic unity. nl 
Theoretical mind is intelligence, as it relates itself to 
the given rational object. "Intelligence consists in 
treating what is found as ita . own. 112 Hegel identified the 
activity of intelligence with cognition, which means knowl-
edge.3 Hegel is convinced that cognition is genuine just 
so far as it realizes the concept. "The act of cognition 
itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence."4 The 
stages of cognition are "intuition, conception, memory ••• 
these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim 
is solely the concept of cognition."5 Practical mind is 
will, which is mind indetermined. It is ''the author of ita 
. 6 
own conclusions,'' and the "origin of its self-fulfilment." 
Practical mind differs from theoretical mind; the latter is 
determined by the rational object, while the former is self-
possessed, and "in the widest sense free. 11 7 But the practical 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
7. !bid. 
mind is related to the theoretical mind, especially since 
"the essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a 
thought."l In a striking statement Hegel anticipated and 
states his objection to Kierkegaard 1 s theory that will is 
identified with what is irrational and absurd: 
True liberty, in the shape of the moral 
life, consists in the will finding its purpose 
in a universal content, not in subjective or 
selfish interests. But such a content is only 
possible in thought and through thought: it is 
nothing short of absurd to seek to banish 
thought from the moral, religious, and law 
abiding life.2 
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Hegel's statement reveals his objection to separation o~ in-
tellect and will. 
Hegel's free mind is the synthesis of the theoretical 
and practical mind.3 He maintained that both the practical 
and theoretical mind round their unity in actual rree will. 
The rollowing statement points out Hegel's view or the unity 
or mind: 
1. 
2. 
3· 
4· 
The will is the immediate individualiti 
selr-instituted,--an individuality, however, 
also purified of all that interferes with 
its universalism, i. e. with freedom itselr. 
This universalism the will has as its object 
and aim, only so far as it thinks itself, 
knows this its concept, and is wili as free 
intelligence.4 ----
ibid., sec. 469 
Ibid. 
ill.S.·, sec. 481 
Ibid. 
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These last words, "'~ill as free i ntelligence," express the 
essential view of Hegel that mind is a unity of will , feel-
ing and intellect. 
In disagreement with Hegel•s rationalistic approach, 
Kierkegaard•s psychology is anti-rationalistic. That is, 
Kierkegaard sought to account for the integration, striving, 
and organization of the human person in accordance with a 
theory of s·elf based upon the emotional-volitional act of 
faith. If a man does not have faith, Kierkegaard remarked 
"there is but a single expression which explains his failure-
that he did not will it."1 Kierkegaard objected to faith as 
an intellectual position or a form of cognition, but ''it is 
2 · an,:·expression of the will." To quote further: 
1. 
The psychologist generally regards it as a 
sure sign that a man is beginning to give up 
a passion when he wishes to treat the object 
of it objectively. Passion and r eflection 
are generally exclusive of one another. Be-
coming objective in this way i s always retro-
gression, for passion is man 's perdition, but 
it is his exaltation as well. In case dia-
lectic and reflection are not used to intensify 
passion, it is a retrogression to become objec-
tive; and even he who is lost through passion 
has not lost so much as he who lost3passion, for the former had the possibility. 
Discourses, trans. David F. Swen-
n Swenson Augsburg: 1943), I, 17. 
2. Kierkegaard, Papirer IV B 87: 2 C~ Thomte, op. cit., 
p. 21. 
3. Kierkegaard, Conclud}ng Unscientific Postscript, p. 540. 
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This statement affirms Kierkegaard's basic view that self-
integration is a passionate act of faith. 
Kierkegaard insisted that faith increases with suffering 
and frustration. Thus he maintained that frustration is a 
good angel in disguise, since it serves to intensify faith.l 
He believed that a person who upheld his faith finds that 
life is reintegrated in reduplication, which means the trans-
formation of man's entire life in accordance with the pattern 
of Christ. 2 
Kierkegaard 1 s analysis of despair portrays profound in-
sights of depth psychology. In The Sickness Unto Death, he 
investigates the corruption within human nature in accordance 
with the psychological experience of despair. Kierkegaard 
represented despair under various categories. First, despair 
is described in terms of the factors in the synthesis of self-
hood such as finitude and infinitude, and possibility and 
necessity.3 As the self is a synthesis of finitude and in-
finitude, despair arises when either of the two factors gets 
out of equilibrium. The despair of infinitude portrays it-
self in fantasy.4 The despair of finitude means narrowmind-
edness.5 The individual adjusts to convention and becomes 
1. ~· 
2. Martin, op. cit., P• 169. 
3. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, PP• 54, 62. 
4. Ibid., p. 50. 
5. Ibid., P• 49. 
.l.CU 
wise in the ways of the world. The despair of possibility 
involves the individual who constantly maintains imagined 
possibilities without facing personal limitations.1 In 
modern psychological terminology, this person has an ar-
rested development. The despair of necessity manifests it-
self in philistinism or fatalism. Philistinism is the in-
ability to cope with reality, while fatalism means a dumb 
submission to life.2 The cure for despair of necessity is 
having faith in God, in Whom all things are possible. 
Secondly, Kierkegaard described despair in accordance 
with unconsciousness and consciousness. Unconscious despair 
is the refUsal to face the truth, and hiding behind illu-
sions. Kierkegaard•s important example of this type of des-
pair is Hegel's speculative system, which is viewed by Kier-
kegaard as an example of unconscious despair. Hegel's meta-
physical edifice, in Kierkegaard 1 s thought, is a speculative 
illusion that bas nothing to do with life. 
Conscious despair is Kierkegaard•s last essential cate-
gory. It involves two central factors of "not willing to be 
oneself, n3 and "willing to be oneself. n4 "Not willing to 
be oneself" is the despair of weakness, and it manifests 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4· 
Ibid., p. 54. 
Ibid., pp. 63, 65. 
Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, pp. 29-30~ 
Ibid. 
-
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itself in the enslavement to outward circumstances. "Will-
ing to be oneself" is despair of defiance; the individual 
seeks to overcome finiteness and necessity on his own power 
through the sheer exertion of his will.l All despair is an 
attempt of the individual "to tear self away from the Power 
which constituted it."2 Kierkegaard 1 s point of departure 
from a psychological to a theological view of despair is in 
the fact that all despair is sin, and its opposite is faith. 
What Klerkegaard has diagnosed psychologically as despair is 
considered by him to be theologically sin. The therapy is 
faith. 
In Kierkegaard 1 s theory of despair, Hegel had anticipa-
ted him. In the Positivity of Christian Religion, Hegel an-
alyzed despair in accordance with self-deception and false 
·tranquillity. Hegel defined selr-deception as the belief 
tha.t"one has the prescribed reeling, that one's feeling 
corresponds with what one finds described in the books."3 
But Hegel maintained that a feeling artificially "produced 
could not possibly be equivalent to the true and natural feel-
ing either in force or value.n4 The result of self deception 
leads to a false tranquillity which is an over estimation of 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Hegel, Early Theological Writings, P• 141. 
4. Ibid. 
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feelings "manufactured in a spiritual hothouse.nl If the 
individual recognizes the weakness of these feelings, nhe 
sinks into helplessness, anx~ety, a~d self-distrust, a 
psychical state which often develops into madness.n2 
He falls into despair if he thinks that, 
despite all his good will and every possible 
effort, his feelings have still not been 3 intensified to the extent required of him. 
In the realm of feeling, the person can never "reach any 
firm criterion of his perfection (except perhaps via de-
ceptive imagin1ngs).4 Hegel concluded that the individual 
may go 
into a frenzy of anxiety which lacks all 
strength and decision and which finds a 
measure of peace only io trusting on the 
boundless mercy of God.~ 
To summarize: Hegel holds that feeling, will, and in-
tellect have a common root in the mental life, and the in-
tegration of personality is the unity of these three parts 
of the one life of mind. Kierkegae.rd accounts for the inte-
gration, striving, and organization of the human person in 
accordance with the emotional-volitional act of faith. Kier-
kegaard 1 s view lacks Hegel's comprehensiveness, since the 
latter emphasizes the organic unity of the theoretical mind, 
practical mind, and free mind. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid. 
4· lQ!.g,. 
5. ~· 
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It is of interest to note that Kierkegaard•s theory of despair 
was recognized by Hegel, and the two thinkers analyzed despair 
in accordance with deceptive imaginings and will. 
4. Aesthetics 
Hegel's aesthetic philosophy is the first stage of the 
Absolute Mind, in which the Absolute Mind is revealed as a 
sensuous form. This subjective sphere of the Absolute Mind 
is the thesis of a triad, where religion is the objective 
sphere, or antithesis. And philosophy, the highest sphere, 
is the synthesis. In Art, the Absolute is revealed in beauty 
by way of a sensuous medium, which means the external repre-
sentation of the object under the conditions of time and 
spa~e.1 The individual seeks to reveal the Divine in vis-
ible form as the Beautiful. Material things are represented 
as symbols. 2 Hegel interpreted the mission of art to be the 
gathering of the scattered threads of beauty as it exists in 
symbol as one of the forms in which the Absolute exists for 
man. 
In studying art this is not a mere amusing 
playing, or a useful instrument with which we 
have to do, but is the attempted deliverance 
of the mind from the trammels of finite exist-
ence, and the manifestation and the harmony of 
1. Hegel, The Philosophy af'':'p:tne Art, trans. F. B. B. Os:n:a a-
ton (Loridon: Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1920), p. 12. 
2. Ibid. 
the Absolute under sensible forms, and thus it 
becomes the best recompense _for the rude travail 
to which man is condemned in the order of science 
and knowledge.l 
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Hegel's contribution is that the eternal idea of the "Beau-
tiful" is the quest of man, and man's art is his symbolical 
manifestation of one stage of the Absolute. Art addresses 
the sensibility and the imagination, and it differs from 
the reflective i'aculty, since 11 it cannot be submitted to 
its rigorous methods."2 ttThe enjoyment of it is not in-
creased by analyzing that -enjoyment."3 Furthermore, art 
-
bas a freedom that science lacks, i'or the world of "imagi-
nation is the world of the irregular and the arbitrary,n 
while the "world of science is the world of regularity and 
necessity.ii4 
Hegel's philosophy of art is comprehensive. It re-
veals insights into Greek art through classical German human-
ism; including Winckelmann to Goethe, Schiller, the Romantics, 
and Kant. In order to bring out his theory more clearly, He-
gel objected to Kant's theory of art. According to Hegel, 
the "Beautiful awoke in Kantian aesthetic a pleasure which 
1. Ibid., p. 301. 
2. Ibid., P• 2. 
3· Ibid. 
4· Ibid. 
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was disinterested without awakening the consciousness of an 
abstract idea.1 Hegel went beyond Kant by insisting that 
the ideal must be discovered not in its abstract but "in 
its living and concrete fonn, "2 which means spirit has arrived 
at the manner of existence which suits best the essential 
idea of spirit.3 
A basic detect in Hegel's treatment ot art is his view 
of the "Beautiful" in :nature. Hegel claimed that there is 
no criterion to determine the degree of natural beauty: 
is 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
The opinion has been uttered that the works 
of Art are inferior to the works of Nature, 
because the works ot man are inanimate, while 
these are organized and living; because in Art 
the life is only upon the surface, while the 
substance is only wood, stone, words, etc. But 
indeed this dead stuff is not the material with 
which Art deals. What it creates upon or with-
in it belongs to the domain or the spirit, and 
is living as it is. And in a circumstance, a 
character, or the development ot an action, 
what interests us Art seizes hold of and makes 
to reissue in a manner more living, purer and 
clearer than we find it in the objects of nature 
or the facts of real life; and this is why the 
creations of Art are higher than those of Nature. 
No real existence expresses the ideal as Art 
does. q. 
Hegel's main point is that the creative imagination 
richer and t'reer than nature. He held art to be 
Ibid.' p. 7. 
Ibid.' p. 17. 
Ibid.' p. 24. 
Ibid.' p. 8. 
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a higher movement than nature, since the latter lacks spir-
itual expression. But t irls position indicates that Hegel 
had not applied his teleological theory in his philosophy 
o~ nature to his explanation of nature in his Aesthetic. 
In the classification of the stages in the history of 
art, Hegel listed: symbolic art, classic art, and romantic 
art. What characterizes the ~irst o~ these, symbolic art, 
is the ~act that the spiritual is weighed down by the cor-
poreal and material; there~ore spiritual· meaning can only 
be suggested through a symbol. 1 Particular instances o~ 
symbolic art can be found in Hindu art, which sought to 
convey the greatness o~ the gods by multiplying their heads, 
ar.ms, and legs. In the second, classical art, there is the 
conciliation o~ content and ~or.m. Here the ~or.m adequately 
expresses the content. This ~act is particularly character-
istic of Greek art, since their statues were elear and fixed, 
crystallizing into perfect shape an ideal. 2 In the third, 
romantic art, no sensuous for.m can adequately express the 
spiritual characteristics which predominate. Captivated 
by romantic thought, man became indifferent to the natural 
world, since he realized his independence of it. "It 
is plastic .in .his hands."3 Art cente'red in spiritual terms 
1. Ibid., P• 130. 
2. ibid.' P• 136. 
3. Ibid., 
-
P• 147. 
of fidelity, chivalry, love, and humor. The ideal human 
holiness was in Jesus Christ, and the deeper significance 
of sin was brought before the human mind through rmnantic 
poetry, music, and painting. 
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For Hegel, these three stages reveal the evolution of 
arts in general, and the three must not be thou~t of as 
separable, since they run into each other. 
These words, Symbolic, Classic, Romantic, 
will be found very convenient to characterize 
stages of the evolution separable in thought. 
In the concrete they have never been pirfect-
ly separated, but run into each other. 
Hegel's statement is that art, like the history of philoso-
phy, is an evolution, and "anything seemingly new on the 
one side of any alleged gulf will be found to have its roots 
2 far back in the other." 
Turning to the interrelations of the special arts, He-
gel followed this sequence: architecture, sculpture, paint-
ing, music, and poetry. Of these, only poetry is the univer-
sal art, for it can fully express the Absolute Idea. For He-
gel, there are several areas within the poetical field com-
parable to the stages in the life of man. The beginning is 
with epic poetry, which is akin to the childhood of man. 
Epic :poetry appeals to the supernatural and imaginative 
1. Ibid.' p. 123. 
2. Ibid. 
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capacity, rather than the rational faculties. Lyric poetry 
shows the stage of adolescence in man; it is overly subjec-
tive. Poetic maturity is revealed in dramatic poetry, for 
all avenues of feelings are opened to the mind. And only 
dramatic poetry can adequately reveal the Absolute. 
Kierkegaard•s aesthetics lacks the comprehensiveness 
of Hegel•s. In Kierkegaard's thought, the art of life is 
the highest art. His view is sharply distinguished from 
the historical study of art, which is concerned with the 
development of schools and style as 1n Hegel's point of 
view. Kierkegaard suggested throughout his many aestheti-
cal works that art is life: 
An eternity ••• is something which cannot be 
represented in art, let it be your comfort as 
it is mine that tm highest and most beautiful 
things in life are not to be heard about, nor 
read about, nor seen but, if one will, may be 
lived.l 
Following this same argument, Kierkegaard pointed out: 
In one of the tales of the Romantic School 
which evinces the greatest genius, there is 
one character who .has no desire to write poetry 
like the others among whom he lives, because 
it is a waste of time and deprives him of the 
true enjoy.ment; he prefers to live. Now if 
he had had the right conception of what it ~s 
to live, he would have been the man for me. 
An analysis of the preceding statements reveals Kierke-
gaard' s important point to be that life is an art, which 
1. 
2. 
Kierkegaard, Either~r, I. Cf. Robert Bretall's A Kier-
ke~aard Anthology ( inceton: Princeton University Press, 19 1), p. 89. 
Ibid. 
consists in studying am "finding deligpt in people. 111 Kier-
kegaard suggested that there are three spheres of life: aes-
thetics, ethics, and religion. The aesthetic stage, which 
represents his view of art, is the sphere of immediacy, and 
characterizes life in the actual passion and pleasure of the 
moment. 
Every man, however lowly his talents are, 
however subordinate his position in life, natu-
rally feels the need of forming a life· view, a 
conception of life's significance and of its 
purpose •••• The universal expression which has 
been heard from age to age an~ in all stages 
is this: One must enjoy life. 
The aesthetic individual has an immediate interest in the 
pleasures of the world. 
Kierkegaard•s essential contribution is his analysis of 
the aesthetic moment. At the end of the ''Banquet Scene" in 
the Stages, Johannes the Seducer ends his speech with the 
proposition that woman is only the moment.3 According to 
Kierkegaard, this is in its generality the essential aes-
thetic principle. Namely: 
The moment is everything, and in so 
again essentially nothing; just as the 
phistic proposition that ev~rything is 
means that nothing is true.LI-
far 
so-
true 
1. Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, p. 438. 
2. Kierkegaard, Either/Or, II, 152. 
3. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 265. 
4- Ibid. 
Kierkegaard•s statement implies that for the aesthetician 
the moment is everything, but as an instant of time it is 
1 perpetually vanishing. Thus to say the moment is every-
thing is equal to saying that it is nothing. 
In Either/Or, Kierkegaard pointed out further that 
aesthetic love has its concentration in the moment, and 
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"the more intense the concentration the greater the aes-
thetic effect. 112 In this work, Kierkegaard traced the aes-
thetic moment through a variety of media. His treatment 
includes aphorisms, an extensive analysis of Mozart•s Don 
Juan, a general treatment of music~ a comparison of ancient 
and modern tragedy emphasizing the character of Antigone, a 
series of subjective portraits, an essay on Scribe• s ''The 
First Love, 11 and a concluding section of the first volume 
entitled the "Diary of the Seducer." Kierkegaard•s essen-
tial point is that the aesthetic moment is a sensual genius, 
which is absolutely lyrical. 
It is force, life, movement, com tan t un-
rest, perpetual succession, but this unrest, 
this succession, does not enrich it, it remains 
always the same, it does not unfold itself, but 
it storms unin~erruptedly forward as if in a 
single breath. 
Kierkegaard added that the restlessness and resultant des-
pair of the aesthetic way of life arise in tbe fact that 
1. Ibid., p. 265. 
2. Kierkegaard, Either/Or, I, 99· 
3 • Ibid • ' p • 57 • 
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this passing moment is both everything and nothing. 
Unlike Hegel, Kierkegaard had no hierarchy of the arts. 
But he agreed with Hegel that in the aesthetic life the 
natural passion must become ideal passion. Kierkegaard•s 
aesthetic category implies the sphere of religion. For ex-
ample, a few months after Either/Or was publiShed, Kierke-
gaard issued Two Editying Discourses. The former deals ex-
tensively with the aesthetic sphere, while the latter illus-
trates the religious stage. The relationship between the 
two is stated in Kierkegaard•s own words: 
I held out Either/Or to the world in my 
left hand, and in my right the Two Edifying 
Discourses; but all, or as good as all, 
grasp~d with their right what I held in my 
lef't. 
Kierkegaard•s contention is that at the same time that he 
was an aesthetic writer, he was al so a religious writer. 
Furthermore, this point E substantiated in the publication 
in July 1847, of' an essay entitled The Crisis and a Crisis 
in the Life of an Actress. The essay was signed Inter et 
Int er. By this signature, Kierkegaard intended to indicate 
that as he had been a religious author from the beginning. 
so he is an aesthetician still at the end.2 The point is 
made here that Kierkegaard' s philosophy of art does not 
1. Kierkegaard, The Point of View, trans. Walter Lowrie 
(London: Oxford UniversiV,r Press, 1939}, p. 20. 
2. Ibid.' p . 150. 
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analyze passion for the sake of passion, but his main thesis 
is that the aesthetic stage is the point of departure toward 
spiritual being. Thus Kierkegaard maintained a view, which 
has its seed thought in Hegel, that the purpose of art is 
not merely for the stimulation of pleasure, but man's art 
should lead him from natural toward spiritual being. To 
quote Hegel: 
The notion is ina·dequate that the purpose 
of art is merely to excite the sensation of 
pleasure. Those systems which content· them-
selves with the analysis of impressions and 
emotions, and go no further, are insufficient, 
since they furnish no fixed standard, no cri-
terion of excellence •••• Although the object 
is addressed to the sense immediately, yet 
mediately and ultimately it is addressed to 
mind, ind intended to reach our spiritual 
being. 
For Hegel, as for Kierkegaard, art is the point of depar-
ture for religion. 
·There is a central tendency of Klerkegaard's thought 
that diffe'rs .from Hegel's view on the transition from one 
stage to another. 2 The distinctive feature of Kierkegaard's 
difference can be briefly stated. It consists of change 
.from one sphere to another involving a leap by which the re-
ligious passion called faith emerges. This transition re-
1. Hegel, PhilosO£hy or Fine .Art, p. 12. 
2. Cf. Chapter II, Pt. B. The above point of view does 
not deny an early position that the Hegelian strain in 
Kierkegaard' s view would imply "that ,he is opposed to 
any succession of completely unrelated steps. But in 
his anti-Hegelian moods, Kierkegaard would insist that 
each stage is a radical break with the preceding one." 
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quires a divine assistance. According to K~erkegaard, the 
transition from the aesthetic to the religious sphere is a 
subjective act of faith. 
Hegel differs with Kierkegaard at this point. In his 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Fine Art, the German philoso-
pher points out frequently that the transition pf art through 
its stages to the religious sphere is necessitated by the 
Notion, ani is logically deduced. The term nlogically de-
duced'' implies, tor Hegel, that the transition must be ob-
jective, and not merely a subjective act. Since the Abso-
lute is Spirit, it can only be known as Spirit. But the 
very notion of art involves the apprehension of the Absolute 
not as Spirit but essentially as sense-object. Art being 
tbus inadequate and contradictory, a new form is required. 
Religion is the intermediate stage between art and philoso-
phy. In religion the Absolute is apprehended as partly sen-
suous and partly rational, whereas in philosophy the Abso-
lute is apprehended as pure thought. 
To summarize: Kierkegaard•s outstanding contribution 
to art is his analysis of tba aesthetic moment. Hegel is 
famous for his evolutionary theory of art. Hegel and Kier-
kegaard agree that art is related to religion, since the 
two philosophers suggest that the material embodiment of 
art should lead to a spiritual reality. But the two think-
ers disagree on the way the transition from one stage to 
another must be understood. 
5. Ethics 
Hegel's concept of ethics is presented in the doctrine 
of objective mind, whiah is the antithesiB in 'the super-
triad of Philosophy at' :&lind, including: subjective mind, 
objective mind, and Absolute Mind. In ethics, Hegel ob-
jected to the abstract morality of individual conscience. 
Opposing the abstract good will of Kant, Kierkegaard main-
tained that it is the concrete social good which determines 
our actual duties in accordance with family, society, and 
political relations. In Hegel's thought, ethics is repre-
sented in the s tate, since there is no sovereign over state. 
Thus true morality is found only in the social, because only 
in the state does man reach the universal and rational.1 
Hegel discussed ethics under three main heads: abstract 
right, abstract morality, and social ethics. Hegel defined 
abstract right in the following mgnner: 
Personality essentially involves the capac-
ity for rights and constitutes the concept and 
the basis (itself abstract) of the system of 
abstract and therefore formal right. Hence 
the imperative of right is:2 •Be a person and respect others as persons.' 
What does Hegel mean? The individual :is a person, insofar as 
he possesses and exercises rights as a person. Thus the rule 
1. Hegel, Philosophy of Risht, p. 11. 
2. Ibid.' p. 37. 
of right is, "Be a person and respect others as persons."l 
According to Hegel, a person is entitled to the right of 
property, which is the realization of a self-conscious will 
in an external thing. There is also the right of contract, 
2 that is, the freedom to dispose of private property. Fi-
nally, wrong is the synthesis of the sub-triad of property 
and contract. Wrong means that the individual will has 
placed itself against the universal will.3 Justice is the 
universal will restoring itself over the will of the par-
ticular. 
The second stage, abstract morality, Hegel defined as 
the sphere of freedom. "Morality, therefore throughout 
portrays the real aspect of the concept of freedam."4 This 
level has three momentsJ purpose, intention, and conscience. 
Hegel thought that in purpose the individual was not treated 
as a person but as a subjeot.5 Purpose is the will reflec-
ted into itself 1 which means tba t the will belongs to the 
individual and is distinguished from the existing freedom 
in an external thing. Intention, as Hegel defined it, is 
the right of the subject to shape his action in accordance 
with his purposes and wants.6 Both purpose and intention 
1. Ibid:., P• 38. 
2. Ibi:ci-., 
-
P• 58. 
3· Ibid·., p. 64. 
4· Ibid., P• 75. 
5. Ibid:., P• 82. 
6. Ibid. 
-
are abstract, since they can be applied only to particular 
isolated instances. Hegel's third stage or the sub-section 
concerns the good and conscience. "The good is the Idea as 
the unity or the concept or the will with the particular 
will."1 Good, as the determination or the universal will, 
is rreedo.m realized, the absolute end and a~ or the world. 
"Conscience," in Hegel's ethics, "is the expression or the 
absolute title or subjective self-consciousness to know in 
itself and rram within itself what is right and obligatory.•2 
As the unity of subjective knowing what is absolute, con-
science is •a sanctuary which it would be sacrilege to vio-
late."3 
The third basic triad is the sphere o£ social ethics, 
which is the unity o£ abstract right and morality. Social 
ethics deals with the ramily, civil society, and the state. 
Hegel's theory or ethics is organic. The individual has 
real existence, and ethical status only in being a member 
or the state. The entire third part or the Philosophie 
des Rechta smphasizes that the individual must achieve his 
will in an objective social order, which in return must 
accord with his will. According to Hegel, in the state there 
must be the unity or the individual and the universal. To 
quote from Hegel: . 
1. !bid., P• 86. 
2. Ibid., P• 91. 
3· !bid. 
The state as a completed reality is the ethi-
cal whole and the act~alization of freedom. The 
state is the spirit, which abides in the world 
and there realizes itself consciously; while in 
nature it is realized only as the other of it-
self or the sleeping spirit. Let man be aware 
of it or not, this essence realize• itself as 
an independent power, in which partic~ar per-
sons are only phases! The state is the march 
of God in the world. 
As the :foregoing statement suggests, the state is a self-
conscious ethical totality, which smbodies the unifica-
tion of the family and the civil society. 
But what has Hegel's theory of ethics to do with Kier-
kegaard's view? An analysis of Kierkegaard's thinking on 
ethics reveals a very close agreement with Hegel's point 
2 
of view. Like Hegel, Kierkegaard is convinced the ethics 
involves the category of the universal. According to the 
Danish philosopher, the ethical individual desires to unite 
himself' to others in social obligations of friendship, mar-
riage, and work in a community.3 Perhaps Kierkegaard•s 
closeness to Hegel at this point is clear, since the preced-
ing view that the individual has a social obligation is in-
consistent with his main thesis that truth is subjective 
and individ~alized. But Kierkegaard's ethics implies that 
1. Knox, op~ -cit·. I P• 258. 
2. R. Tbo.mte, op~ cit., P• 57n. The author says that: "In Fear .and .Tremb1ipg the ethical is the ethical in a He-
gelian ~ense.* 
3. c.r. Kierkegaard's Sta8es .on .L1te 1s Wax. 
there is a universal truth toward which the individual is 
responsible: 
Ethics is as such the Universal, and as the 
Universal, it is valid for all •••• The individ-
ual is the individual who has his telos in the 
Universal, and his ethical task is to express 
himBelf continually in the Universal, to strip 
himself of h1s1 individuality in order to become the Universal. 
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Here Kierkegaard•s claim is that t he ethical life is in-
volved in the mutual obligation and responsibility to the 
universal, which is later considered by him as man• s high-
est duty. 
Although Kierkegaard perceived the ethical nor.m to be 
the universal, yet there are ar eas i n which ethics as the 
universal may become a temptation. Three comments will 
illustrate Kierkegaard•s objections further in the follow-
ing discussion. First is an example of Hegel•s identifi-
cation of the state with the divine. In the Instant, Kier-
kegaard stated his objection to Hegel in the following 
manner: 
How on earth did such a reasonable being 
as the state take an absurdity into its head; 
the desire for patronizing the divine. Now, 
this is a long story, but namely it is con-
nected with the fact that Christianity in 
the course of time was served less and less 
according to its true character as the divine.2 
1. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 258. 
2. This passage is translated in Karl .r!bwith• s article, "On 
the Historical Understanding of Kie r kegaard," Review of 
Religion 17, (1943), 238. 
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Kierkegaard is criticizing Hegel for making the state the 
march of God upon the earth. But a similar construction is 
found in Kierkegaardts statement that, "The ethical is and 
remains the highest task for every human being •••• The ethi-
cal is the very breath of the eternal. 111 Here, Kierkegaard 
is, in principle, guilty of identifying God with whatever 
is man's universal. If it is true, as Kierkegaard insists, 
that the ethical is the highest task of man, and if the 
ethical is also the universal implying man•s total social 
responsibility, the.n the "very breath of the eternal" is 
identified to whatever is man's highest social responsibil-
ity. Hegel claimed that the state is man•s highest ethical 
responsibility, and he associated the state with the march 
of God on the earth. 
Secondly, Kierkegaard saw a deficiency in the ethical 
universal as is illustrated in the problem: nrs there such 
a thing as a teleological suspension of the ethica1?"2 The 
phrase means, for Kierkegaard, that the universal morality 
can be suspended in the case of some particular and revealed. 
dFectly by God to the individual's conscience.3 Kierkegaard 
pointed out that in the case of Abraham there is such a sus-
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp.l35-136. 
2. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 79. 
3. Ibid., p. 38. 
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pension. Abraham is called upon by God to sacririce his son, 
Isaac. Ethically considered Abraham's act to sacririce his 
son is murder on the one hand, and religiously considered 
it is obedience to God's commandment on the other.l Abraham 
suspended what was universally ethical, so that he might 
obey the will or God. Here the individual stands opposed 
to the universal morality. Kierkegaard's attitude is that 
in the case or a special revelation or God to man, the in-
dividual has a right to disobey the ethical categories or 
his cultural lire.2 Kierkegaard emphasized the motive or 
individual choice as opposed to the universal objective 
reason of Hegel's ethics. 
It is interesting to note that Hegel foresaw with com-
prehensive insight the weakness of extreme individualism of 
the type which the foregoing view of Kierkegaard illustrates. 
Hegel analyzed clearly the contention that the individual is 
over the community in the following passage: 
It is not the thing that is excellent, but 
I who am so; as the master of law and thing 
alike, I simply play with them as with my 
caprice; my consciously ironical attitude 
lets the highest perish and I merely hug 
myself at the thought.3 
1. Ibid. 
2. Thomte, op. cit., p. 59. 
3. Knox, op~ ·cit. P• 102. 
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"This type of' subjectivism111 represents, f'or Hegel, the prin-
ciple of' evil, since it 11 substitutes a void for the whole 
content o:f ethics, right, duties, and laws."2 If' the p~eced-
ing statement be true, Hegel saw the limitation of' extreme 
individualism, f'or he opposed the individual deciding over 
against the group on truth and values. 
Thirdly, Kierkegaard claimed that Hegel's syste.m had 
no ethics, since his view mediated the distinction between 
good and evil.J In Hegel's dialectic opposites are au.f-
gehoben into a higher unity, which preserves the two con-
traries in a new for.m while it destroyed them as separate 
entities. Kierkegaard's objection is that this is the de-
struction of' all ethics. Good and evil are absolutely dis-
tinct, and they can not be synthesized into a third. "Pan-
theistic systems ••• abrogate the distinction between good 
and evil, and destroy freedom."4 Kierkegaard•s central 
criticism of' Hegel's ethics is in the following quotation: 
The derelict Hegelian ethics, with its 
desperate attempt to make the State the court 
of' last resort, is a most unethical attempt 
to reduce the individual to finitude, an un-
ethical flight f'rom the category of the in-
dividgal personality to the category of the 
race.~ 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientif'ic Postscript, P• 111. 
4• Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
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In the foregoing quotations Kierkegaard is making conces-
sions to the religious category as being above the ethical. 
As it has been shown, in one basic aspect of his ethical 
thought, Kierkegaard held in an Hegelian mode of thought 
that the ethical is the universal and the highest task for 
man. Kierkegaard is saying that the religious category is 
man's highest task, and he is objecting to Hegel's media-
tion of inner and outer, good and evil, and the individual 
and universal. 
6. Religion 
There is a close resemblance in their views of religion 
in the young Hegel and Kierkegaard, although this similarity 
is not so pointed in the mature Hegel.l An analysis of 
Nohl' s Hegel's Theologische · .Jugendschri.ften brings to light 
that in the early Hegel, there is an emphasis upon the 
practical and existential meaning in religion. In Hegel's 
thinking, Volks-religion is characterized a synthesis of the 
objective and the subjective, understanding and .feeling, re-
ligion of the mind and religion of the heart. Accordingly, 
1. Josef Maier, On Hegel's Critique o.f Kant (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, -l9 39), P• 8 Maier writes: "Hegel's 
mind was oriented toward practical philosophy from the -
very beginning. The earliest recorded phase of his in-
tellectual development shows him struggling with the 
religious problem." 
Hegel distinguished between Sache des Verstandes and Sache 
des Herzens. Subjective religion is immediate, living hu-
manity; objective religion is institutionalized religion.l 
Hegel maintained that there must not be any barrier between 
life and Volks-religion. The latter must be in harmony with 
all the feelings and emotions of life. 2 Furthermore, Volks-
religion must accompany the people and assist them in their 
serious activities as well as in their feasts and exulta-
tions.3 In a striking existential statement, the young He-
gel maintained that Verstandesbildung made men ttwiser but 
not better.ri4 Moreover, 
Skillful reasoning, calculating thinking, 
can never lead to a truly moral order of life. 
Principles are nev~ made practical through 
the understanding.~ 
Like Kierkegaard, Hegel maintained that no printed morals, 
or enlightment of the mind can prevent "evil desire from 
arising and developing to a great degree.n6 The end to 
which all efforts must be directed is the same for Kierke-
1. This passage from Hegel's Theologische Jugendschriften is 
translated by Maier, op. cit., p. 11. 
2. Hermann Nohl, Hegel's Theologische Jugendschriften (Tu-
bingen, Mohr, 1907), p. 26. This point of view is ex-
pressed in Maier, op. cit., P• 11. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., P• 12, translated by Maier, op. cit., p. 48. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
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gaard as the young Hegel: "Man shall act, function, and re-
solve for himself and not let others act for him."1 
In the mature Hegel, there was a greater emphasis upon 
the religion of reason becoming a positive faith, although 
still present were the existential insights of the Young He-
gel. Accordingly, Hegel's philosophy culminated not with 
religion as the highest stage, as Kierkegaard 1 s did, but 
philosophy. For instance, within the category of Absolute 
Mind, Hegel treated art, religion, and philosophy. Art re-
veals the subjective phase of the Absolute Mind, while re-
ligion shows the objective element, yet philosophy is the 
highest embodiment of Absolute Mind. In religion, the an-
tithesis of art, the doctrine of the Trinity is regarded by 
Hegel in terms of a logical triad. In particular, the 
Father represented the thesis, the Son, antithesis, and the 
Holy Spirit, the synthesis. This dialectical triad may be 
stated in another way: As Absolute Identity, God is Father. 
In going forth eternally in the finite beings, God is Son. 
After cancelling this distinction, and being enriched by 
this self-manifestation, God is Holy Spirit.2 
Basically, Hegel's conception is that religion repre-
sents only symbolical truth. In the final analysis, it is 
philosophy alone that can pierce to the final truth concern-
1. Ibid. 
2. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, P• 397. 
ing God. In the concluding words or Philosophie der Religion, 
Hegel stated: 
These lectures have had as their aim to rec-
oncile reason with religion and to interpret 
religion in its manirold forms as necessary. 
Faith possesses the right content; it has still 
to be given the right form or thought.l 
. . 
The above statement indicates the Hegelian interpretation 
that the content or religion and philosophy are similar, 
but philosophy molds this content into a higher ror.m. 
Unlike Hegel's subjugation of religion to philosophy, 
Kierkegaard makes religion· the highest sphere in his scale 
of values. 
While aesthetic existence is essentially en-
joyment, and ethical existence essentially 
struggle and victory, religious existence is 
essentially suffering, and that not as a tran-
sitional moment, but as persisting.2 
Implicit within this element of suffering, Kierkegaard was 
aware or man's estrangement, finitude, and guilt. Suffering 
and anguish are bound up with the religious consciousness. 
Against Hegel, Kierkegaard maintained that faith, and not 
r~ason, is the bridge whereby the chasm between man and God 
2. Kierkegaard, Conciuding Unscientific Postscript, p. 256. 
may be reconciled. With Hegel, Kierkegaard insisted, how-
ever, that man is a synthesis of Infinite and finite, free-
dom and necessity, and eternality and temporality, but the 
relationship is based upon the absurdity of faith, rather 
than the assurance of reason. 
F. An evaluation and summary 
The aim of this chapter has been to assess generally 
the extent of Hegel's influence upon Kierkegaard. The ar-
gument of this chapter has been that Kierkegaard's relation-
ship to Hegel involves a double irony. That is, Kierkegaard 
uses Hegel's teP.minology and views to give birth to his rea-
soning as well as a germ for his criticism of Hegel. Thus 
Kierkegaard's relationship to Hegel is always paradoxical. 
There are several important points on which Hegel and Kier-
kegaard agree, and often enough this agreement suggests a 
profound influence of Hegel on the Danish philosopher. Yet 
even in this basic sphere of agreement, Kierkegaard 1 s use 
of Hegelianism is not free from reservation and hesitancy. 
The following stataments may summarize the main points 
of this chapter: 
1. Kierkegaard's division of the three stages sug-
gests the inspiration of Hegel's triadic design. 
Up to a certain point, the religious stage of the 
Danish philosopher is the synthesis of the two 
preceding stages. The movements of Kierkegaard's 
stages are related steps in a Hegelian fashion, -
in spite of the for.mer•s emphasis that the move-
ments from step to step are unrelated. 
2. rr it be true that Kierkegaard 1 s view or ethics em-
phasizes the unity or the inner and outer, then he 
is close to Hegel's idealistic tradition. However, 
Kierkegaard's theory or the teleological suspension 
or the ethical is an attack upon Hegel's universal 
morality. 
3. Hegel's idealistic theory or knowledge is rar more 
adequate than K1erkegaard 1 s realistic position or 
immediate intuition. 
4. Kierkegaard's objection to Hegel's identification 
or logie and metaphysics as an abstract identity 
misses the empirical side of Hegel's thought. 
5. Kierkegaard opposes Hegel's position that nature is 
an object or thought. But the ror.mer agrees with 
Hegel that nature serves as a medium which reveals 
the Absolute. 
6. Kierkegaard 1 s philosophy or art lacks the compre-
hensiveness of Hegel's view, since the Danish 
thinker does not deal with the development of his-
torical theories and schools. Kierkegaard 1 s basic 
contribution to art is an analysis of the aesthetic 
moment, while Hegel is famous tor his evolutionary 
theory of art. The two thinkers agree that art is 
related to religion. 
7. In psychology, Hegel holds that will, feeling, and 
intellect have a common root; they are parts of the 
one life of mind and cannot be separated rrom each 
other as Kierkegaard seeks to do. 
8. There are certain aspects ot Hegel's religious 
thought, especially his early theological writings, 
which are close to Kierkegaard 1 s position. 
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CHAPTER III 
KIERKEGAARD' S ATTEMPTED REFUTATION OF HEGELIAN IDEALISM 
A. Preliminary considerations 
The basic aim of this chapter is twofold: First, to de-
fend Hegel's philosophy against Kierkegaard•s main criticisms 
of it. Secondly, clearer insights are sought on the problem 
of this study concerning the relation between the two thinkers 
by showing that Kierkegaard often misinterprets Hegel's view, 
while holding at the same time in principle a position near 
to him. The following discussion of being and thought, free-
dom and necessity, system and finality, and speculation and 
objectivity will seek to crystallize the twofold aim. The 
crucial question of this chapter: Is Kierkegaard correct in 
his interpretation of Hegel? 
B. Being and thought 
Kierkegaard•s attack on Hegel was largely against Hegel's 
identification or the rational with the rea1.1 In Philosophie 
des Recht, Hegel stated that reality is rational. There-
fore, "to comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy, 
because what is, is reason. "2 According to Kierkegaard, Hegel 
1. Hegel, Hegel's Phil~sophy of Rignt, p. 10. 
2. Ibid., p. 11. 
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made the cognitive, rerlective aspect of existence dominant, 
while confusing thought with existence. Kierkegaard wrote 
in Concluding Unscientific Postscript: 
The philosophical principle or identity is 
precisely the opposite of what it seems to be; 
it is the expression for the fact that thought 
has deserted existence altogether.l 
Kierkegaard maintained that Hegel identiried all the rich-
ness of existence with thought, and the speculative philos-
opher forgot what it meant to live. In Kierkegaard's view, 
existence can not be thought, since "if I think it I abro-
--
gate it."2 "It might therefore seem to be the proper thing 
to say that there is something that cannot be thought, -
namely, existence."3 Consequently, for Kierkegaard, the 
subsequent error of Hegel's confusion of existence and 
thought results in a metaphysical system or pure being and 
pure thought. 
So called pure thought is in general a psy-
chological curiosity, a remarkable species of 
combining and construing in a fantastic medium, 
the medium of pure being. The facile deifica-
tion of this pure thought as the · highest stage 
in life shows that the thinker4who does it has never existed gua human being. 
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 295. 
2. Ibid., P• 274. 
3. Ibid. 
4• Ibid., p. 269 
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Hegel's rationalistic metaphysics or pure being and 
pure thought, Kierkegaard called abstract and a "fantastic 
bypothesis."l In his opinion Hegel failed to understand 
that it is impossible to grasp real being in a conceptual 
formulation of existence. If Hegel had comprehended this 
fact, Kierkegaard would have considered him the greatest 
thinker that has ever lived. 2 Now he is comic, which means 
something both to laugh at and to weep over. In opposition, 
therefore, to Hegel, Kierkegaard posed the following ques-
tion: 
That Hegel in his Logic. nevertheless per-
mits himself to utilize a consciousness that 
is only too well infor.med about the concrete, 
and what it is that the professor needs next 
in spite of the necessary transition, is of 
course a faul~which Trendelenburg has very 
effectively called to our attention. To cite 
an example from the field of the subject im-
mediately before us, how is the transition 
effected by which die Existenz becomes a plu-
rality of existences? •Die Existenz ist die 
unmittelbare Einheit der Reflexion-in-sich 
und der Refiexion-in-ariders. sie ist daher ••• 
die unbesttmmte Men~e von Existierenden.• How 
does the purely abs ract determination of e4-
istence come to be split up in this manner?~ 
Kierkegaard•s answer to the question of "how does the 
purely abstract determination of existence come to be split 
up in this manner" might be stated as follows: Factual ex-
1. Ibid. ' p. 292. 
2. Kierkegaard, The Journals o:f Kierkegaard, p. 134. 
3. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscienti:fic Postscript, p. 267n. 
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istence is concrete, and it is indifferent to the many dif-
ferences of essence. 
For factual existence is subject to the dia-
lectic of Hamlet: to be or not to be. Factual 
existence is wholly indifferent to any and all 
variations in essence, and everything that exists 
participates without any petty jealousy in being, 
and participates in the same degree. Ideally to 
be sure, the case is quite different. But the 
moment I ·speak .of being in the ideal sense I no 
longer speak of being, but of essence. Highest 
ideality has this necessity and therefore it is. 
But this its being is identical with its essence; 
such being does not involve it dialectically in 
the determinations of factual existence, since it 
is.l 
Kierkegaard was aware that being-in thought functions well 
within the sphere of pure being, where the latter is synony-
mous with pure thought. But it cannot succeed in the area 
of factual existence, since a "philosophy of pure thought is 
for an existing individual a ~himera.u2 
It is interesting to note that Kierkegaard's polemic 
against the category of pure being is limited to the iden-
tification of thought and existence. His criticism is not 
directed at pure being itself, but Hegel's identification of 
thought with being or existence with es~ence.3 The result 
of this seems to lead Kierkegaard to an important considera-
tion. A positive element of thought emerged in the attitude of 
1. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Eragffients, p. 33n. 
2. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 275. 
3. Wyschogrod, M., Kierkegaard and .Heidegger: The Ontology 
of Existence (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 
1954), p. 127. 
158 
Kierkegaard towards Hegel.1 This element is found in Kierke-
gaard•s identification of the concept of eternity with the 
category of pure being. Kierkegaard said: 
In modern philosophy the abstraction cul-
minates in Wpure being•; but pure being is 
the most abstract express ion for eternity, 
and in tur~ like •nothing', it is the in-
stant.2 
The main point of the quoted passage is that Kierkegaard iden-
tified eternity with the category of pure being and the con-
cept of the instant. An analysis of Kierkeg3ard•s concept 
of the instant reveals the theoretical abstraction of eternity 
into a category of pure being. Speaking of Plato•s view of 
the instant, Kierkegaard wrote: 
By Plato the instant was conceiven in a 
purely abstract way. To orient oneself in 
the category of the instant one must take 
into acyount the fact that !t is non-being 
under the category of time • 
. . 
Kierkegaard is to add that non-being was conceived ontologi-
cally by the _. Eleatic philosophers "to the effect that what 
~ 
is affirmed about it can only be affirmed in contradictions, 
that only being is."4 After comparing Greek philosophy to 
the modern view of being, Kierkegaard pointed out that, 
"Greek philosophy m d modern philosophy alike take the posi-
1. Ibid. 
2. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 75n. 
3. Ibid., p. 74n. 
4- Ibid. 
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tion that everything depends upon getting non-being to came 
into existence."1 
But Kierkegaard distinguished the last two positions 
from the Christian concept, since: 
The Christian view takes the position that 
non-being is everywhere present as the Nothing 
out of which all is created, as appearance and 
vanity 1 as sin •••• as the temporal forgotten 
by eternity; wherefore the whole point is t~ 
do away with it and get being in its stead. 
Resuming the argument concerning Plato•s view of the in-
stant, Kierkegaard shows that the instant is "the general 
category or transition. ,.3 
For Plato shows that the instant is rela-
ted in the same way to the transition from 
unity to plurality and from plurality to 
unity, from likeness to unlikeness, etc., 
it is the instant in which there is ••• 
neither discrimination nor integration ••• 
With all this Plato has the merit of making 
the difficulty clear, but neverthel~ss the 
instant remains a mute abstraction.~ 
Kierkegaard adds further tm t in the dialogue Parmenides, 
Plato reveals the consequences of the instant as an abstrac-
tion in the following way: 
It is shown then how under the category of 
time there emerges the contradiction that 
unity ••• becomes younger and older than i tsel:t' 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 75n. 
4- Ibid. 
and than plurality ••• and then in turn, that 
it is neither younger nor older than itself 
and plurality •••• Unity nevertheless must ex-
ist, it is said, and now it is defined thus: 
participition in a being or an essence in the 
present. 
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In developing further Plato t s expression that "under the 
category of time there emerges the contradiction," Kierke-
gaard points out the argument that leads directly to his 
central doctrine of the instant in the following statement: 
Of the contradiction it then appears that 
the present ••• wavers between the present, the 
eternal, the instant. This tnow• ••• lies be-
tween •was' and twill bet and unity, as it 
strives forward from the past to the future, 
cannot leap by this •now•. So then it canes 
to a stop with the2 tnow•, does not became older nor younger. -
In Kierkegaard' s thought the "now" of the foregoing passage 
becomes the fullness of time or the never changing "pres-
ent." This is the meaning of eternity as seen in thecate-
gory of pure being and as characterized by the instant.3 
Kierkegaard defines the instant in these words, "The 
instant is not properly an atom of time but an atom of e-
ternity. n4 Identifying his view with the Christian position, 
Kierkegaard states tta t the instant is the "fullness of 
time, n5 and yet "this eternity is at once the .future and 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 79. 
5. Ibid. 
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the past."l According to Kierkegaard, time is an infinite 
succession.2 But time and eternity touch in the instant.3 
Eternity is constantly intersecting time in a series of 
moments. The above passages indicate clearly that the clue 
to Kierkegaard•s meaning of eternity is related to his view 
of pure being and the instant.4 
The pure being of Hegelian rationalistic metaphysics 
is close to Kierkegaard•s view of eternity. Kierkegaard 
does not say that his view is related to Hegel• s, but as 
it has been indicated Kierkegaard explicitly stated that 
pure being and eternity are the same.5 And the culmination in 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4-
5. 
Ibid. 
Ibid.' p. 77. 
Ibid., P• 79. 
Martin Heidegger, "Sein und Zeit" Jahrbuch fHr Philoso-
phie und Phanomenologische Forschung 8 (1927), p.235 n. 
Passage Is translated In Michael Wyschogrod•s Kierke~~ 
and Heidegger (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.,l 54), 
p. 127. Heldegger expresses the view that Kierkegaard•s 
acceptaro e of the ontology of pure being represents an 
acceptance of the ontology of Hegel and the philosophy of 
antiquity. "In the 19th century s. Kierkegaard explicit-
ly grasped the problem of existence as an existential one 
and thought it through penetratingly. The existentialis-
tic problem is so foreign to him, however, that in the 
ontological respect he is completely under the sway of 
Hegel and the philosophy or antiquity as seen through 
him." . 
Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p •. 75n. 
modern philosophy of the abstract category of pure being 
is another name for eternity.l An analysis of Hegel's 
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theory of pure being will thrQ;w further light on the rela-
tion between Hegel and Kierkegaard. Because ar the logical 
abstraction of being, in Hegel's thinking, nothing is iden-
tified with it. "The pure concept of being is seen to con-
tain the idea of nothing. Absence of everything is the 
same as nothing. 112 Becoming is the third category of the 
triad, which means that being and nothing are superceded. 
Hegel wrote in the Logik that the truth is that "each immed-
iately disappears in its opposite. "3 The category of be-
coming is essential to Hegel's system, since God, life, 
history, nature, and the world are in the process of becom-
ing. According to Hegel, becoming is actualization.4 Be-
coming suspends itself, and becomes something actually ex-
istent here-and-now, which is Dasein. The term Dasein 
means a definite, being, that is, a determinate being.5 
"Becoming," Hegel said 
1. Ibid. 
2. Hegel, Science of Logic, I, 95. 
3. Carl J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Hegel (New York: 
The Modern Library, 1953), p. Xliii. 
4- Ibid. 
5. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, p. 145. 
stands before us in utter restle~sness •••• Be-
coming is, as it were, a fire, which dies out 
in itself, when it consumes its material. The 
result of this process, however, is not an 
empty nothing, but ••• determinate being; the 
primary import of which evidently is that it 
has beeome.l 
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Hegel is convinced that what is destroyed in one form is pre-
served in another. 
The above paragraph has shown that existence as it 
emerges in Hegel is a step in the evolution of pure being. 
In an earlier part of the argument it was brought out that 
Kierkegaard's view of eternity is synonymous with the tra-
ditional philosophical position of pure being. The affirma-
tion o:f this area o:f the argument is that Kierkegaard's ex-
istential thinking proceeds within a framework o:f being that 
is pure being or eternity. But Kierkegaard uses the category 
of pure being to create tension within human existence, for 
man has to relate himself to eternity which is pure being. 
Kierkegaard stated: 
In eternity there are chambers enough so 
that each may be placed alone in one. For 
wherever conscience is present, and it is and 
shall be present in each person, there exists 
in eternity a lonely prison, or the blessed 
chamber of salvation. On that account this 
consciousness of being an individual is the 
primary consciousness p:f man, which is his 
eternal consciousness.4 
1. Ibid., p. 146. 
2. Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart, trans. Alexander Dru and 
Walter Lowrie (London: Oxford University . Press, .1940), 
PP• 177-178. 
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Thus it may be pointed out that Kierkegaard•s reaction 
to Hegel's category of pure being is related to the identi-
fication -of the thinker's point of view with it.1 The main 
result, according to Kierkegaard, is that the system which 
the thinker's construct is only a being in thought. Kier-
kegaardts polemic is directed against the identification o~ 
pure being with the situation of the thinker, and not at the 
concept of pure being itself. 2 Kierkegaard•s effort is not 
a basic destruction of the ontological categories of Hegel. 
rather the categories 'are merely placed in a new position.3 
Kierkegaard accepts the ontological category of pure being 
as the "abstract expression for eterni.ty. "4 But he charac-
terizes it as the instant in which time meets the temporal 
and constitutes the existence of the individual.5 
c. Freedom and necessity 
Kierkegaard launched one of his main criticisms against 
Hegel's theory of freedom and necessity. Hegel's metaphysi· 
1. Wyschogrod, op. cit •. , p. 127. The author points out 
that eternity as pure being has a place in Kierke-
gaard' s thought. And "Kierkegaard' s effort is there-
fore not a basic destruction of the ontological cate-
gories of Hegel, but a new juxtaposition of thEm." 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 44-
4· Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 75n. 
5. Ibid., p. 79. 
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cal doctrine of freedom and necessity is found in his view 
of actuality, which is the third main category in the triad 
of the Wesen book. Actuality means the complete unity of 
essence and existence, or "inward and outward."1 According 
to Hegel, actuality is thoroughly reasonable, since "every-
thing which is not reasonable must on that very ground cease 
to be held actual."2 Hegel's discussion of actuality is 
divided into three main categories of possibility, contingency, 
and necessity. Possibility, in Hegel's terminology, means 
the mere inside manifestation of actu~lity.3 
Generally speaking, possibility is whatever happens to 
be. But as an essential moment in every actual phenomenon, 
"Possibility is what is essential to r .eali ty, but in such a 
way that it is at the same time only a possibility. u4 Though 
in the imagination all things are possible, yet everything 
that is possible is not actual. Hegel illustrated his mean-
ing in the following example: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
It is possible that the moon might fall 
upon the earth tonight; for the moon is a 
body separate from the earth and may as well 
fall down5upon it as a stone thrown into the air does. 
Hegel, The Losic of Hesel, p. 251. 
Ibid.' P• 259. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 261. 
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The possibility of the preceding example Hegel called formal 
possibility, which means everything is possible which is not 
self-contradictory.1 But Hegel ruled that for.mal possibility 
is empty, since it has only the outer shell of reality.2 He-
gel summed up his view of possibility by stating that it is 
incomplete, and perfects itself in actuality "as it opens it-
self out, discloses itself to be necessity.n3 
As possibility is the mere internal side of actuality, 
contingency is the external side.4 Hegel stated that con-
tingency depends upon something else, and not "upon itself."5 
Hegel denied the notion of ordinary understanding that free~ 
dom is contingency, which is opposed to necessity.6 Hegel's 
claim is that contingency in respect to will is a false free-
dom, since real freedom transcends contingency altogether. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4· 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Freedom of choice, or the capacity of de-
termining ourselves towards one thing or an-
other, is undoubtedly a vital element in the 
will (which in its very notion is free); but 
instead of being freedom itself, it is only 
in the first instance a freedom in for.m.7 
- - -
Ibid., p. 260. 
Ibid., p. 261. 
Ibid., P• 262. 
Ibid., P• 263. 
Ibid., p. 266. 
Ibid., p. 264. 
Ibid. 
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According to Hegel, when narrowly examined, free choice is 
a contradiction, since "the matter of choice is given, and 
known as a content dependent not on will itself, but on 
outward circumstance."l Real freedom is related to a higher 
form of the Absolute Spirit. 
Necessity is the third triad of actuality. The union 
of possibility and contingency is necessity.2 In Hegel's 
de:f'ini tion necessity is that "it is, ,3 which me~s necess-
ity is a "simple self-relation, in which all dependence on 
something else is removed. 114 Hegel•s treatment of the na-
ture of necessity includes the following categories: sub-
stantiality, causality, and reciprocal activity. These 
categories are the different possible ways by which ne-
cessity is formed. It is important in understanding Hegel's 
doctrine or freedom and necessity to analyze the categories 
further, since man• s freedom lies in recognizing these laws. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4-
5. 
Substantiality is that which is the ground of itself. 
Substantiality is the absolute form-activity 
and the power of necessity: all content is but 
a vanishing element which merely belongs to 
this process, where there is an absolute re- ~ 
vulsion of form and content into one another.~ 
Ibid., p. 264. 
Ibid.' p. 267. 
Ibid.' p. 268. 
Ibid.' p. 268. 
Ibid.' p. 274. 
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As the quotation indicates, the category of substance is the 
constant form which is the underlying basis of the vanishing 
modes of existence. Hegel's treatment of the philosophy of 
Spinoza throws further light on his view of substance. Hegel 
denied the charge that Spinoza•s pantheism meant atheism. 
"These crises arise because of Spinoza•s conception of God 
as substance, and substance only. nl Hegel supported Spimz~ ·s 
position, on the one hand, by arguing that in a certain 
stage of .the evolutionary development of the Absolute Idea, 
"It is true that God is necessity, or, as we may also put 
it, that He is the Thing."2 Hegel's criticism of Spinoza 
is that he failed to reach to point that God is Absolute 
Person, rather than substance.3 This statement shows clearly 
the place af the deep gulf that separates Spinozats treat-
ment of substance tram Hegel•s. 
Hegel pointed out, on the other hand, that the weakness 
of Spinozats philosophy is not his atheism, since instead of 
denying God,4 he denied the reality off the world. Hegel cal-
led this view acosmism,5 which is the denial of the positive 
being of the world. Hegel's Absolute, as Absolute Person, 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 275. 
-5. Ibid. 
seeks to qualify Spinoza'a substance so it would not be 
the universal negative power, is as it were a 
dark, shapeless abyss which engulfs all def-
inite content as radically null, and produces 
from itself nothing that has a positive sub-
sistence of its own.l 
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Turning to the problem of cause, Hegel deduced cause 
from substance.2 Since substantiality passes into the re-
lation of causality, "substance is cause in so far as sub-
stance reflects into ~elf.n3 When substance suspends the 
reflection into self and lays itself open to the negative 
of itself, it produces an effect, or actuality.4 In Harne's 
empiricism cause and effect are two distinct events. Hegel 
held that every cause is also an effect.5 There is no con-
tent in the cause that is not in the effect. Hegel illus-
trates the connection between cause and effect in the fol-
lowing words: "The rain (the cause) and wet (the effect) 
are the self s~me existing water."6 According to Hegel, 
as the cause is conserved in the effect, the effect is the 
actuality of the cause. The transition from cause to effect, 
and effect to cause goes on ad :i.nfinitum.7 
1. Ibid., P• 276. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4· Ibid.. 
5. Ibid., p. 277. 
6. Ibid. 
7. !.!:?..!.!! • ' P• 278. 
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Reciprocal activity which is the relation or action 
and reaction is the synthesis or substance and cause. 1 In 
Hegel's interpretation of the Wesen book all the categories 
have displayed a duplicity, but in reciprocity the duplicity 
of cause and effect has collapsed into unity. At the close 
of the discussion of reciprocity, Hegel said that the "truth 
of necessity, therefore, is Freedom. "2 In the sphere of 
substance, necessity is the basic guiding principle, but in 
moving from the sphere of substance through causality and 
reciprocity to the realm of Spirit, the movement is rrom the 
realm of necessity to the sphere of freedom, yet freedom and 
necessity are not opposing factors. 
Necessity indeed sra necessity is far from 
being freedom. Yet reedom presupposes ne-
cessity~ and contains it as an ••• element in 
itself • ..J 
As freedom is self-determination, necessity is determination 
from without. Freedom is the realization of one's own in-
ner tendency. 
Hegel is convinced that true freedom is true necessity, 
since man is most free under the law of a divine necessity. 
Hegel summed up his position on freedom and necessity by 
stating that actuality is only an approach to freedom. Abso-
lute Freedom of Spirit is found in the third stage of the 
1. Ibid., p. 280. 
2. Ibid., p. 282. 
3. Ibid. 
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Begri:ff. Here freedom is the eternal Idea, "in full frui-
tion of its essence ••• engenders and enjoys itself as Abso-
lute Mind (Spirit)."l The metaphysical doctrine of freedom 
as self-determination and self-fulfillment is the central 
doctrine of Hegel's philosophy of law, right, and history. 
Against Hegel's combining of necessity with freedom, 
Kierkegaard claimed that Hegel's usage compromises the 
categories of possibility, actuality, and necessity, since 
the last term ough. t to be dealt with alone. In Concluding 
Unscientific P?stscript, Kierkegaard expressed his opposi-
tion in the following words: 
Necessity must be dealt with by itself. 
The fact that modern speculative thought 
has imported necessity into the historical 
process has caused much confusion; the 
categories of possibility, of actuality, 2 and of necessity have all been compromised. 
In the foregoing statement Kierkegaard denies the view that 
necessity should be dealt with in accordance with actuality 
and possibility. Since Kierkegaard•s analysis o:f the nature 
of choice as a free act o:f will presumes the reality of human 
freedom, it is essential for him to refute a theory of ne-
cessity which means determinism. Several important conse-
quences follow tram his position. 
First, in "The Interlude" of the Philosophical Fragments, 
1. Wallace, The Philosophy of Mind., par. 577. 
2. Kierkegaard, Concludi~ Unscientific Postscript, p. 306. 
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Kierkegaard held that freedom is at the center of becoming.l 
Kierkegaard•s first question is, "how does that which comes 
into being ~ba.nge?"2 His analysis of the problem is that 
wham becomes was not there previously. If what becomes had 
been there previously then nothing has become, since it was 
there all the time.3 If it had not been there before, then 
there is no becoming, since "every change presupposes a some-
thing that undergoes the process of becoming."4 As a 'solu-
tion to this problem, Kierkegaard developed the theory of 
possibility, which implies a being that is also a non-being.5 
Becoming is then the transition from possibility to actual-
ity. Kierkegaard is convinced that what becomes, changes 
from the possible to the actual. But since the necessary is, 
it "cannot undergo any change. "6 To say, according to Kier-
kegaard, that anything happens necessarily is a contradiction. 
In the sphere of necessity, nothing happens, rather everything 
is stati~ logical relations of quantity. But coming into be-
ing is a quality, for "all caning into being is a kind of suf'-
:f'ering, and the necessary cannot suf':f'er; it cannot suf'fer the 
1. Kierkegaard, PhilosoEhical Fra~ents1 p. 6o. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid.' p. 61. 
4. Ibid., p. 6o. 
;;. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
suffering of the actual. nl Kierkegaardt s reason for this 
view is clearly stated in the following words: 
Everything that comes into being proves pre-
cisely by coming into being that it is not nec-
essary; for the necessary is the only thing that 2 
cannot come into being, because the necessary is. 
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"Is not necessity then a synthesis of possibility ani 
actuality?" is another basic question raised by Kierkegaard. 
He pointed out that necessity is the determination of es-
sence. The distinction between the possible and actual is 
not of essence but of being, which means the subjectivity 
of existence. The category of necessity is not applicable 
to becoming, rather it applies to the areas of laws and 
propositions. Necessity is not a synthesis of the possible 
and actual, but it is something different from both: 
If the possible and the actual were capable 
of uniting to become the necessary, they would 
in becoming the necessary become an absolutely 
different essence, which is not a kind of change; 
and in becoming necessity or the necessary they 
would became that which alone of all things ex-
cludes becoming, which3is as impossible as it is self-contradictory. 
Kierkegaardts final estimation is that freedom is at the 
core of all becoming, inasmuch as "all becoming takes place 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 61. 
.l"(4 
with freedom, not by necessity. nl As "the change involved 
in becoming is an actual change," it involves a "free cause. n2 
Dealing with the problem of freedom and necessity in 
.the area of history, Kierkegaard denied historical deter.mi-
nism. ThougJ. historical necessity may seem plausible be-
cause of the immutability of the past, the fact that the 
past cannot be changed does not mean that "what has happened 
has happened, and cannot be undone. u3 Kierkegaard rejected 
even the necessity . of the past.4 His main point is that if 
the past was logically necessary, the .future is also, far 
there is no way of assigning freedom to the fUture without 
assigning it to the past. 
The .future has not yet happened. But it is 
not on that aeeount less necessary than the 
past, since the past did not become necessary 
by coming into being, but on the contrary 
proved by coming into being that it was not 
necessary. If the past had become necessary 
it would not be possible to infer the oppo-
site abcut the .future, but it would rather 
follow that the future was also necessary.5 
The implication of Kierkegaard•s rejection of historical de-
terminiam is that history is not a necessary event, as Hegel 
would have you believe, rather history is the operation of 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid.' p. 62. 
3. Ibid., p. 63. 
4· Ibid. 
5. Ibid., p. 63. 
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the Absolute free Will of God. 1 
Thus the individual is able to grasp the meaning of 
historical events by a free act, a decision which is char-
acterized by faith. 
Faith believes what it does not see, it 
does not believe that the star is there, for 
that it sees, but it believes that the star 
has come intQ being. The same holds true 
of an event.2 
In Kierkegaard 1 s view freedom is creative, since man in his 
essential relation with it is free to choose the good. 
Though Kierkegaard criticized severely Hegel's theory 
of freedom and necessity, his argument demonstrates the He-
gelian terms.3 Kierkegaard held in agreement with Hegel 
that man is a synthesis of the finite and infinite, tem-
pora1 and eternal, and necessity and freedom. 
Man is a synthesis of the infinite and 
the finite, of the temporal and of the e-
ternal, of freedo~ and necessity, in short 
it is a synthesis.4 
The above passage suggests Hegel's well-known view that 
there is a core of necessity in all freedom, which has in-
fluenced Kierkegaard considerably. It is especially recog-
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., P• 67. 
3. Collins, op. cit., P• 196. Collins makes the interesting 
observation that Kierkegaard uses Hegelian terminology 
to express his concept of freedom. 
4. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 17. 
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nized in his view that moral freedom is divine necessity.! 
The most tremendous thing which has been 
granted to man is: the choice, freedom. And 
if you desire to save it and preserve it 
there is only way: in the very same second 
unconditionally and in complete resignation 
to give it back to God, and yourself with it.2 
The significance of the foregoing statement is that 
Kierkegaard is saying that freedom and necessity are bound 
together, since "one must, therefore freely choose what one . 
cannot choose, what one must necessarily choose."3 
Kierkegaard's relation to the Hegelian conception of 
freedom is further demonstrated in his view of self-deter.mi-
nation, which means that freedom is self-relization within 
limits. He emphasi;ed this point in the Stages on Life's 
lrlay: 
I am aware of freedom in my choice only 
when I surrender myself to necessity, and in 
surrending to it forget it. I cannot say, 
'To whom should I go but unto Thee.•4 
1. Jean Wahl, "Freedom and Existence ili Some Recent Philos-
ophies," Philoso and Phenomenolo ical Research, VIII 
(1947-48), 3 • Wahl expresses the view that Kierke-
gaard places necessity at the core of freedom: "But let 
us observe that for Kierkegaard inside freedom itself 
there is an action of the grace, of a divine necessity." 
2. Kierkegaard, The Journals of Kierkegaard, p. 372. 
3. Martin, op. cit., p. 30. 
4. Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, P• 323. 
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The term "law" suggests a divine principle within the sel.f. 
Similarly, it is because man is self-determined that there 
exists for him the possibility o.f despair. If self were ab-
solutely free without any necessity, there would be no need 
to despair. 
If a man were a beast or an angel, he would 
not be able to be in dread. Since he is a syn-
thesis he can be in dread, and the greater the 
dread, the greater the man.l 
In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard compared 
.freedom as sel.f-deter.mination with Aladdin's miraculous lamp. 
In the .fable of Aladdin the spirit o.f the lamp is the ser-
vant o.f the owner o.f it, but Kierkegaard maintained that 
whoever rubs the lamp o.f .freedom becomes himself' the servant 
o.f the Divine Spirit, the Spirit of the Lord. "Whosoever 
rubs the wonder.ful lamp o.f .freedom becomes himself a servant--
the Spirit is Lord.n2 . A .famous passage o.f Hegel that empha-
sizes this point is .found in the Logik: 
In short, man is most independent when he 
knows himself' to be determined by the Absolute 
Idea throug hout. It was this phase of mind 
and conduct which Spinoza called Amor intel-
lectualis De:i..3 
Both Hegel and Kierkegaard, as the above passages indicate, 
are saying that true .freedom is true necessity, which is a 
1. Kierkegaard, The Concept o.f ~ead, p. 139. 
2. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscri£t, p. 124. 
3. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, p. 283. 
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divine necessity. As in the early part of the discussion, 
Kierkegaard maintained that necessity and freedom are mu-
tually exclusive. There he was criticizing Hegel's position. 
Here Kierkegaard complicated his former argument by holding 
that necessity and freedom are inclusive, which was the 
position that he was criticizing in Hegel. 
Like Hegel, Kierkegaard recognized in his doctrine of 
freedom and necessity the essential need for a view of possi-
bility. It is interesting to note that Kierkegaard's doc-
trine of possibility is near Hegel•s concept of it. Kier-
kegaard defined possibility to mean "I can."1 The following 
quotations will indicate that Kierkegaard's view owes much 
to Hegel. 
For freedom is always possible as soon as 
it is actual, in the same sense in which it 
has been said by an earlier philosophy that 
when ~od's existence is possible it is neces-
sary. 
Though the expression, "has been said by an earlier philoso-
phy," does not refer directly to Hegel, it is indirectly 
related to him, since it points to the philosophy of the 
Hegelia.n Erdmann. 3 
1. Kierkegaard,. The · Concept of Dread, p. 44. 
2. Ibid., P• 20. 
3. Ibid., pp. 148, 153. 
Kierkegaard's view is always complicated by the fact 
that he used Hegelian terminology in both a positive and 
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negative way. But in one clear statement in the conclud-
ing section of The Concept of Dread, Kierkegaard identified 
his doctrine of possibility with Hegel's view of faith. 
But in order that the individual may thus 
absolutely and infinitely be educs.ted by pos-
sibility, he must be honest towards possiblli-
lty and must have faith. By faith I mean what 
Hegel in his fashion calls very rightly 'the 
inward certainty which anticipates infinity.• 
When the discoveries of possibility are hon- -
estly administered, possibility will then dis-
close all finitudes and idealize them in the 
form of infinity in the individual who is over-
whelmed by dread, until in turn he is victor-
ious by the anticipation of faith.l 
This passage shows that Kierkegaard recognized the agreement 
of his view with Hegel's in the treatment of possibility and 
:f'aith. 
The discussion of freedom and necessity in Hegel's and 
Kierkegaard's views may be concluded by pointing out briefly 
the main issues involved. Though claiming to represent the 
exact opposite of' Hegel's metaphysical conception of' freedom 
and necessity, Kierkegaard agrees with Hegel that man is both 
rree and determined within a divine necessity. Here necessity 
becomes self-necessity and determinism is self-determinism. 
1. Ibid., P• 140. 
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The issue between Kierkegaard and Hegel is complicated by 
the ract that Kierkegaard denies that necessity is the truth 
concerning man in one area or his argument, yet in another 
area he maintains that man is both free and determined. 
Though using Hegelian terminology, Kierkegaard holds contra-
dictorily to Hegelian and unHegelian meanings. Hegel's basic 
disagreement would be against Kierkegaard 1 s attitude that 
freedom and necessity are not rationally conceivable. 
D. System and rinality 
Hegel's philosophical system is an attempt to give a 
connected account of the historical erforts of man to make 
intelligible the world of his experience. Hegel expressed 
this view in the following words: 
The history which we have before us is the 
history of Thought rinding itself, and it is 
the case with Thought that it only finds it-
self in producing itselr; indeed, that it 
only exists and is actual in rinding itselr.l 
According to Hegel, a system of philosophy is no "motion-
less statue, but is alive, and swells like a mighty river, 
which increases in size the further it advances from its 
source. tt2 Hegel added that a true system of philosophy is 
1. Hegel, History of Philosophy, I, 5. 
2. Ibid., 3. 
organic, f"or it inserts through the dialectical process 
each world-view in its proper setting. 
The Idea as Concrete in itself, and self'-
developing, is an organic system and a totality 
which contains a multit~de of stages and of 
momer ts in development. 
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In the above passage Hegel maintained that a philosophical 
system is an organic self-developing totality. 
The question arises concerning the static and final 
nature of Hegel's world-view. Though many of Hegel's crit-
ics have claimed that his system was static and stopped 
with him, Hegel maintained explicitly a developmental view 
of philosophy. 
This is the function of our own and of 
every age: to grasp the knowl edge which is 
already existing, to make it our own, and 
in so doing to develop it stil~ further and 
to raise it to a higher level. 
In t he Logik, on the subject of a refutation of' a philosoph-
ical system, Hegel pointed out further that to refute a sys-
tem implies that the view should not be considered final and 
absolute.3 A true refutation of a philosophical system im-
plies that its limits have been passed, and that its fixed 
principles have been reduced to an organic element in a 
completer whole.4 
1. Ibid., 27. 
2. Ibid.' 3. 
3. Hegel, The Lo~ic of Heeiel, pp. 136-137. 
4· Ibid. 
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Kierkegaard 1 s philosophy is anti-systematic, 1 and the 
Hegelian systam is radically ridiculed by him. "The sys-
tematic tendency promises everything and keeps nothing."2 
The systematic and the closed are also identical, and op-
posed to existence .and life. On the contrary, "existence 
is what acts as an interval, and keeps things apart; the 
systematic is closing up, perfect linking together.n3 En-
tire chapters of Concluding Unscientifie . Postscript and 
Phiiosopbicai FragMents are used by Kierkegaard to contest 
the Hegelian systematic approach to philosophy. Further-
more, Kierkegaard insisted that the systematical is iden-
tity and continuity. Thus the core of the matter is this 
for Kierkegaard: system equals finality, or a closed scheme. 
Kierkegaard 1 s concise formulation of the foregoing view is 
the following statement: 
An existential system is impossible. An 
existential system cannot be for.mulated. Does 
. thl.~ ~~~n that _no such system exists? By no 
1. Jolivet, Introduction to Kierkegaa~d, p. 110. The au-
thor suggests the view that though Kierkegaard appears 
to be anti-systematic, his works follow a plan that "en-
ables us to tor.m all these doctrinal themes into groups 
in a comparatively rigorous and logical manner." 
2. Kierkegaard, c.one1uding UnsciEmti.fic Postscript, p. 18. 
3. Ibid., p. 112. 
means; nor is this implied in our assertion. 
Reality itself is a system--for God; but it 
cannot be a system for any existing spirit. 
System and finality correspond to one another, 
but exist!nce is precisely the opposite of 
finality. 
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Accordirg to the above statement, a system cannot be for 
the existing individual, since it is :f"inal and complete. 
Kierkegaard is convinced that the only systematic thinker 
is God. Employing a further qualification to the doctrine 
that an existential system is impossible, Kierkegaard added: 
All logical thinking employs the language 
of abstraction, and is sub specie aeterni. To 
think existence logically is thus to ignore 
the difficulty, that is, of thinking the eter-
nal as a process ot becoming •••• To think 
existence sub srecie aeterni and in abstract 
terms is essent Slly to abrogate it, and the 
merit of the proceeding is like the much 
trumpeted merit o2 abrogating the principle 
of contradiction. 
In the area of abstract thought, according to Kierkegaard, 
there is no place for an existential concern. Thus in spec-
ulative philosophy being a system and being finished are 
almost one and the same: "System and finality are pretty 
much one and the same, so much so that if the system is not 
finished, there is no system. n3 
Perhaps Kierkegaard mistakes Hegel's meaning at this 
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding unscientific Postscript, p. 101. 
2. Ibid., P• 273. 
3. Ibid., p. 98. 
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point.l The claim cannot be swmmarily held that Hegel's 
system is identical with finality, wb~le Kierkegaard's 
existence deals with what is opened. Specifically, Hegel 
insisted at the end of Geschichte der Philosophie, "This 
is the point which consciousness has attained."2 Moreover, 
in the PhKnomenologie des Geistes, Hegel remarked: 
This transforming process is a cycle that 
returns into itself, a cycle that presupposes 
its beginning, and reaches its beginning only 
at the end.3 
With this view, to use Hegel's phrase, "Beginning only at 
the end," Hegel's system, in spite of Kierkegaard, is an 
opened system of process and reality, rather than a closed, 
abstract, scheme of Kierkegaard's interpretation. Spe-
cifically, Hegel's systematic idealism is open to the 
future,4 and does not end with Hegel. 
1. 
2. 
Every individual is a child of his time; 
so philosophy too is its own time apprehended 
in thoughts. It is just as a bsurd to fancy 
that a philosophy can transcend its contempo-
rary world as it is to fancy that an individ-
ual can overleap his own age •••• If his theory 
Whittemore, op. cit., p. 139. Whittemore suggests that: 
"Hegel's system is other than \-J hat Kierkegaard has under-
stood it to be. 
Hegel, Phiiosophy or Histo~, trans. J. Sibree (New York: 
The Colonial Press, 1899), 56. 
Baillie, op~ cit., PP• 800-801. 
~ttemore, op~ cit., p. 48. The author expresses the 
view that Hegel takes his place with those philosophers 
for whom the future is open· f or process is the mea-
a ure of reality. 
really goes beyond the world as it ~s and builds 
an ideal one as it ought . to be, that world exists 
indeed, but only in his opinions, an unsubstan-
tial element where anything you please may, in 
fancy, be built.~ 
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Hegel is reemphasizing in the foregoing statement a tact 
that is essential to his entire philosophy. That is. 
philosophy is a child of experience. It appears clearly 
that Hegel had what Kierkegaard claimed to be impossible. 
that is, an existential system. Kroner says: 
Hegel's Logie is a logic of life, the logic 
he had been seeking ever since he had recog-
nized life as the medium in which opposites 
both arise · and dissolve •••• It aims at a rec-
onciliation of opposites, tries to overcome 
one-sided rationalism, one-sided emotionalism, 
or one-sided empiricism. It is dialectical 
in its structure ••• Hegel still feels that 
there is no possible logical path to ulti-
mate truth, that a living unity of spiritual 
experience must take ~he place of a construct-
ed unity or concepts. . 
Kroner's point of view is well taken that Hegel's syste.m 
contains existential insights. Moreover, an ample justifi-
cation is found in Hegel's view which notes that it was 
other than what Kierkegaard thought. Instead o:f being 
final and static, it was opened and sensitive to the living 
~unity of spiritual experience.• 
But what does the foregoing discussion of system and 
final! ty imply ror the problem of this study? First, the 
1. 
2. 
Knox, op~ ·cit., P• 11. 
Hegel, Earli Theological Writings, trans. T. M. Knox 
with an "Introduction" and "Fragments" trans. Richard 
Kroner (Chicago: Chicago Press, 1948), PP• 30, 12. 
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above discussion reveals that Hegel's system was other than 
what Kierkegaard thought it to be. Instead of being a logi-
cal abstraction without contact with reality and experience, 
Hegel's system is empirically concrete, which emplies a dy-
namic interpretation of all levels of human experience with-
in an organic, developing system. Secondly, Hegel's system 
is opened to process and reality, rather than a closed, ab-
stract, scheme of Kierkegaard's characterization. Finally, 
Kierkegaard 1 s criticism that a logical system ignores ex-
istence is not true of Hegel's organic approach, since the 
latter's view is an actual analysis of existential rela-
tiona. The last point will be discussed fully in a later 
chapter. 1 
E. Speculation and objectivity 
Hegel's essential theme is that speculation is a con-
tinual movement to synthesis. Thesis passes into antithesis, 
where both are comprehended in the higher unity of synthesis. 
Synthesis becomes then a new thesis against its opposite in 
a new and further progression. 
Now, to turn these rational (of course posi-
tively-rational) realities into speculative 
principles, the only thing needed is that they 
be thought. The expression 'Speculation' in 
common life is often used with a very vague and 
at the same time secondary sense, as when we speak 
of a matrimonial or a commercial speculation.2 
1. Cf. chapter four, sec. B, 1. 
2. Hegel, The Logic of Hegei, p. 153. 
Hegel's meaning of speculation may be summarized in the 
following words: 
First, that what is immediately at hand has 
to be passed and left behind; and secondly, that 
the subject-matter of such speculations, though 
in the first place only subjective, must not re-
main so, bft be realised or translated into ob-
jectivity. 
187 
In the above passage Hegel suggests that in speculation 
the subjective must be "translated into objectivity." Hegel 
points out in the Logik three distinct meanings in which the 
term "objective" is used: Objective is used in a loose manner 
to designate what is external, in contrast to the subjective 
which is regarded as dream and fancy.2 Secondly, ~gel dis-
cusses the Kantian use of objective as that which is neces-
sary and universal in tho.ught.3 Thirdly, Hegel states his 
meaning of objective to be ~n agreement with Kant's necessary 
and universal elements of thought, but Hegel adds that the 
universal and necessary elements must represent the real es-
sence of the existing thing.4 Hegel's basic view of objec-
tivity is the following statement: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
It means the thought-apprehended essence of 
the existing thing, in contradistinction from 
what is merely our thought, and what consequently 
is still separated from the thing itself, as it 
exi~ts in independent essence.5 
Ibid., 
-
p. 153. 
Ibid., P• 83. 
-
~., p. 86. 
Ibid., pp. 86-87. 
Ibid. 
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Opposing the speculativeness and objectivity of the 
foregoing analysis, Kierkegaard poked fun continually at 
the speculative thinker who builds an abstract syste-m, but 
must remain an existing individual. Kierkegaard said: 
In relation to their systems, most systema-
tisers are like a man who builds an enormous 
castle and lives in a shack close by; they do 
not live in their own enormous systematic 
buildings. But spiritually that is a decisive 
objection. .Spiritually speaking a man's 
thought must be the building in which b.e lives-
otherwise everything is topsy-turvy.l 
Throughout his major and minor writings, Kierkegaard 
decried speculative thinking. One of the basic charges 
made by Kierkegaard agai~st Hegelian speculation is, "It 
has no presuppositions. It proceeds from nothing. It 
assumes nothing as given, it begs no postulates."2 This 
criticism is not unlike a charge brought by Trendelenburg 
against Hegel. For Kierkegaard identified his criticism 
with Trendelenburg in the Journals in a satirical dialogue 
of Hegel with Socrates. To quote Kierkegaard: 
The Dialectic of Beginning 
Scene in the Underworld 
Characters: Socrates, Hegel. 
Socrates sits by a rippling stream, in the cool, 
listening to the sound of the water. 
Hegel is sitting at _a ta~le reading Trendelen-
burg's Logische Untersuchungen, Pt. ii, page 
198, -and goes across to Socrates in order to com-
plain. Socrates: Shall we begin by being in com-
ple~e disagree~ent, or in agreement upon something 
1. Kierkegaard, Journais, P• 156. 
2. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 49. 
which we will call an assumption? 
Hegel: ----
Socrates: With what assumptions do you begin? 
Hegel: From none at all. 
Socrates: That is quite possible; perhaps you 
do not begin at all• 
Hegel: I not begin, I who have written twenty-
one volumes? 
Socrates: Ye Godsl What a hecatomb you have 
sacri.ficed. 
Hegel: But I begin from nothing. 
Socrates: Is that not from anything? 
Hegel: No, the inverse process. It -is only 
understood at the end of the whole work, !n 
which I have dealt with all sciences, the 
whole of universal history etc •••• 
Socrates: How shall I ever get over that dif.fi-
culty, .for many curious things must certainly 
have happened which would charm me. (A misuse 
of oratorical statement) ·And you know that I 
never let even Polos talk for more than five 
minutes, and you want to talk twenty-one 
volumes.l 
.LU'1 
At this point, Kierkegaard in equal agreement with 
Trendelenburg is criticizing the Hegelian claim in the 
Larger Logic of a presuppositionless beginning. As Tren-
delenburg asks in his Logisclie Untersuchungen:. 
Is there such a logical beginning without 
presupposition, a beginning in which thought 
has nothing but itself, and scorns all imagery 
and perceptio~ and thus deserve the name of 
pure thought? 
Both Trendelenburg and Kierkegaard are opposing the Hegel-
ian beginning with immediacy: 
1. 
2. 
Kierkegaard, Journals, p. 148. 
Trendelenburs, Logische Untersuchungen (Leipzig: s. 
Hirzel, 1870), I, pp. 36-37. The passage is trans-
lated in McGilvary 1 s article, p. 497. 
Being is here the beginning represented as 
arising from mediation, a mediation which trans-
cends itself; it being assumed that pure knowl-
edge is the result of finite knowledge, of con-
sciousness. If no assumption is to be made, and 
the beginning is to be taken immediately, it de-
ter.mines itself only in this way, that it is to 
be the beginning of logic, or independent tb:>ught 
•••• The beginning must be an absolute, or, what 
here is equivalent, an abstract beginning; it 
must presuppose nothing, must be mediated by 
nothing, must have no foundation; itself 1s to 
be the foundation or the whole science. It must 
therefore just be something immediate, or rather 
the tmmediafe itself •••• The beginning there is 
Pure Being. 
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Earlier in the chapter it was maintained that Kierke-
gaard criticized Hegel's theory or pure being as it is re-
lated to being-in-thought. 2 It was pointed out also at 
that time that Kierkegaard used the pure being category 
to support his argument for eternity. Here the argument 
is that Kierkegaard's basic criticism is not against the 
pure being category, rather he is criticizing the position 
that a logical doctrine can have a presuppositionless be-
ginning, which means an immediate beginning or being. Ac-
cord :Jng to Kierkegaard, Hegel's view presupposes the entire 
process of reflection and abstraction, such as immediate 
and mediate, being and non-being. ~erkegaard observed in 
the Concluding Unscientific Postscript that Hegel aould not 
begin his Logik with the concept of being, if he had not 
1. Johnston and Struthers, op. cit., p. 82. 
2. cr. Chapter three, sec. ~ 
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presupposed the sensuous intuition and empirical given of 
Phlnomenologie des Geistes. 1 Moreover, Kierkegaard pointed 
out that the "dialectic of the beginning must be made 
clear."2 The problem involved, for Kierkegaard, is: "How 
does the System begin with the 1mmediate?"3 Kierkegaard's 
answer is that, "The beginning which begins with the 1m-
mediate is thus itself reached by means of a process of re-
flection.n4 Therefore, "There is no absolute beginning.n5 
Even the Hegelian expression, "Beginning and nothing," is 
.. 
deceptive and tautological. By that, Kierkegaard means, 
"The beginning is not, and the beginning begins with noth-
ing, are wholly identical propositions; and we have not 
advanced a single step."6 
The above interpretation of Kierkegaard implies that He-
gel maintained the view that his Loglk is without a presup-
position. Thus, it has an absolute beginning. However, what 
Kierkegaard bas failed to see, as have many of Hegel's crit-
ics, is that the passage, which was refuted so well from the 
1. Kierkegaard, Conciuding -Unscientiric Postscript, p. 106. 
2. ibid.., P• 101. 
3. :tbid. 
4. Ibid., P• 102. 
5. Ibid., PP• 103-104. 
6. Ibid., PP• 104-105. 
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Ger.man philosopher concerning a presuppositionless beginning, 
admits in the total philosophy of Hegel a dual interpretation. 
Hegel stated also that his Logi~ has a presupposition.! In 
the Greater Logic, Hegel asserted that the Logik presupposed 
an analysis of the Phanomenologie des Geistes: 
In the Phenomenology of the Spirit I have 
set forth the movement of consciousness, . 
from the first crude opposition between it-
self and the object, up to absolute knowl-
edge. This process goes through all the 
forms of the relation of thought to its 
object, and reaches the concept of Science 
as its result. Thus this concept (apart 
from the fact that it arises within the 
boundaries of Logic, needs here no justifi-
cation, having already received its justi-
fication in that place.2 
Hegel is saying that the Logik has its foundation in the 
findings of Phlnomenologie des Geistes. To quote ~om Hegel: 
This conception of the pure science and 
the deduction of it are assumed in the pres-
ent treatise, in so far as this, the Phenom-
enology of the Spirit is nothi~ other than 
the deduction of this concept.3 
Furthermore, 
The beginning is logical in that it is to 
be made within the sphere of thought existing 
1. McGilvary, op~cit., P• 497 
2. Johnston and Struther, op. cit., P• 59. 
3. Ibid., p. 82. 
freely for itself, in other words, in pure 
Knowledge; its mediacy here arises from the 
fact that pure Knowledge is consciousness in 
its last and absolute truth. We have remarked 
in the introduction that the Phenomenolo~ of 
Stirit is the science of consciousness, ~mon­
s rating that consciousness has for result the 
concept of Science, that is pure Knowledge. 
The science of manifested Spirit, which in-
volves and demonstrates the necessity, and 
hence the proof, together with the mediation 
in general, or that standpoint which is rure 
Knowledge, is thus presupposed by Logic. 
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This massive support of the evidence points out Hegel's 
meaning that the presupposition of the Phinomenologie des 
Geistes is immediate, sensuous consciousness, and the pre-
supposition of the Logik is the Phlnomenologie. And this 
emphasis in Hegel's view is no different from Kierkegaard•s, 
since both agree that a logical doctrine cannot make a pre-
suppositionless beginning. 2 Hegel wrote: 
Being is here the beginning represented 
as arising from mediation; a mediation which 
transcends itself; it being assumed tm t pure 
Knowledge is the result of finite knowledge 
of conseiousness.j 
Kierkegaard opposed not only speculation with its al-
leged absolute beginning, but also Hegelian objectivity. 
In fact, Kierkegaard spc~e of speculation and objectivity 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
Collins, ;a· cit., Collins maintains correctly that 
Kierkegaa often uses Hegelian fire to put out Hegel-
ian fire throuet.Lout this wolk. 
Johnston and Struthers, op. cit., p. 81. 
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as synonomous. The consistent negative theme of Kierke-
gaard 1 s anti-Hegelian writings is that no objective knowl-
edge, no logical system, or metaphysical result can attain 
adequately to an existential reality. In Kierkegaard's 
polemic, objectivity implies the Hegelian belief in a uni-
versal reason. Kierkegaard wrote: 
According to Hegel, truth is the continuing 
world-process. Each generation, each stage of this 
process is valid; and yet is only a moment of the 
truth •••• The passionate question of truth does not 
even arise, since philosophy has begun by tricking 
the individuals into becoming objective. The 
positive Hegelian truth is as illusory as happiness 
was in paganism. The individual could not know 
whether he was happy until all was at an end.l 
It is this mode of objectivity, which Kierkegaard denounced, 
since: 
A contemplative spirit, and this is what 
the objective subject is, feels nowhere any 
infinite need of a decision, and sees no de-
cision anywhere. This is a falsum that is 
inherent in all objectivity; and this is the 
significance of mediation as the mode of tran-
sition in the continuous process, where noth-
ing is fixed, where nothing is infinitely de-
cided; because the movement turns back upon 
itself and again turns back, so that the move-
ment becomes chimerical, and ~he philosopher 
is wise only after the event. 
In all this, Kierkegaard is attacking the Hegelian attempt 
to view reality sub-specie aeterni, or as a dispassionate 
spectator at the expense of the individual's existence. 
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 34n. 
2. Ibid., PP• 33-34• 
Kierkegaard said: 
The dispassionate spectator apprehends the 
world-historical in terms of purely metaphysi-
cal categories, and views it speculatively as 
an immanent system of relationships between 
cause and effect, ground and consequent. Whether 
he is able to glimpse a telos for the race I 
shall not attempt to say; but this telos is not 
the ethical telos that exists for the individu-
al, but a metaphysical teios •••• the dispassionate 
spectator does not view these deeds as reflected 
back into the individual and the ethical, but he 
views them as connected with the totality.! 
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In spite of numerous assumptions and quotations, Kier-
kegaard's view that Hegel is simply an apriori thinker, who 
spins the web of theories out of his head, leaves much to 
be desired. Throughout the Logik, Hegel shows the relation-
ship of his philosophy to experience. His Geaahichte der 
Phiiosophie is a practical and sober presentation based upon 
the facts of experience. Moreover, Phinomenoiogie is a com-
prehensive attempt to aeoount for the empirical flow of ex-
perience on all levels of existence. Hegel wrote: 
In the first place there is another circle 
of objects which it does not embrace. These 
are Freedom, Spirit, and God. They belong to 
a different sphere, not because it can be said 
that they have nothing to do with experiences; 
for though they are certainly not experiences 
of the senses •••• The real ground for assign-
ing them to another field of cognition is that 
in their scope and content these objects evi-
dently show themselves as infinite •••• But in 
the second place in point of form the subjec-
tive reason desires a further satisfaction 
1. ~., PP• 138-139. 
than empirical knowledge gives; and this for.m, 
is, the widest sense of the term, Necessity. 
The method of empirical science exhibits two 
defects. The first is that the Universal or 
general principle contained in it, the genus, 
or kind •••• is, on its own account, indetermi-
nate, and vague, and therefore not on its own 
account connected with the Particulars or the 
details •••• The second defect is that the be-
ginnings are in every case data and postulates, 
neither accounted for nor deduced. In both of 
these points the form of necessity fails to 
get its due. Hence reflection, whenever it 
sets itself to remedy these defects, becomes 
speculative thinking, the thinking proper to 
philosophy .1 
The foregoing passage indicates the empirical core 
.J.'jO 
of Hegel's philosophy. Kierkegaard, like many of Hegel's 
critics, failed to grasp the empirical side within Hegel's 
position. Thus Kierkegaard's attempted refutation appears 
to imply that there is merely a one-sided rationalism of 
abstraction from life in Hegel's idealism. In Hegel's 
fBIIlous phrase, "the real is the rational," he is not saying 
that the reason is opposed to life as Kierkegaard would 
have believed. The dialectical structure, according to 
Hegel, is the very nature of life, reason, and experience. 
Furthermore, Hegel did not mean by the real what empiri-
cism would mean. What to empiricism would be the rea1, to 
Hegel appeared irrational. It was only after the empirical 
flow was viewed within a synoptic vision that Hegel saw it 
as rational and real. In Kierkegaard 1 s failure to grasp 
1. Wallace, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
197 
the working together of the . empirical and rational sides of 
Hegel's idealism, may be discovered his inability to give 
credit where credit was due in Hegel, but Kierkegaard could 
have heeded Hegel's stricture: 
The refutation of a philosophy, therefore, 
only means that its barriers are crossed, and 
its special principle reduced to a factor in 
the completer principle that follows. Thus 
the history of philosophy, in its true meaning, . 
deals not with a results, resembles not a museum 
of the aberrations of the human intellect, but a 
Pantheon of Godlike figures. These figures of 
Gods are the various stages of the Idea, as they 
come forward one after another in dialectical de-
velopment.! 
Hegel is convinced that a one-sided view can not give utter-
ance to a speculative truth. 
A comparison of Kierkegaard's and Hegel's views of spec-
ulat ion and objectivity suggest the following conclusions. He~ 
gel's speculative thinking seeks to do justice to the living, 
moving, and organic existence of lif e and thought. Kierke-
gaard's failure consciously or unconsciously to grasp this 
element in Hegel's idealism makes his view stand as an exact 
ant ithesis to Hegel's. But Kierkegaard's sharp contrast 
of existential thinking with abstract speculation of Hegel's 
system is not amply justified in light of Hegel's total 
world-view. 
1. Hegel, The Logic of ~agel, P• 160. 
F. An evaluation and summary 
Having discussed Kierkegaard 1 s main criticis~ or He-
gel's philosophy, it appears that Kierkegaard 1 s basic dis-
agreement with Hegel is at the point where he misinterprets 
him. On the one hand, Kierkegaard1 s philosopQr may serve 
as a corrective for what is considered at times an over-
pretentiousness in rationalistic philosophy. On the other 
hand, Kierkegaard•s onesidedness coupled with his misinter-
pretation of Hegel reveals that his view lacks the compre-
hensiveness necessary ror the refutation of Hegel's system. 
Kierkegaard holds a position, though he may not have con-
sciously realized it, close to one area of the German think-
er's philosophy. 
The rollowing statements are the main points or this 
chapter: 
1. Kierkegaard's revolt against Hegel's category of 
pure being is related to the identification or a 
thinker's view with a being-in-thought. Kierke-
gaard's -effort is not an essential destruction 
or Hegel's ontological category, rather this cate-
gory is placed in a new position. Perhaps He-
gel's ontological category of pure being is . best 
expressed in Kierkegaard 1 s view of eternity. 
2. Though Kierkegaard reacted severely against Hegel's 
conception of freedom and necessity 1 his argument .. 
demonstrates the Hegelian terminology. Yet Kier-
kegaard maintains contradictorily both Hegelian 
and unHegelian meanings. He agrees with Hegel that 
there is a core of necessity in all true freedom. 
Both thinkers agree that true freedom is self-
determinism. Kierkegaard 1 s departure from Hegel 
is at the point where he insists that rreedom and 
necessity are not rationally conceivable. 
J.'-j"j 
3. Hegel's system was other than Kierkegaard's char-
acterization of it as a logical abstraction with-
out contact with reality and life. Hegel's or-
ganic emphasis has within it a consideration for 
existential insights, which are close in many in-
stances to Kierkegaard's conclusions. 
4. Kierkegaard's sharp contrast of existential think-
ing with speculative and objective thinking does 
not do justice to Hegel's total world view, because 
the for.mer omits the empirical basis of the lat-
ter's philosophy• 
CHAPTER IV 
BASIC HEGELIAN TENETS RETAINED BY KIERKEGAARD 
A. Preliminary considerations 
Having treated the problem of Kierkegaard's relation to 
Hegel in general areas of agreement and difference, the en-
quiry of this chapter will seek to determine the basic Hege-
lian tenets retained by Kierkegaard. This specific compari-
son of the two thinkers is no superficial attempt to reduce 
the scope of Hegelian idealism to the level of Kierkegaard's 
existentialism. On the contrary, the comparison seeks to 
note to what degree Kierkegaard's existentialism retains in 
part themes with which Hegel was familiar. 
B. The existentialism of Hegel and Kierkegas.rd 
1. Category of existential thinking 
1 Both Hegel and Kierkegaard are existential thinkers. 
1. Gustav Mueller, "Faust's Goethe and Hegel," The .Per-
sonalist 25(Spring, 1944), 176. The author expresses 
the view that Hegel is an existential thinker by com-
~aring Goethe with Hegel in the following statement: 
Goethe is lyrical as Hegel is existential. Goethe 
writes nothing of importance that _is not a confession, 
an externalization of an internal movement. Hegel 
writes nothing of importance that is not filled with 
his own feeling and his own participation •••• He is 
just as scornful of a mere antiquarian, ungenuine, 
unexistential curiosity, an irresponsible, abstract, 
nonparticipating lmowledge, as Faust is of' Wagner." 
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"The existential thinker is the interested or passionate 
thinker."1 Hegel, like Kierkegaard, wrote nothing of sig-
nificance that was not filled with his participation and 
feeling. This counter-interpretation of Hegel is justified 
in light of the fact that he recognized the importance of 
existential elements as did Kierkegaard. The existential 
attitude is illustrated in Hegel's approach to truth in his 
preface to the Ph!nomenologie des Geistes. 
The truth is thus the bacchanalian revel, 
where not a member is sober; and because every 
member no sooner becomes detached than it eo 
ipso collapses straightway, the revel is just2 as much a state of transparent unbroken calm. 
The clear existential thesis is, as the statement indicates, 
that the thinker is a participant rather than a spectator in 
the search for truth.3 The passage reveals also that Hegel 
had experienced the irrational, ecstatic, self-involving 
character of existential thinking.4 
1. 
2. 
4· 
Paul Tillich, "Existential Philosophy," Journal of His-
tory of Ideas 5(1944), 53. 
Baillie, Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, p. 105. 
Knox and Kroner, Hegel's Earlz Theological Writings, p. 
46. In this work there Is the Interesting view that the 
Phenomenology o"£ Mind "is the emphatically expressed the-
sis ••• that only the existential thinker can think truth." 
:Maximiljian Beck, "Existentialism, Rationalism, and Chris-
tian Faith, " Journal of Religion 26 { 1946) , pp. 29 3-294n. 
Beck mrures the point that Hegel had experienced the irra-
tional character of existence: "To be sure, some passages 
in Hegel's work indicate that he has genuinely experienced 
the irrational character of existence as suCh. The famous 
phrase in the Introduction to his Phenomenologt' lthe Bac-
chanalian revel where not a single being is no drunk,• 
describes the dynamic and ecstatic self-transcendence of 
each particular being." 
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Although Hegel did not use the term existential think-
ing, he indicated plainly what is considered the character-
istics of it in his contrast between the theoretical mind 
and the practical mind. In Hegel's view of the practical 
mind, he revealed the relationship of passion and interest 
to the intellect. Hegel taught clearly that npassion is 
neither good nor bad. 111 
The title only states that the subject has 
thrown his whole soul - his ch~racter, enjoy-
ment, -- on one aim and object. 
Hegel is convinced that the tmmediate personal experience of 
a thinker can be incorporated into his search for truth, for 
"nothing great has been and nothing great can be accomplished 
without passion. n3 Speaking further on this view, Hegel in-
sisted, "Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. 114 
Moreover, Hegel indicated that, "It is only a dead, too 
often, indeed a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against 
the fonn of passion as such. n5 In thinking and in life a 
mants personal attitude is involved, and not merely his 
reason and intellect. To quote from Hegel: 
1. Wallace, Hesel•s PhilosoE:f!l of Mind, p. 96. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4· Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
Impulse and passion are the very life-blood 
of all a6tion: they are heeded ir the a~ent is 
really to be in his aim and the execution 
thereof.l . 
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Against th~ view that makes the impulses and inclinations 
"the free gift of nature, where wants are supposed to find 
their satisfaction without the agent doing anything1 " 2 
Hegel maintained that the agent "must produce a conformity 
between immediate existence and his own inner require-
ments."3 
Hegel was not unaware of the weakness of existential 
thinking. He pointed this out in his criticism of the 
practical mind. 
The rational, which exists in the shape of 
rationality when it is apprehended by thought, 
is the same content as the good practical feel-
ing has, but presented in its universali~y and 
necessity, in its objectivity and truth.~ 
Hegel noted that feeling and passion may become shut up 
within themselves opposing a fruitful contact with the 
universal. Though subjectivity is legitLmate when in con-
formity with reason, it is unessential• onesided, and bad 
when it selfishly sets itself against the universal."5 
In discussing the true intrinsic worth or the ~pulses and 
1. Ibid. 1 p. 98. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid.. 
4· Ibid. 1 PP• 92-93. ~
5. Ibid. 1 P• 92. 
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passions, Hegel said, "The nominal rationality of' impulse 
and propensity lies merely in their general impulse, not to 
be subjective merely, nl but to "get realised, overcoming the 
subjectivity by the subject's o~n agency. 112 
Kierkegaard's view of' the existential thinker is basic-
ally what he called the subjective thinker.3 He distin-
guished between the individual as a spectator of' the meta-
physical system and the individual as a participant of' his 
personal experience. 
If an excursion into the realm of pure 
thought is to determine whether a man is a 
thinker or not, the subjective thinker is 
ipso facto excluded from consideration. But 
In and with. his exclusion every existential 
problem also goes by the board; and the melan-
choly consequences are audible as an undertone 
of warning accompanyin·g the jubilant cries 
with which modern ~peculative thought has 
hailed the System.~ 
In contrast to objective thinking, Kierkegaard sought to re-
turn to subjective thinking, which involves the subject who 
is interested in his own inwardness. Thus Kierkegaard•s 
famous statement is, "Truth is subjectivity. n.5 Kierkegaard 
is referring to a person's mode of existence. His central 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 96. 
3. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 84. 
4.. Ibid., P• 312. 
5. Ibid., p. 169. 
treatment of the problem is the following statement: 
An objective uncertainty held fast in an 
appropriation-process of the most passionate 
inwardness is the truth, the highest truth 
attainable for an existing individual.l 
The same personal concern for truth which is found 
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in the above quotation is basic in Kierkegaard 1 s works. In 
spite of criticism of Hegel's view as representative of an 
objective uncertainty, Kierkegaard agreed that feeling and 
participation involve all truth, thinking, and life. Per-
haps Hegel's reflection in the Logik contains a parallel 
development. He pointed out that thinking that does not 
involve something is like swimming without going into the 
water. 
But to seek to know before we know is as 
absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, 
not to venture into the water until he had 
learned to swtm.2 
Hegel appears to be saying that a person must have a de-
cisive personal cammitment to knowledge, as the individual 
must enter the water to swim. 
K1erkegaard 1 s analysis of passion is close to Hegel's 
position. According to Kierkegaard, the subjective thinker 
requires imagination and feeling, "but passion first and 
last."3 Kierkegaard observed, "Pa~sion ••• is the real 
1. Ibid., P• 182. 
2. Wallace, The Logic of HeSel, p. 17. 
3. Kierkegaard, Conciuding unscientitic Postscript, P• 313. 
206 
measure of man's power. And the age in which we live is 
wretched, because it is without passion.ul Again, "Passion 
is the culmination of existence for an existing individual."2 
Like Hegel, Kierkegaard pointed out clearly what he consid-
ered the weakness of passion in the following statement: 
Let no one misunderstand all my talk about 
passion and pathos to mean that I am proclaim-
ing any and every uncircumcised ~ediacy, all 
manner of unshaven passion.3 
Passion must be baptized in the waters of reflection and 
transfigured, since "the pathos of ideality" alone will lead 
man towards full humanity.4 The "pathos of ideali ty11 is a 
partaking of the eternal.5 
When compared with Hegel's, Kierkegaard 1 s position 
shows both similarities and differences. Both Hegel and 
Kierkegaard hold that man is an actor rather than spectator 
in the knowledge-situation. Generally speaking, Hegel and 
Kierkegaard understand the term passion in the same way. 
In spite of the parallel development, the result of the two 
thinkers' use of the term passion is different. Kierkegaard 
has a tendency to depreciate the objective for the sake of the 
1. Kierkegaard, Journals, p. 102. · 
2. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, P• 176. 
3. Kierkegaard, JoUrnals, p. 133. 
4. Jolivet, . op. cit., P• 117. 
5. Ibid. 
purely subjective.1 In allowing thought to lean so heavi-
ly upon subjective experience, his position is a revolt 
against reason. Two quotations, which illustrate his basic 
weakness and difference fro.m Hegel's view are stated here: 
"The conclusions or passion are the only reliable onea, 
that is, the only convincing conclusions."2 To quote rrom 
Kierkegaard: 
As soon as the truth, the essential 
truth, may be assumed to be known by 
everyone, the objective becomes appro-
priation and inwardness.3 
Hegel would insist, on the contrary, that true subjectivity 
must lead to a body of objective coherent facts, yet truth 
must stand also in direct relation to experience.4 
l. 
2. 
Ibid., P• 172. 
............ 
Kierkegaard, Fear ·and Trembiin8, p. 154. 
Kierkegaard, concluding unscient1ric Postscript, P• 217. 
Josiah Royce, The SPirit of Modern . Philoso~~ (Boston: 
The Riverside Press Cambridge, 189Z}, PP• · -227. 
The author writes: "People usually .eall Hegel a cold-
hearted systam-maker, who reduced all our emotions to 
purely abstract logical ter.ms, and conceived his abso-
lute solely as an incarnation of dead thought. I, on 
the contrary, call him one who knew marvelously well, 
with all his coldness, the secret of human passion, 
and who, thererore, described, as rew others have done, 
the paradoxes, the problems, and the glories or the 
spiritual life. His great philosophical and systematic 
error lay, not in introducing logic into passion, 
but in conceiving the logic of passion as the only 
logic." 
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2. Category of irrationalism-rationalism 
Rationalism is the "doctrine of the supremacy of reason.nl 
Philosophically, there are three basic meanings of what rea-
son is in modern thought. But only one is essential to this 
study. It is the appeal to coherence as the criterion of 
truth. The view that defined reason as coherence is Hege-
lian.2 Irrationalism is the appeal to immediate experience 
as opposed to coherence or rational thought.3 The age-old 
conflict between rationalism and irrationalism is among the 
most futile, since it is very difficult to arrange individ-
ual rationalists or irrationalists in a elear order of phil-
osophical development. Historically, Hegel has been consid-
ered the arch-rationalist of modern philosophy, but Kroner, 
in Von Kant bis Hegel, observes, "Hegel is without doubt 
the greatest irrationalist whom the history of philosophy 
knows."4 Kierkegaard in his revolt against Hegel's system 
is held to be an arch-irrationalist, yet Wild writes in The 
1. Brightman, "Rationalism," An Encyclopedia .of Religion, 
ed. v. Ferm - (New York: The Philosophical Library, Inc., 
1945), p. 635. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. R. Kroner, Von Kant bis ·Hegei (Ttlbingen:: Mohr, 1921), 
II, 271. The passage is translated in Michalson 1 s 
article, "The Boundary between Faith and Reason: -A 
study .ot Hegel's Giauben ·un.e ·wisseri.," Drew University 
Bulletin 39{December, 1951), P• 4. -
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Challenge of Existentialism: "If we took this irrational-
ism seriously, we would have to reject his writings, which 
are a triumph of theoretical analysis. ttl Undoubtedly, 
Kroner and Wild overstate their cases, although their ob-
servations are understandable, since there are irrational 
and ra tione.l elements in both thinkers. 
Hegel's irrationalism is related to his dialectic of 
immediacy.2 He defined immediacy as the appea.l to immediate 
experience. 
The knowledge, which is at the start or 
immediately our object, can be nothing else 
than just that whic~ is immediate knowledge, 
knowledge of the immediate, of what is. We 
have, in dealing with it, to proceed, too, 
in an immediate way, to accept what is 
given, not altering ~nything in it as it is 
presented before us.j 
Explaining further the nature of immediacy, Hegel pointed 
out that it is something that is felt, or it is a "this" 
which apprehends a "that," or what had not been previously 
related. In a central statement of the nature of immediacy, 
Hegel said that it "is nothing else than what is untrue, 
irrational, something barely and simply meant.n4 
1. J. Wild, The -Challenge of Existentialism~ PP• 53-54. 
2. Cf. H. W. Dresser's article, "The Element of Irrational-
ity in The Hegelian Dialectic," The .Philosophy of Spirit 
(New York: G. P. Putnrun 1 s Sons, 1908). 
3. Hegel, Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, p. 149. 
--
4• Ibid., p. 160. 
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Hegel's rationalism is related to his usage or the 
ter.m reason, coupled with his special view that the irra-
tional is a particular mode or the rational. According to 
Hegel, the highest runction or the rinite and Absolute Mind 
is reason. Reason is basically cognitive in character, but 
it does not mean simple reflective activity, nor merely in-
tuitive activity. "It is both at once in an indivisible 
act."1 Thus reason is both immediate and mediate. 2 That is, 
reason transforms the immediate experience by the mediating 
process or reflection into meaning and order.3 Der Begrift 
is reason in the rullness of its power. 
Reason is spirit, when its certainty of be-
ing all reality has been raised to the level 
of truth, and reason is consciouslx aware of 
itselr ~s its own world, and or the world as 
itself.l.J. 
Hegel developed further his theory of reason by dis-
tinquishing between the terms Verstand and Vernuntt. Ac-
cording to Hegel's treatment: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4· 
5. 
Verstand is the more practical intellect 
which seeks definite and restricted results 
and knowledges, while Vernunrt is a deeper 
and higher power which aims at completeness.5 
. - -
Ibid., P• 32. 
Ibi·d.. 
Ibid., P• 33. 
~., p. 457. 
Hegel, The Logic or Hegel, p. 400. 
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As the statement indicates, Hegel attributed to Vernunrt 
operations that go beyond the limited activities of the 
Kantian Verstan.d. In Hegel's reflection upon vernun:rt, there 
are illustrated two of his famous sayings and his basic view 
concerning rationalism. "The real is the rational, nl and 
"The truth is the whole. "2 The first of' these famous say-
ings is motivated by the insight that the universe is a 
rational system, and the intellect to a degree, in virtue 
of coherence, is capable of grasping the nature of it. The 
latter means that truth is a reasonable whole. In Hegel's 
thinking the existence of irrational elements is not an 
exception to the reasonableness of the world, but the ir-
rational factors are one necessary aspect of the rational 
order. 
Kierkegaard revolted against reason and systematiza-
tion, in favor of the subjective, the individual, and the 
existential.3 Yet he never rid h±mself' of the conflict be-
tween rationalism and irrationalism. On the negative side, 
Kierkegaard's irrationalism is related essentially to the 
self-contradictory nature of faith. His polemic against 
1. Knox, op. cit., p. 14. 
2. Baillie, op. cit., p. 81 
3. Brightman, "Reason in Religion," An Encyclopedia of 
Religion, ed. v. Fer.m (New York: Phliosopbleai Library, 
Inc., 1945), p. 637. 
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Hegel is derived basically from this position. Kierkegaard•s 
central view is that in faith the individual is in the truth. 
Against the Hegelian rationalistic system, Kierkegaard prized 
the absurdity of faith. "The absurd is the object of faith, 
and the only object that can be believed. nl Yet there is, 
however, a risk in this faith, but 
without risk there is no faith. Faith is pre-
cisely the contradiction between the infinite 
passion of the individ~al' s inwardness and the 
objective uncertainty. . 
In the last quotation ~erkegaard is convinced that what for 
the intellect is objective uncertainty is a certainty of 
faith, since man•s task is "to endure the crucifixion of the 
understanding. n3 In his negative attitude toward Hegel • s 
system, Kierkegaard held to absurdity, contradiction, and 
irrationality. 
On the positive side, ~erkegaard used speculative 
reason a good deal, in order to show that there is in man 
a faculty higher than reason. That Kierkegaard experienced 
the conflict between his irrationalism and his usage of 
reason finds expression in many of his writings. In the 
Journal, he writes: 
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 189. 
2. Ibid., p. 182. 
3. Ibid., p. 500. 
There will always remain one thing to. be con-
sidered, which cannot be passed over: to what 
extent is one to consider reason as a temptation 
with regard to faith? To what extent is it sin• 
ful, to what extent is a harmonious conjunction 
of faith and reason in itself a point of taith?l 
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Kierkegaard's conflict is here between absurdity and reason. 
Although Kierkegaard 1 s basic choice appears to be absurd! ty, 
his position is ambiguous. An illustration ot his view on 
reason is the following statement. 
I have never had any immediacy, and there-
fore, in the ordinary haman sense of the word, 
I have never lived. I began at once with re-
flection, it is not as though in later years 
I had amassed a little reflection, but I am 
reflection tram first to last.2 
If the preceding statement be true, then Kierkegaard appears 
to be making room for reflection in his view. 
In the Point of View, Kierkegaard declared that he 
carried out his view in an exact, rigorous, and methodo-
logical manner closer to coherence of reason than to the 
inspiration of faith. 
No, I must say truly that I cannot under-
stand the whole, just because . to the merest 
insignificant detail I understand the whole, 
but what I cannot understand is that now I 
can understand it and yet cannot by any means 
say that at the instant of commencing it I 
understood it so precisely~~hough it is I 
that have carried it out and made every step 
with reflection.3 
... . . . . ... 
1. Kierkegaard, j6urnal, _1844, _IV A 191. This passage is 
quoted from Jo11vet, qp. cit., P• 57. 
2. Kierkegaard, The . :Point -of View, P• 81 
3. Ibid.., P• 72. 
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Coupled with this statement is Kierkegaard' s denial that he 
wrote under inspiration: 
I can lay no claim to an tmmediate relation-
ship with God, that I cannot and dare not say 
that it is He who immediately inserts the 
thoughts in me, but that my relationship to 
God is a reflectionyrelationship, is inward-
ness in reflection. 
I t h&s not without reason been asked whether, in spite of his 
polemic against Hegel, Kierkegaard does not try to rational-
ize his concepts in accordance with Hegel's principle of 
mediation?2 
In comparing the two thinkers, it may be pointed out 
briefly that both thinkers were aware of the rational-
irrational conflict. Hegel, like Kierkegaard, affirmed the 
irrational character of existence. But Hegel differed fro.m 
Kierkegaard by uniting the irrational and rational elements 
within a reasonable whole. Kierkegaard•s position is incon-
sistent. He held to a faith that excludes all reflection, 
1. Ibid., PP• 68-69. 
2. Jolivet, op. eit., P• 60. The author expresses the fol-
lowing view: 11 If all is dialectic however in Kierke-
gaard, that is, if everything assumes the for-m. of dia-
logue, and even, as we have seen, of polemic, is there 
not also to be found in him. a secret liking for attempts 
at mediation? Such an inclination would give the ful-
lest signifieance to his polemic against Hegel, which 
would then appear as a polemical attack by Kierkegaard 
upon himself •••• Indeed, might not Kierkegaard•s pro-
found and admirably subtle taste for. states of transi-
tion, moments of uncertainty, .doubtful positions, be 
taken as a replica, on the existential plane, of Hegel's 
rational mediation?" 
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and a reflection that excludes all faith.l Yet his total 
view is to use reason as an instrument to defend the irra-
tional side of life. 
3. Category of the individual 
In the main, Hegel's treatment of the individual did 
not place a sufficient stress upon him. Hegel was convinced 
that the truth or the individual was in its relation to the 
whole of the ethical order. 
Actuality is always the unity of universal 
and particular, the universal dismembered in 
the particulars which seem to be self-subsistent, 
although they really are upheld and contained 
only in the whole. Where this unity is not 
present, a thing is not •ctu~l even though it 
may have acquired existence • 
. 
But it cannot be maintained, as Kierkegaard indicates, that 
Hegel did not treat the individual. Though the individual 
is a part or an organic structure, yet individual! ty implies 
tor Hegel an existing tor itself. 
As the individual in his own particular 
work ipso facto accomplishes unconsciously 
a universal work, so again he also performs 
the universal task as his cgnscious object. 
The whole becomes 1n its entirety his work, 
£or which he sacrifices himself, and precise-
1. Ibid., p. 223. Jolivet points out that Kierkegaard is 
wa!Vided between .a .fideism which excludes all reason 
and a rationalism which excludes all .faith." 
2. Hegel, The Philosoppy of Right, p. 283. 
ly by t~t means receives back his own self 
from it. 
Likewise, Hegel added: 
There is nothing here which may not be re-
ciprocal, nothing in regard to which the inde-
pendence of the individual may not, in dissi-
pating its existence on its own account (Fur-
sichseyn)', in negating itself, give itself 
its positive significance of existing for 
itself.2 
"Existing f or itself," is an expression of Hegel, which 
me ans that the individual is "particularized in his mvn 
individual! ty. "3 
~.Lb 
Opposing the pursuit of totality found in Hegel, Kier-
kegaard insisted that to consider man merely as a part of 
the whole is to negate him. Kierkegaard did not seek to 
refute Hegel in paragraphs, but with the use of the category 
of the individual. In The Point of -View he stated his cen-
tral theme is the category of the individual: 
1. 
2. 
3· 
4· 
I was conscious of being a religious 
author and as such was concerned with 'the 
individual'••• a thought in which is cGn-
tained an ent~re philosophy of life and 
of the world.4 
Accepting the _ c~tegory of the individual, Kierkegaard 
Hegel, Hegei's Phenomenolog,y of Mind, p. 377. 
Ibid. 
!.!?..!E.· 
Kierkegaard, The Point of View, P• 21. 
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pointed out that pure ideality commits the capital error of 
not envisaging the real individual. Kierkegaard•s philoso-
phy seems to indicate that Hegel•s logical system does to 
the individual what Rostand 1 s Cyrano De Bergerac connotes, 
11It seems too logical: I have missed everything even my 
d~ath. nl But Kierkegaard maintained: 
And yet, if I were to desire an inscrip-
tion for my tombstone, I should desire none 
other than l tThat Individual• ~f that is not••• 
understood, it surely will be. 
A closer analysis of Kierkegaard•s "That Individual" 
reveals two converse meanings. First, Kierkegaard spoke of 
the individual as having an infinite relationship and inter-
est in self and destiny.3 The task of the individual, as 
Kierkegaard expresses it in the following statement, is 
"to exercise the absolute relations hip to the absolute 
telos. 114 But this view is not different fran a parallel 
development of the individual .found in Hegel 1 s Werke: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4-
In the Christian world the subject is not 
a mere accident of the deity, but an infinite 
end in himself--in this divine world the cre-
ation of true individuals is all that matters: 
that state may demand its sacrifice to save 
Edmund Rostand, czrano De Ber~erac (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 923), p. 1 1. 
Kierkegaard, The Point of View, p. 131. 
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 273. 
Ibid.' p. 364. 
the whole, but in relation to God and in God's 
realm it is an end in and ~or itsel~. 
t::::.LO 
Kierkegaard 1 s view is similar, since the individual is what 
he is because of his relationship with God, and his interest 
with himself and destiny. Consequently, "The individual has 
his teleology in himself ••• This self ••• is not an abstrac-
tion but is absolutely concrete."2 
Secondly, Kierkegaard speaks of the individual in rela-
tion to the whole in a Hegelian manner: 
He ••• who chooses himself ethically chooses 
himself concretely as this definite individual 
••• This self which is the aim is not merel~ 
a personal self but a social, a civic self.3 
Is not Kierkegaard saying with Hegel that the individual is 
a concrete actuality only as he relates himself to his so-
cial world? Hegel is convinced that, "True universality 
takes its stand on the side of organic individual single-
ness, which is thereby a living individual entity."4 
A comparison of the two views reveals that Hegel and 
Kierkegaard are convinced that the individual is of value, 
but Hegel would be opposed to the essential tendency of 
Kierkegaard to make the individual the only value. Hegel 
1. Hegel, Werke (Stuttgart), XIV, 247. This passage is 
translated in Gustav Mueller's article, "Faust's Goethe 
and Hegel," The Personaiist (Spring, 1944), P• 176. 
2. Kierkegaard, Either/Or, II, 229-230. 
3• Ibid., 210, 220. 
4 • . Hegel, Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, p. 324. 
is aware of the evil of extreme individualism, which is a 
fundamental weakness in Kierkegaard•s position. Against 
Kierkegaard•s expression "the crowd .is the untruth,"1 Hegel 
would add: 
The right of individuals to be subjective-
ly destined to freedom is fulfilled when they 
belong to an actual ethical order, because 
their conviction of their freedom finds its 
truth in such an objective or~er, and ••• 
their own inner universality. 
Although Kierkegaard correctly noted that the individual's 
existence must be accounted for, he was mistaken in not re-
alizing that the universal needs also an explanation for 
its existence.3 
C. Reality as dynamic and spiritual 
Hegel considered reality to be dynamic and spiritual. 
It is the essential task of his system to show that every-
thing contains a dynrunic destiny; it comes to self-develop-
ment, and becomes a part of a higher truth. Thus, accord-
ing to Hegel's philosophy, the dynamic pattern is manifest-
1. Kierkegaard, The Point of View, p. 114. 
2. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, p. 109. 
3. Whittemore, op. cit., P• 144. Whittemore holds a simi-
lar view in the following statement: "Kierkegaard•s 
cry of protest against submerging individual in univer-
sal may be psychologically sound but ontologically it 
stands as a protest against what may prove to be the 
very nature of Reality itself, if only because it for-
gets that the Cosmic no less than the micro-cosmic re-
quires explanation." 
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ed throughout all existence, whether it be on the plane or 
a scientific movement, the level of a literary concept, or 
religlous creed. Regardless, progress and truth are the 
result of conflict of opposing elements. Instead of truth 
and life being fixed and static, they are active and dynwn-
ic, passing from its given ter.m (thesis), to its opposite 
(antithesis), and onward to a third ter.m (synthesis), 
which comprehends both thesis and antithesis within a higher 
unity. Hegel saw all life and history as the dynamic, in-
exorable march of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Instead of 
a transcendent, eternal Being operating from another world, 
Hegel's Absolute Spirit is immanent in all the cultural 
epochs of history, as well as the lower order of inanimate 
nature. The history of civilization becomes the actual re-
alization of an Infinite and World Geist. For example, in 
tbe Geschichte die Philo sophie, Hegel affirmed, "The general, 
the principle of all development involves an inner capacity, 
striving to realize itself. "1 For Hegel, the principle of 
all development, ~anent in all life, is the universal 
Geist, which is the sovereign of the world, and in constant 
flux. Hegel wrote: 
But for Spirit, the highest attainment is 
self-knowledge, and advance, not only to the 
1. Haldane, op. cit., p. 105. 
intuition but to t£e thought, the clear con-
ception of itselt. 
C:..t::....L. 
He is seeking to give, as Adams has suggested in the 
early writings of Hegel, a dialectic of life which con-
sisted of spiritual striving. His later works, Logik and 
Pblnomenolosie des Geistes, are attempts to make the spir-
2 itual BegeisterUQs articulate. The conviction that lies 
in the background of his thinking in his early work is an 
experience which possessed an inner self-movement, a spirit 
which is dynamic and dialectical.3 The very life of this 
experience consisted in overcoming oppositions, a winning 
of peace, an atonement, and reconciliation. 
Like Hegel, Kierkegaard insisted that reality is dynam-
ic ~nd spiritual.4 Where struggle and conflict stop, there 
1. Ibid. 
2. Adams, op. · cit., P• 92. 
3. Ibid. Adam~ _ points out that in this process which goes 
on within Leben, a process of tension, separation, and 
reconciliation, there is the earliest for.m of Hegel's 
dialectic of history. It is also added that the dia-
lectic of life, and of history is the real dialectic of 
Hegel, while the Logic of pure ideas is a formal ex-
pression. 
4. Moore, op. cit., P• 573. "What is here said of Marx is 
true of Kierkegaard that the major share in what is 
reputed to be Kierkegaard 1s discovery of existential 
thinking is seen to be Hegelian. That our thoughts and 
actions cannot be inferred from a static datum, but 
one's decisions are in a process ot trial and conflict, 
this is surely existential and belongs to Hegel. In a 
sense Kierkegaard did no more than push tae Hegelian 
dialectic to the extremes of what he thought to be the 
hwnan situation and proclaim that the Hegelian sense ot 
conflict of opposites must be taken so seriously that it 
would destroy his philosophical system." 
stop also life and truth. For instance, in the Concluding 
unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard illustrated dramatic-
ally the dynamic element of reality in the famous saying or 
Lessing, "IF GOD HELD ALL TRO'TH IN HIS RIGHT HAND, AND IN 
HIS LEPI' HAND HELD THE LIFE-LONG PURSUIT 0 F IT, HE WOULD 
CHOOSE TEE LEF'r HAND. nl With Hegel, Kierkegaard held that 
to exist is to become, and this uninterrupted movement is 
an unceasingly renewed effort that relates the finite with 
the Eternal. With Hegel, Kierkegaard asserted that reality 
is a dynamic striving discovered in a dialectic of life. 
The dynamic, spiritual real! ty may be the conflict of the 
instant in which Eternity is within temporality. An example 
of this can be seen in the becoming of the Christian life. 
Christian! ty is a dynamic striving through trial, suffering, 
and conflict. Kierkegaard said: 
Becoming a Christian is then the most fear-
ful decision of man's life, a struggle through 
to attain faith against despair and offense, 
the twin Cerberuses ~hat guard the entrance 
to a Christian life. 
According to Kierkegaard, the striving, dynamic aspect 
of reality is to be known only in participation and decision. 
It was at this point in spite of agreement that Kierkegaard 
saw Hegel as knowing the world spirit in a detached or theo-
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 97. 
2. Ibid., P• 333. 
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retical way, instead of being an active participant of the 
historical world. Hegel should not have been a spectator 
according to Kierkegaard. But it appears that Kierkegaard 
has missed Hegel's meaning. It is the essential of Hegel's 
standpoint that reality is dynamic: spiritual inwardness 
as well as outwardness. 
D. Abstraction and unreality 
Both Kierkegaard and Hegel viewed the abstract to be 
the unreal. But this standpoint means one thing to Kierke-
gaard, and another to Hegel. First, Hegel saw anything 
short of the whole as partial, fragmentary, and abstract. 
Accordingly, "The truth is the whole. nl An analysis of 
this whole reveals the essential nature reaching its com-
pleteness through the process of its own development. 2 In 
the Logik, as well as the Phinomenologie des Geistes, truth 
is identified with the whole and reality; wherein anything 
short of the whole is abstract and unreal. Hegel states in 
the Logik: 
The ;t.dea is the 'Druth: for Truth is the 
corr espondence of objectivity ,. i th the no-
t ion; not of course the correspondence of 
exte1~na,1. things with my conceptions,-for 
tbe:se are only correct conceptions held by 
me, the i~d~vidual person •••• And yet, 
1. Baillie, op. cit., p. 81. 
2. Baillie, Ibid., p. 17. 
~gain, everything actual, in so rar as it is 
true, is the Idea, and has its truth by and 
in virtue of the Idea alone.l 
In the many difrerences of the dialectical triad: as 
immediacy and mediacy, positive and negative, abstract uni-
versal and concrete universal, selr and otherness, Hegel 
traced the abstractness or thought. One of the fundamental 
claims of Hegel is that the dialectical triad is a cure for 
the abstraction of thought. Since the real is the concrete, 
the abstract is the unreal, or partial. Hegel said: 
The understanding, which addresses itself 
to deal with the Idea, commits a double mis-
understandine• It takes first the extremes 
of the Idea (be they expressed as they will, 
so long as they are in their unity), not as 
they are understood when stamped with this 
concrete unity, but as if2they remained ab-stractions outside of it. 
According to Hegel, the dialectic combines the abstract mo-
ments of the understanding with the concrete synthesis into 
the totality, which constitutes the reasonableness of reality. 
This view is basic in Hegel's philosophy. 
Generally it is assumed that Hegel is an abstract think-
er. But Hegel was in vigorous opposition and highly polem-
ical to all form of abstract thought. In spite of the fact 
that many passages of his works are difficult to understand, 
Hegel was convinced that any thought that did not take into 
1. Wallace, op. cit., p. 352. 
2. Ibid., P• 356. 
account the fullness of things was abstract. In a short es-
say entitled, "~ denkt abstrakt? 111 Hegel attempted to show 
what was meant by abstract. Hegel's basic point is that ab-
straction is the cardinal sin of analytical thought. Hegel 
illustrated his view by using an example of a murder. 
By abstract thinking, then, is meant that 
in the murderer, we see nothing but the sim-
ple fact that he is a murderer, and by this 
~!~l!h{~~lf~i~~i!:~ate all the human na-
Hegel pointed out that the sentimental Leipsic world 
thought otherwise, since "they threw their bouquets, ard 
twined their flowers round the wheel ard the criminal who 
was fastened to it. n3 According to Hegel, this action rep-
resents the opposite pole of abstraction. 
Turning to what he considered the example of concrete 
thinking, Hegel stated that he had heard a poor old woman, 
"an inmate of tre poor• s-house, rise above the abstraction 
of murder, n4 in the following manner: 
The sun shone, as the severed head was 
laid upon the scaffold. 'How finely,• said 
the woman, •does God's gracious sun lighten 
up Binder's head15 . 
1. The translation of the title is "Who Is the Abstract 
Thinker?" Cf. Wallace's The Logic of Hegel with Proleg-
omena, p-. LXXIX. 
2. Ibid., p. LXXX. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
Hegel added that "we often say of a poor creature who ex-
cites our anger that he is not worth the sun shining on 
him. nl But showing clearly that his view of the concrete 
is closely linked with the organic whole as the Spirit, 
Hegel pointed out further: 
That woman saw that the murder• s head 
was in the sunlight, and that it ha. d not 
become quite worthless. She raised him 
fram the punishment of the scaffold into 
the sunlit grace of God.2 
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Thus against the "abstract-loVLTlg tendency of violets and 
sentimental conceit," the woman brought about the reconcil-
iation of the man. "She saw him in the sun above received 
into grace. "3 Hegel is saying clearly in the direct fore-
going exposition that abstraction is anything taken apart 
from its connection in which it belongs. Concretion is any-
thing in its proper relation to the whole, and the Absolute 
Spirit is most inclusive of it. 
Kierkegaard agrees with what is a basic conception of 
Hegel's philosophy that the abstract is the unreal. But 
Kierkegaard denies Hegel 1 s definition of the abstract as the 
unrelated. Rather Kierkegaard uses Hegel's doctrine in a 
non-Hegelian manner. Kierkegaard concludes that Hegel is 
the chief representative of abstraction in the history of 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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philosophy. It is the belief of Kierkegaard that abstract 
thought does not get at reality. The questionable character 
of abstract thought is apparent in the relationship with 
existential problems. Here abstract thought is like the doctor 
of Holberg, who killed the patient but also expelled the 
fever. Another thing about abstract thought is its dis-
interestedness. But tor the existential individual, 
existence is the highest interest. 
Existence constitutes the highest interest 
of the existing individual, and his interest 
in his existence constitutes his reality. What 
reality is, cannot be expressed in the language 
of abstraction. Reality is an interesse be-
tween the moments or that h:n>othet!cal unity 
of thought end being which abstract thought 
presupposes. Abstract thou~t considers both 
possibility and reality, but its concept of 
reality is a false reflection, since the medi-
um within which the concept of thought is not 
reality, but possibUity. Abstract thought 
can get hold of reality only by nullifying it, 
and this nullification of reality consists in 
transforming it into possibility. All that 
is said about reality consists in the language 
of abstraction and within the sphere of abstract 
thought, is rfally said within the sphere of 
the possible. 
Kierkegaard maintained that the monk in the cloister 
does not live as unreal a life as that of the abstract 
thinker. For the hermit abstracted from the entire world, 
but he did not abstract from himself, whereas the abstract 
thinker ends in the cosmic lunacy of abstracting from him-
self. 
1. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 279. 
We know how to describe the fantastic sit-
uation of the cloister, far from the haunts of 
men, in the solitude of the forest, in the 
distant blue of the horizon; but we take no 
notice of the fantastic situation of pure 
thought. And yet, the patheti c unreality of 
the hermit is far preferable to the cosmic 
unree.li ty of the pure thinker; and the passion-
ate forgetfulness of the hermit, which takes 
from him the entire world, is much to be pre-
ferred to the comical distraction of the phil-
osopher engrossed in the contemplation of uni-
versal history, which leads him to forget 
himself.l 
Like Hegel, Kierkegaard is the persistent and virile 
critic of abstraction. The latter maintained that 
Hegelian philosophy was abstraction and unreality. Yet 
this viewpoint is not totally justif ied in a man who 
insists that his own· "energies are for the most part ••• 
consecrated to the service of speculation." 2 In light 
of the evidence and Kierkege.ard' s admission, he is 
struggling against the Hegelianism that he denies, and 
the Hegelianism that his view retains. 
E. Dialectical method 
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant deals with the 
categories of space, time, and matter, and he shows that 
pure reason is involved in contradiction, antinomies, and 
paradoxes. Likewise, in Hegel's philosophical system, 
1. Ibid., p. 284. 
2. Ibid., P• 92. 
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there is an emphasis on the paradoxical nature or reality, 
analogous to the contraries of thesis and antithesis. Hegel 
sought to show in his principle of mediation that all para-
doxes of speculative reasoning move from thesis, antithesis, 
to synthesis, until the Absolute Spirit is reached, where 
all paradoxes are aufgehoben, cancelled out and preserved 
in a higher realm of reality. The law of advance is from 
position to opposition to new combinations, and the enriched 
reality of Absolute Spirit. In the Absolute Spirit, the 
subjective spirit and the objective spirit arrive at unity 
and spirit, perfectly free and reconciled. 
Kierkegaard, like Hegel, is a philosopher of paradoxes 
and syntheses, though the former sought to deny the latter 
term.l Reuter, Bohlin, and Geimmar hold that Hegel's theory 
of contradiction is the origin of the paradox in Kierkegaard.2 
1. Grene, op. cit. 1 p. 34. Grene states: "Along with Hegel-
ian definitions, Kierkegaard retains the habit of para-
doxical play with philosophical vocabulary-." 
2. 
~jU 
In Concluding Unscientiric Postscript, Kierkegaard shows how 
essential is the term paradox for his thinking: 
The thinker without a paradox is like a 
lover without reeling: a paltry mediocrity. 
But the highest pitch of every passion is 
always to will its own downfall; and so it 
is also the supreme passion of the Reason 
to seek a collision, though this collision 
must in one way or another prove its undoing. 
The supreme paradox or all thought is the at-
tempt to discover something that thought can-
not think. This passion is at bottom present 
in all thinking, even in the thinking or the 
individual, in so rar as in thinking he 
participates in something transcending him- · 
selr. But habit dulls our sensibilities, 
and prevents us from perceiving it.l 
The paradoxical nature or existential thinking involves 
three basic aspects ror Kierkegaard. First, Kierkegaard 
used the word "paradox" to imply opposites, analogous with 
the contraries or thesis and antithesis in Hegel's dialec-
tic. In view or this, Kierkegaard remarked, "The existing 
thinker is always as negative as he is positive.n2 Hegel's 
statement or this common principle is, "That the Negative 
in . its own nature is quite as much Positive, is implied in 
saying that what is opposite to another is its other."3 
Part or Hegel's dialectical view or things is the doctrine 
of polar opposites, which are antagonistic bQt necessary to 
1• Kierkegaard, Phiiosophical Fragments, P~ 29. 
2. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientiric Postscript, p. 78. 
3. Hegel, The Logic or Hegei, P• 221. 
~j.l 
each other. In the Papirer, Kierkegaard stated the follow-
ing view concerning opposites: 
The words •either/or• are a two-edged dagger 
I carry about with me, wherewith I assassinate 
actuality. For I say •either/or•~either this 
is this, or it is that. When, however, nothmg 
in life is tither this or that ••• life itself 
is nothing. 
Hegel's treatment of the principle of contradiction is a 
similar view. 
A must be either •A or -A, it says. It 
virtually declares in these words a third 
A •••• Even the mere plhs and minus of number 
or abstract direction ave, it we like, zero, 
for their third.~ 
As Kierkegaard makes .. nothing" the third or either-or, Hegel 
makes zero the third of ei. ther "plus" or "minus." 
Secondly, Hegel reconciles all contraries by mediation, 
but Kierkegaard aaintained that only relative paradoxes, or 
contraries can be mediated. Kierkegaard said: 
We do not need Hegel to tell us that 
relative oppositions can be mediated, for 
we are taught by the ancients that they 
can be resolved. But personality will to 
all eternity protest against the mediation 
of Absolute oppositions. This protest is 
o~ course quite incompatible with claim ot 
mediation. Personality will for ever 
repeat its ~ortal dilemma, •to be or not 
to be, that is the question.•3 
1. Kierkegaard, Papirer, p. 179. Translated by Croxall, 
op. cit., p. 43. 
2. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, p. 220. 
3. Croxall, op. cit., p. 42. 
As the first portion of the quotation implies, Kierkegaard 
agreed with Hegel that some paradoxes can be mediated. But 
in the latter portion, he denied that all paradoxes can be 
mediated. In Kierkegaard's f~ulation of the mediation 
or paradoxes, his view is a parallel development with the 
Hegelian view. Particularly, two areas of his thought show 
the boxxl which unites his paradoxes to Hegel's synthesis. 
First, in his early work, The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard 
develops in close relation to Hegel the theory or the para-
doxical synthesis as the first approach to speculation from 
time to eternity.1 The term paradoxical synthesis means 
for Kierkegaard that contraries are synthesized into a 
third term. In Samlede Vaerker he illustrates this view 
in the following way: 
Every for.m of the exclusion of inwardness 
in either activity-possibility, or passiv-
ity-activity, and whether it is th~ one or 
the other lies in self-reflection. 
To add another of the mediated paradoxes, Kierkegaard said: 
Pride-cowardice: Pride begins through an 
activity, cowardice through a passivity, 
otherwise they are identical; for there 1 is 
in cowardice just so much activity, tha~ 
the dread of the good can be preserved. " . 
1. Wahl, op. cit., p. 373. 
2. Kierkegaard, Samlede Vaerker, IV, p. 451, translated by 
Grene, op. cit., p. )6. 
3. Ibid. 
A further illustration of his view can be seen in 
Kierkegaard's definition of man as a synthesis of body 
and soul. 
Man is a synthesis of the soulish and the 
bodily. But a synthesis is unthinkable if 
the two are not united in a third factor. 
The third factor is the spirit.l 
Other terms employed by Kierkegaard to designate this rela-
tionship are that man is a synthesis of infinite and finite, 
of freedom and necessity, and of eternality and temporality. 
Speaking of man as a synthesis of the temporal and the eter-
nal, Kierkegaard states: 
So then, man said to be a . synthesis 
of soul and body; but he is at the seme time 
a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. 
I have no objection to recognizing that this 
has often been said ••• As for the latter syn-
thesis, it evidently is not fashioned in the 
same way as the former. In the former case 
the two factors were soul and body, and the 
spirit was a third term •••• The other syn-
thesis has only two factors: the temporal 
and the eternal. Where is the third term? 
And if there be no third term, there is 
really no synthesis; for a synthesis of 
that without a third term, for the recogni-
tion that the synthesis is a contradiction 
is precisely the assertion that it is not a 
synthesis.2 . 
Passftges like these illustrate the part which the paradoxical 
synthesis plays in Kierkegaard 1 s dialectic and his ambiguous 
relation to Hegel. Kierkegaard uses the term synthesis 
which is in contradiction to itself. This development is 
1. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 39. 
2. Ibid., p. 76. 
close to the Hegelian vi,ew that in the synthesi·s there is 
always identity within differences.! 
Secondly, the doctrine of the good life as a dialectical 
movement through life 1 s stages or spheres is near the evolu-
tionary view involved in Hegel's dialeetic. 2 The importance 
of dialectic . lies for Kierkegaard in the third stage of re-
ligion, which gives authentic meaning to the whole. The lev-
els of life are three: the aesthetic, the ethical, a.nd the 
religious. There are two boundary zones of irony and humor. 
Irony is the boundary zone between the aesthetic and the ethi-
cal categories. Humor is the transitional or boundary zone 
between the ethical and the ~eligious. As the aesthetic is 
trivial, the ethical ·is transitory, the truth of the move-
ment is the religious stage, where the aesthetic and ethical 
spheres are incorporated into a higher way of life.3 
There is an interesting analogy between Kierkegaard's 
usage of the paradox and Hegel's usage of the term contradic-
tion. Kierkegaard 1 s conception of the good life as involving 
1. Swenson, op. cit., p. 96. The author suggests the fol-
lowing relation between Hegel's and Kierkegaard's dialec-
tics: "His native dialectical powers were disciplined by 
a serious study of Hegel; and though emancipating himself 
from the tyranny of Hegel's dominant influence, he ac-
quired through his aid the mastery of a precise and fin-
ished terminology." 
2. Cf. chapter two, section B of this study. 
3. Ibid. 
a dialectical movement through lire's spheres is near the 
developmental view or Hegel's dialectic. Though Kierke-
gaard denies that absolute contradictions can be synthe-
sized, yet he agrees with Hegel that some syntheses are 
mediated. While this conception leads to wide dirrerences 
in the two views, Kierkegaard's emphasis upon a paradox!-
cal synthesis does point out Kierkegaard 1 s ambiguous re-
lation to Hegel. 
F. An evaluation and summary 
In· the above discussion of Hegelian tenets retained 
in Kierkegaard's philosophy it can be seen that, on the one 
hand, no feature of the two systems brings out more clearly 
the vast gulr between them. But on the other hand, no fea-
ture shows better the elements of Hegel's philosophy which 
Kierkegaard 1 s view retains. Kierkegaard 1 s definition of 
dread as a "sympathetic antipathy and an antipatb.etic . sym-
patby"1 aould be justly applied in defining his relation 
to Hegel. One of his biographers puts it so aptly when he 
says, ttHe renotmced Hegel, but used his terminology."2 
The following statements are the important points of 
this chapter: 
1. Kierkegaard, The Concept. of Dread, P• 38. 
2. Ibid., P• VIII 
1. Hegel and Kierkegaard are existential thinkers, 
since neither philosopher writes anything of 
significance which is not filled with his par-
ticipation and feeling. 
2. Hegel, like Kierkegaard, considers reality to 
be dynamic and spirit~al. For both tbinkers 
all becoming involves striving. 
3. Kierkegaard, along with Hegel, considers the 
abstract the unreal, tho~gh Kierkegaard is not 
q~te fair to Hegel's system in making it the 
avatar of abstraction. 
4. It is from Hegel that Kierkegaard borrows the 
definition of Christianity as s~bjectivity. 
There is also a close connection between the 
view of religion in the young Hegel, and Kier-
. kegaard' s view of the Christian religion. 
5. There are rational and irrational elements in 
the philosophies of both thinkers. Hegel seeks 
to unify the irrational and re. tional, while 
holding that the for.mer is necessary for the 
latter. Basically, Kierkegaard chooses the 
irrational elements as a criterion of the 
Christian life, b~t he ~ses reason to defend 
this view~ 
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6. K1erkegaard 1 s threefold design of the spheres of 
life appears a Hegelian inspiration. Hegel's 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis is close to Kierke-
gaard's position. The significance of dialectic 
lies for Kierkegaard in the third stage of re-
ligion which gives meaning to the whole. 
7. Both Kierkegaard and Hegel were aware of the 
significance and value o:f the individual~ Al-
though Hegel did not place su.tficient stress 
11pon the individual., Kierkegaard • s ace usa tion 
against Hegel that he did not treat the indi-
vidual is untrue. Kierkegaard's over-emphasis 
~pon the individual leads to a -false individu-
alism which Hegel's doctrine overcomes. 
CHAPTER V 
SOME HEGELIAN AND KIERKEGAARDIAN 
TRENDS I N CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT 
A. Preliminary considerations 
In Chapter I this study sought to compare Hegel and 
Kierkegaard in the light of their interpretations of his-
torical predecessors. Chapters II, III, and IV were the 
attempts to describe the thoughts of the German philose-
pher and the Danish thinker in areas of their own systems. 
The present chapter is by no means to be taken as a com-
plete s-urvey of contemporary thought. It is limited to a 
consideration of four main contemporary schools as repre-
s entatives of some Hegelian and Kierkegaardian trends. He-
gel's and Kierkegaard's philosophies will be compared with 
the systems of pragmatism, realism, post-Kierkegaardian 
existentialism, and idealism. To give an exhaustive account 
of any one of these positions is beyond the scope of this 
investigation. The main a i m is a selective recording of the 
important ideas of four contemporary systems and a compari-
son of these ideas with the essential views of Hegel and 
Kierkegaard. 
B. Pragmatism 
Pragmatism is not generally understood to be a specula-
237 
tive philosophical system, rather nit is a method o£ inquiry 
and a theory of meaning and truth derived f'rom the natural 
sciences and applicable to philosophy."! The origin o£ 
American pragmatism can be traced to Charles s. Peirce (1839-
1914). In his famous article, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear, 11 
Peirce developed the theory that is the cardinal principle 
of pragmatism, which is that the meaning of conceptions and 
propositions ar e i n their practical consequences. 
In order to ascertain the meaning of an in-
tellectual conception one should consider what 
practical consequences mignt conceivably ~t 
by necessity from the truth of that conception; 
and the sum of these consequences will con~ti­
tute the entire meaning of the conception. 
Another important principle of pragmatism formulated by 
Peirce is: 
Consider what effects, that might conceiv-
ably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then, our 
conception of these effects i~ the whole of 
our conception of the object.~ 
In defining pragmatism as a method, rather than a system, 
Peirce noted that "pragmatism is not a Weltanschuung but is a 
method of reflection having for its purpose to render ideas 
clear. n4 
l. Frank Thilly and Ledger Wood, A History of Philosophy (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), p. 634. 
2. Charles Hartshorne (ed.) and Paul Weiss (ed.) Collected 
Palers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge: Harvard 
Un varsity Press, 1931-1935), V, par. 9· 
3. Ibid., par. 2. 
4. Ibid., par. 13n. 
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William James and John Dewey were to develop two differ-
ent aspects of pragmatic thought. In an address delivered 
before the Philosophical Union of the University of ~ornia 
in September 1898, James reformulated Peirce's pragmatic 
theory of meaning in the following stat~ent: 
To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts 
of an object, then, we need only consider what 
effects of a conceivably practical kind the 
object may involve--what sensations we may ex-
pect from it, and what reactions we must pre-
pare. OUr conception of .these effects, then, 
is for us the whole of our conception of the 
object, so far as tbft conception has positive 
signif icance at all. 
In agreement with Peirce, .James holds that pragmatism 
is a theory of meaning, but the latter adds also that prag-
matism is a criterion of truth. "Any idea," James says: 
that will carry us prosperously from any one 
part of our experience to aqy other part, 
linking things satisfactorily, working se-
curely, saving labor, is true for just so 
much, tru~ in so far forth, true instru-
mentally. 
James qualified the above passage by adding, "The true ••• 
is only the expedient in the way of thinking, just as the 
right is the expedient in the way of our behaving."3 Ac-
cording to James, an idea is true if it works or has prac-
1. William James, Collected Essays and Reviews (New York: 
Longmans, Green and Company, 1908), p. 411. 
2. William. James, Pragmatism (Chicago: Henry Regneny Company, 
1907)' p. 58. 
3. illE.· 
tical consequences. "On pragmatic principles, if' the hy-
pothesis of' God works satisfactorily, in the widest sense 
of' the word, it is true."1 
John Dewey's pragmatism is .called instrumentalism or 
experimentalism. Its central doctrine may be f'ound in the 
following pa~sage: 
Instrumentalism is an attempt to consti-
tute a precise logical theory of' concepts, 
of' judgments and inferences in their v~s 
f'orms, by considering primarily how thought 
!'Unctions in the exper~ental determination 
of' f'uture consequences. 
An essential f'eature of' Dewey's pragmatism is his view that 
the meaning of' a judgment consists in its anticipated con-
sequences. "The term 'pragmatic' means only the rule of' 
referring all thinking, all reflective considerations to 
consequences f'or final meaning and test."3 
Dewey's instrumentalism may be identified with P. w. 
Bridgmants operational theory, which is expressed in these 
words: "We mean by an:y concept nothing more than a set of' 
operations; the concept i;:s smonymous with the corresponding 
set of' operation~."4 Using operationalism to support 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4· 
Ibid. 
D. s. Robinson, Anthology of Recent Philosophy, p. 431. 
John Dewey, Essays in ETierim.enta1 Logic (New York: 
Dover Publications, 195 , p. 330. 
John Dewey, ~est for Certainty (New York: Minton Balch 
and Company, 1929), p. 111. 
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his instrumentalism and experimentalism, Dewey defined an 
idea "in terms of operations to be performed and the test 
of the validity of the ideas by the consequences of these 
operations."1 Dewey is convinced that operationalism has 
made possible "an empirical theory of ideas :free from the 
burdens imposed alike by sensationalism and a priori ra-
ionalism."2 Dewey, like James, stresses action and ex-
perience, yet the former emphasizes more the natural sci-
ences than the latter. Dewey is also less tender-minded 
than James when it comes to religion. 
Though there are other contemporary :forms of prag-
matism, such as Clarence I. Lewis's conceptual pragmatism, 
the purpose of this study is to deal with the views o:f' 
James and Dewey. 
Having generally defined pragmatism, what is the re-
lation of Hegel and Kierkegaard to this specific school? 
The Kierkegaardian stress is more evident in James, while 
the influence of Hegel is more recognized in Dewey. Accord-
ingly, James' pragmatism shows an af:f'inity with Kierkegaard's 
existe~tialism in three basic areas. First, James makes an 
interesting statement concerning a Danish thinker, who shares 
a point of view equal to his conception of truth. James 
1. Ibid., P• 114. 
2. Ibid. 
writes, "We 11 ve i'orwards, a Danish thinker has said, but we 
understand backwards. nl James states :f'urther: 
This regulative notion of a potential better 
truth to be established later, possibly to be 
established some day absolutely, and having 
powers of reactive legislation, turns its face, 
like all pragmatist notions, towards ~oncrete­
ness of fact, and towards the fUture. 
Strikingly, there is a close similarity between the view of 
this unnamed "Danish thinker" and Kierkegaard' s doctrine of 
repetition. The term is the title of one of his early books. 
Kierkegaard defines repetition by contrasting it to the Greek 
doctrine of recollection. Kierkegaard writes: 
Repetition is a decisive expression for 
what •recollection' was for the Greeks. Just 
as they taught that all knowledge is a recol-
lection, so will modern philosophy teach that 
the whole of life is a repetition •••• Repeti-
tion and. recollection are the same movement 
only in opposite directions, for what is 
recollected bas been, is repeated backwards; 
whereas repetition properly so-called is 
recollected forward.j 
In Kierkegaard's category of repetition, life is a dynamic, 
growing, creative experience, since existence becomes.4 
Kierkegaard claims that all knowledge is the progressive dis-
covering or the Eternal. Like James and Dewey, Kierkegaard 
1. William James, Pragmatism (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 
1907), p. 15. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Kierkegaard, Repetition, pp. 3-4. 
4- Ibid.' p. 34. 
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insists that reality is as men experience it immediately in 
their actual living. The living experience reveals more 
completely the nature of reality than any objective, r~onal 
scheme. Although the claim cannot be made that James had 
reference to Kierkegaard in the foregoing quotations, the 
tact of the closeness of the two views at this point should 
not be overlooked.1 
Secondly, Kierkegaard and James opposed Hegel's system 
on psychological, emotional, and personal grounds. 2 In 
America, Josiah Royce's s~eculation was oriented toward 
Hegel. To his colleague and friend, Royce, James attacks 
the Absolute in these emotional terms, "Damn the Absolute,"3 
which was not unlike Kierkegaard 1 s passionate rebellion 
against Hegel's system. In The Will to Believe, James 
criticizes Hegel in a Kierkegaardian way. He writes, "His 
1. Hector Hawton, The Feast of Unreason {London: Watts & 
Co., 1952), p. 17. llawton says: "There is an element 
of Pragmatism in this point of view." This insight 
is shared to some extent by J. V. L • . Casserley in The 
Christian in Philoso§by {London: Faber and Faber Limit-
ed, 1949), p. 131. peaking of pragmatism, this author 
writes: "There is just a dash of existentialism in 
their conception of truth." 
2. Julius s. Bixler, "The Contribution of Existenz-Philos-
ophie," Harvard Theological Review 33 (January, 1940), 
36. Bi.Xier gives this Interesting view: "It must be 
understood first of all as a movement of revolt which 
takes a direction not unlike that of Jamesian Pragma-
tism." Cf. Morton White, op. cit., p. 16. 
3. William James, The Letters of William James (Boston: 
The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), II, 135. 
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system resembles a moQse-trap, in which if yoQ once pass the 
door you may be lost forever. Sa.fety lies in not entering."l 
Even Kierkegaard's obsession with abnormal states of 
consciousness was shared by James. Then, too, both agree 
that Hegel's system led to .finality, or to use James' phrase, 
a "block universe." James states: 
Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar 
attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, 
but it represents it, as it seems to me, both 
in a more radical and in a less objectionable 
form than it has ever yet assumed. A pragmatist 
turns his back resolutely and once for all 
upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to pro-
fessional philosophers. He turns away from 
abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal 
solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from 
f'ixed principles, closed systems •••• That 
means the empiricist temper regnant and the 
rationalist temper sincerely given up. It 
means the open air and possibilities of nature, 
as against dogma, artificiality, and the 
pretense of finality in truth.2 
In the above statement, James' error appears parallel to 
that of Kierkegaard's. For both thinkers .failed to see 
that Hegel's Absolute was not static and .final, but a con-
crete universal. Hegel insisted that the true is the whole, 
but this whole is arrived at through organic process and 
self developmant.3 
1. William James, The Wiil -to Believe (New York: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1927), p. 275. 
2. William James, Pragmatism {New York: Longmans, Green & 
Company, 1907), P• Sl. --
3· Wallace, The Logic -ot -Hegel, pp. 308-309. 
Thirdly, there is another feature of Jamea' philosophy 
that is close to Kierkegaard's view, namely, the importance 
given to belief or faith, as opposed to reason or knowledge. 
Je.mes states his case in terms near to Kierkega.ard' s risk 
of faith, "We have the right to believe at our own risk 
any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will.nl 
This insight is analogous also to Pascal's wager. Accord-
ingly, in further agreement with the irrational strain in 
religion and morality, James asserts, "In all important 
transactions of life we have to take a leap in the dark."2 
For: 
. _our ·· passional natllre not . only lawfulli: 
may, but must, decide an option betwee~ 
prolosi tiona, whenever it. is a genUine . _ .. _ 
opt on .that cannot by its nature be decided 
qn intellectual groands; for to say, under 
such circumstances, •Do not decide, but 
leave the question open,' is itself a . .. 
passionate decision,-just like decidins 
zes or no,-.and is attended with the same 
risk of losing the truth.3 
As the preceding statements indicate, James• interest in 
voluntaristic faith is not unlike Kierkegaard's stress upon 
making a decision and taking the leap of faith. 
To sum up the conclusion to which this part of the dis-
cussi~~ _ seems _ to l~~d: James' pragmatism is in philosophical 
1. William James, The Will to -Believe, P• 29. 
2. Ibid., P• 31. 
3. Ibid., P• 11. 
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criticism and construction close to Kierkegaard's existen-
tialism. The closeness of the two thinkers should not be 
overlooked in their opposition to Hegel's system on psycho-
logical, emotional, and personal grounds. However, there 
is also a remarkable difference between the two: James and 
Dewey are concerned with the problems and methodologies or 
natural knowledge, whereas Kierkegaard does not lean toward 
the world or science. 
Now, unlike James•, Dewey's pragmatism is known as in-
strumentalism, and this view is more influenced by Hegel. 
Although instrumentalism is compatible with James• biolog-
ical emphases that life must be interpreted in terms of ac-
tion, it takes also a synoptic for.m particularly related to 
Hegel, while portraying less interest in the voluntaristic 
faith of Kierkegaard and James. As William Savery writes, 
''It is possible that Dewey's view is a naturalistic version 
or inversion of Hegel.nl 
In Contemporary .Ameriean Philosophj, Dewey tells of 
his debt to Hegel in the article, "From Absolutism to Exper-
imente.lism. n2 . He states two basic reasons for the appeal of 
l. 
2. 
Paul A. Sehilpp, The Philoso;~ of John Dewej (New York 
Tudor Publishing Company, 19 l , P• 498. 
George P. Adams and Wm. P. Montague, Contemporary Ameri-
can Philosopgy {New York: The Ma~illan Company, 1933), 
PP• 13-31. 
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Hegel for him. In the first place, during his graduate work 
at John Hopkins University, Dewey came under the influence of 
George Sylvester Morris, who taught him not only Kant and He-
gel, but interested him in the writings of the Neo-Hegelians 
like Edward and John Caird, Thomas Hill Green, Wallace, Lord 
Haldane, and W. T. Harris, editor of The Journal of Specula-
tive Philosophy. 
In the second place, Dewey found in Hegelian idealism 
a subjective basis for unity. In addition be was also 1m-
pressed with the dialectical method, theory of knowledge, 
and concept of history within Hegel's view. Dewey says: 
Hegel's thought ••• supplied a demand for 
unification that was doubtless an intense 
emotional craving, and yet was a hunger that 
only an intellectualized subject-matter could 
satisfy •••• The sense of divisions and sepa-
rations that were, I suppose, borne in upon 
me as a consequence of a heritage of New Eng-
land culture, divisions by way of isolation 
of self from the world, of soul from body, 
of nature from God, brought a painful oppres-
sion-or rather, they were an inward lacera-
tion •••• Hegel's synthesis of subject and ob-
ject, matter and spirit, the divine and the 
human, was, however, no mere intellectual 
formula; it operated as an immense release, 
a liberation. Hegel's treatment of human 
culture, of institutions and the arts, in-
volved the same dissolution of hard-and-rast 
divid inX walls. and had a special attraction 
ror me. 
Even later, when Dewey became a critic of Hegel's idealism, 
he still appreciated the richness of Hegel's synthesis. More-
1. Ibid., p. 19. 
over, Dewey admits that Hegel left a per-manent deposit in his 
thought.1 
Having discussed the positions of Hegel and Kierkegaard 
in their general relations to the pragmatism of James and 
Dewey, it remains to point out that Kierkegaard, James, and 
Dewey have been impressed by Hegel's account of life as active. 
All tln'ee schools insist that realit7 is not ready-made, or 
£1xed, but a changing, growing, and dynmnic relationship. 
This theory of development in philosophy is a common idea of 
the Hegelian tradition, and both existentialism and pragma-
tism are indebted to Hegel for it. Kierkegaard, like James 
and Dewey agree with Hegel that neither life, action, nor 
thought can be inferred from a static datum. 2 But life must 
be a process of trials and conflicts. Accordingly, Kierke-
1. 
2. 
Ibid • ' p. 21. 
W. G. Moore, or· cit., p. 572. Seeking to answer the ques-
tion of what d d k!erkegaard learn from Hegel, the author 
writes: "What is reputed to be Kierkegaard•s discovery of 
existential thinking is seen to be Hegelian. That our 
thoughts '.and actions cannot be inferred from a static da-
tum, but are decisions in a process of trial and conflict, 
this is surely existential and belongs to Hegel." Cf. 
Phyllis Ackerman's article, "Some Aspects of Pra~atism 
and Hegel," Journal of Philosophy 1.5(1918), p. 347. The 
author expresses a similar view of pragmatism as follows: 
"In fact, has not the wb:>le of pragmatism been anticipa-
ted by Hegel •••• But first to substantiate our statement 
that pragmatism is Hegel resaid or rather a part of Hegel 
resaid. This point is clearest in the Phenomenology •••• 
Anything is defined by its negative relations, its con-
flicts with that which it is not." Ackerman adds that 
discrepancies are "the source of the movement ••• a mcwe-
ment which is continuous through a series of stages." 
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gaard emphasizes the personal development in life from the 
aesthetic area, to moral responsibility, and to religious 
faith. In Kierkegaard• s employment of the doctrine of devel-
opment and activity, he differs from Hegel in not being in-
terested in the laws of liistorical process. Kierkegaardts 
concern is with the spiritual development, and the ideal 
movement or the indi~i~ual human soul to religious conscious-
ness. A similar doctrine is obvious in James and Dewey, who 
seek to integrate theory and practice, and express the striv-
ing for human progress and well-being. But this obvious 
point or contact should not be taken to obscure the many dif-
ferences or these three schools. Both existentialism and 
pragmatism stand opposed to the monism and rationalism of 
Hegelian idealism, while both disagree with each other. The 
p~agmatism of James and Dewey suffers from the positivistic 
bias, which is an over-emphasis upon the empirical, natural-
istic, and scientific insights, while Kierkegaard leans toward 
the moral and spiritual perspectives. 
c. Realism 
Generally realistic tendencies have appeared in opposi-
tion to idealism. The ter.m real1sm means that some or all 
objects of thought, when properly understood, are 1ndepend-
ent of mind.l The main principle of realism may be summa.- · 
1. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 289. 
rized in the rollowing passage: 
There exists a reality external to and inde-
pendent or consciousness, mind, or experience; 
it is a protest against the idealistic theory 
that reality is constituted by and exists only 
ror mind, whether it be an individual mind or 
an absolute experience.l 
250 
Contemporary realism owes perhaps a great deal to William 
James, whose essay concerning the existence or consciousness 
was a vigorous attack against the idealistic traditionf A 
s~ilar line of criticism against idealism was developed fur-
ther by Perry, who wrote the article, "The Egocentric Pre-
dicament.") 
Realism holds that idealism leads to formalism in logic, 
and a rejection of the empirical findings in the area of 
science. Moreover, new realism denies generally the conten-
tion of idealism that relations are organic and internal, 
while insisting upon the analytic method and the doctrine of 
external relations. However, it will be seen later that per-
haps realism does not hold consistently the analytic approach. 
Contemporary realism has many diverse for.ms. Three of 
the basic for.ms are: English new realism, American neo-
1. James, "Does Consciousness Exist?", article is included 
in Theories of Mind (Chicago: Uni-versity of Chicago 
Press, 1932), p. 110. 
2. Ibid. 
3. R. B. Perry, "The Egocentric Predicament," Jotirne.l of 
Philosop~y 1 (1910), 5-14. 
-..--
realism, snd critical realism. First, English new realism 
has its beginning largely in G. E. Moore's article, "Refu-
tation of Idealism. 111 In this article Moore points out 
that there are two main features in experience, the act of 
awareness and the object of awareness. 2 Moore maintains 
that Berkeleian idealism in failing to distinguish exactly 
between the act of knowing and the object known ends with 
the incorrect view that things exist only in being perceived.3 
Denying the idealistic thesis that objects exist only 
in so far as they are known, Moore comes to his own position 
that the object is independent of the knowing act. The ob-
ject of knowledge is no different when there is the aware-
ness of it, since it "is precisely what it would be, if we 
were not aware. u4 Samuel Alexander agrees with Moore's for-
mulation of distinction between the act of awareness and the 
object of awareness. The distinction can be seen in Alexan-
der's two forms of knowledge which he calls "enjo7flllent '' and 
"contemplation. n.5 The act of the mind• s awareness of itself 
l. This article appeared in 1903 in the British Philosophical 
Journal, Mind. The article is included also in Moore's 
Pbilosoph!Car Studies {New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 
1922). 
2. Ibid. z p. 17. 
3. Ibid. z p. 19. 
4· Ibid. z p • 29. 
.5. Samuel Alexander, Space, 
Company, 1920) I, p. 12. 
Time, and Deitz (London: Macmillan 
is called enjoyment, while contemplation is the mind's appre-
hension of an object other than i t self. . "The mind enjoys 1 t-
self and contemplates its objects. nl According to Alexander, 
the mind is one among other things in the world. "Minds are 
but the most gifted members known to us in a democracy of 
things. In respect of being or reality all existences are 
on an equal footing. n2 
Bertrand Russell is a member of the English new realistic 
movement. His realistic views of sense data and physical ob-
jects reveal the influence of Moore. In Problems of' Philoso-
Ehl' Russell distinguishes between sensation as an act or 
conscious experience, sad sense data as an object of aware-
ness. "Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation 
of the colour, but the colour itself is a sense-datum, not a 
sensation. n3 But unlike Moore, however, Russell holds that 
sense data are private, whereas the former maintains that the 
sense data are public.4 Russell develops further his realism 
by combining physical objects with universals. The basic re-
sult or this is a form of logical realism in his position. 
Secondly, American nee-realism differs from English new 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 6. 
3. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, (New York: 
Henry Holt, 1912) p. 32. 
4. Ibid. 
realism among other things in that the former is monistic in 
epistemology, while the latter is dualistic. R. B. Perry de-
fines in Present Philosophicai Tendencies the meaning of epis-
temological monism in the following words: 
Epistemological monism means that when 
things are known they are identical element 
for element, with the idea or content of the 
knowing state ••• That which is commonly cal-
led the 'object' of knowledge merges, accord-
ing to this view, with the idea, or is the 
whole thing of which the idea is a part. Thus 
when one perceives a tulip and the real tulip 
coincides, element for element; they ire one 
in color, shape, size, distance, etc. 
If subject and object are identical in the act of knowl-
edge, as the above passage indicates, how is error possible? 
The problem of error, illusion, and hallucination is a diffi-
cult issue for American neo-realism. E. B. Bolt and others' 
The New Reaiism seeks to meet the difficulties of the issue 
of error in monistic realism. Of this attempt L. Wood says: 
We cannot here consider the ingenious de-
vices by which Holt and other monistic real-
ists assimilate delusive cognition to their 
theory; we observe merely, for the most part, 
that they have the courage and consistency to 
ascribe reality of a sort to illusory and hal-
lucinatory objects.2 
Critical realism arose out of the basic problem or error 
in American ne6~realism. Attacking the monistic emphasis of 
1. 
2. 
' R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies (New York: 
Longmans, 1912), p. 126. 
Vergilius Fer.m, A Histopy of Philoso~hioal S~stems (New 
York: The Philosophical Library, 19 O), P• 21. Cf. 
Ledger Wood's article, "Recent Epistemological Schools." 
the American new realists, the critical realists hold to a 
dualistic position in epistemology. As American nee-realism 
contends that subject and object are identical in the knowl-
edge-situation, critical realism maintains that there are 
three factors in the situation of knowledge. These are a 
subject, a datum known, and an object to which this datum 
points. Ledger Wood has summarized the essential features 
of critical realism as follows: 
(1) The mind is directly confronted with 
sense-data which constitute the content or 
vehicle of knowledge; (2) physical objects 
exist independently of the mind and are known 
tlFough the mediation of the sense-data; (3) 
material objects are numerically disti~ct 
from the data by which they are known. 
Leading representatives of this movement have been Durant 
Drake, A. o. Lovejoy, George Santayana, R. W. Sellars, and 
c. A. Strong. 
After having stated a few of the general features of 
realism, the question now is: What is the relation of Hegel 
and Kierkegaard to the realistic movement? Most realists 
are anti-idealistic, yet two characteristic features may well 
be cited which indicate in their viewpoints an agreement with 
Hegel. There is in most new realistic positions the adoption 
of the synoptic framework, in different ways, even while crit-
1. Ibid., p. 525. 
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icizing Hegel's view that the true is the whole.1 In his 
famous article, "The Refutation of Idealism, 11 G. E. Moore 
states that rationalistic idealism fails to distinguish 
pointedly enough between knowing and the object. 2 And one 
of the strongest expressions of Moore's anti-Hegelianism is 
found in his rejection of Hegel' s method and doctrine. But 
Moore•s break with Hegelianism is not total. He treats 
philosophy in a synoptic way characteristic of the idealis -
tic tradition.3 Moore defines philosophy to be the attempt 
to describe the whole universe. Moore says: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4-
To begin with, then, it seems that the 
most important and interesting thing which 
philosophers have tried to do is no less than 
this; namely: To give a general description 
of' the whole universe, mentioning all the 
most important kinds of things which we do 
not absolutely know to be in it, and also 
considering the most important ways in which 
these various kinds of' things are related to 
one another •••• The first and most important 
problem of philosophy is: To give ~ gener al 
description of the whole universe.~ 
Bernard Bosanquet, The Meeting of Extremes in Contemlorary 
Philos!hby (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1921 , p. 
vii. e author claims: "That every philosophy, ••• not 
'idealism' only, is attempting to do justice to the stand-
point o£ 'the whole'." 
Published in Mind in 1903, and reprinted in Moore's Philo-
sophical Studres-in 1922. 
Bosanquet, op. cit., pp. 2-3. 
C. E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 19$3), pp. 1-2. 
In spite of Moore's critique of Hegel, he did not break to-
tally with the synoptic vision of Hegel. Perhaps, this fact 
is due to the influence upon Moore of the Hegelians, Bradley 
t 1 and McTaggar • 
An interesting interpretation of Hegel's synoptic method 
appears in the view of the neo-realist, R. B. Perry. Though 
Perry holds the analytic method, and opposes the idealism of 
Hegel, it appears difficult to find a more direct expression 
of the idealistic method than this from the neo-realist. 
Perry says, "Thought is called upon for its greatest compre-
hensiveness, penetration, and self consistency.tt2 In his es-
team for synopsis, Perry claims that a person may be so ab-
sorbed in a particular flower or fruit that he forgets the de-
sign of the whole.3 Again, he asserts, "We must think all con-
sistently together."4 Perry speaks the language of synopsis in 
the above statements. Another striking illustration of this 
fact is found in Perry's example of the elephant and the blind 
men. Perry cites that one of the blind men felt the tail, 
another the trunk, another the leg, but "none of them appre-
1. Morton White, op~ cit., pp. 13 1 16. 
2. R. B. Perry, The Approach -to Philosophy (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1905), P• 20. 
3• Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
hending the whole. nl This statement appears to be the full 
expression of Hegel's view that the true is the whole. 
Roy Wood Sellars is a critical realist who recognizes 
the synoptic framework as a necessary view of philosophy. 
He says, "The philosopher is a synthesist by prof'ession. 112 
Again, he states fUrther his consideration for synthesis, 
"A system is more than an external sum of parts, it is an 
organization in which the whole exerts control over the 
parts. 113 Sellars has formulated his synoptic conception of' 
philosophy in the following way: 
In short, the method of philosophy is an 
analytic-synthetic reflection upon the world 
as it is spread out before a mind full of 
the knowledge gained by the sciences. It 
aims to be a penetrative survey of reality 
as known. It does not so much have a source 
of knowledge all its own ••• as a duty to 
bring human knowledge to its stage of clari-
fication and synoptic synthesis.~ 
Sellars regards synthesis to be a necessary part of the phil-
osophical method, although he maintains also his allegiance 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4-
R. B. Perry, The Ap~roach to PhilosoSby (New York: 
Charles Scribner's ons, 19o5), p. 2 • 
R. w. Sellars, '~t is the Correct Interpretation of 
Critical Realism?" Journal of Philosophy, 24 (1.927), 
p. 238. 
R. W. Sellars, Evolutiona~ Naturalism (Chicago, Open 
Court Publishing Co., 192~, p. 329. 
R. W. Sellars, The Principles and ·Problems of Philosophy 
(New York: Macmillan, 1926), p. 178. 
to the analytic method of naturalism. Generally, there ap-
pear in Sellars• writings indications of departing f'rom the 
preference for the analytic method toward Hegel's synoptic 
approach, since his view presupposes a ,.synoptic synthesis" 
. 1 
and a "doctrine of organic relations." In spite of' this 
fact, however, Sellars• synoptic vision leads to a non-mental 
reality of matter, instead of Hegel's emphasis on the signif'-
icance of mind. 
A second fUndamental feature, which English new-realists 
and critical realists share with Hegel, is the doctrine of' 
emergent evolution. Hegel stresses the emergency of' novelty 
2 in his doctrine of synthesis. According to Hegel, in the · 
conflict of thesis and antithesis there emerges a new quality 
within the synthesis. Two opposites brought into unity for.m 
a new meaning and value. Hegel expresses the truth of this 
idea by the German word aufgehoben. 
Notwithstanding their rejection of' ideal1g.m, Alexander 
and Sellars stress as does Hegel the principle of emergence 
and development. According to Alexander, Space-Time is 
ultimately real and a constant process. Alexander traces 
emergent evolution through matter with the primary qualities, 
to color and sound, to life, and to mind, which is the last of 
1. R. W. Sellars, Philosophy, An Introduction {New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1953), p. 239. 
2. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 272. 
the emergent qualities. 1 An empirical quality, which has 
not yet emerged, is characterized as deity. God is not the 
creator in the traditional sense, but the universe striving 
ror a higher level or being. Sellars holds also a doctrine 
of emergence and development similar to Hegel, though he 
places this view within a materialistic rramework. Sellars 
says, "The principle of evolution means, in the first place, 
the reality of basic alterations •••• It stands for the accept-
ance or process in the place or fixed and static things."2 
Again, "Evolution implies novelty."3 In addition to novelty, 
Sellars calls attention to another principle involved in evo-
lution, that is, "the principle of organization, n4 which in-
volves "the fact of synthesis." 5 °It is the organization 
which is novel."6 Sellars maintains that different levels 
have emerged, "Matter, itself was evolved. Then came the 
earth ••• life.~. mind ••• and society."? These levels are re-
1. s. Alexander, o:e. cit., II, 335-336. 
2. R. w. Sellars, The Priri.ci:eles and Problems of Philoso:e~, 
P• 271. 
3. R. w. Sellars, Evolutionar~ Naturaligffi, P• 161. 
4. R. w. Sellars, Tb.e PrinciEies and Problems of Philoso:e~, 
P• 274. 
5. R. w. Sellars, EVolutiona£Z Naturalism, P• 16. 
6. Ibid., p. 332. 
?. R. w. Sellars, The Princi;eles ·and Problems or PhiloSO.J2~, 
P• 363. 
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lated hierarchically. "The higher order implies and includes 
the lower order. nl 
In spite of the important differences in their individ-
ual systems, Hegel, Alexander, and Sellars agree on the evo-
lutionary development of lif'e. But even here there are dif'-
:rerences in emphasis of' Hegel and t he EngliSh new realists 
ar.d critical realists. Hegel would not agree with the English 
new realists that mind comes late in an up-to-then mindless 
universe, since the process of evolution involves the working 
of the Absolute Mind~ Hegel would deny the contention of' 
Alexander that the evolutionary process must be accepted on 
"natural piety, n2 which means that it admits no rational ex-
planation. Hegel is convinced that the Absolute Spirit is at 
work in evolution rendering the f'acts of emergence more intel-
ligible.3 Neither would Hegel agree with Sellars• materialis-
tic metaphysics discarding God altogether as a metaphysical 
principle.4 
The problem now is to discuss Kierkegaard•s relationship 
to the realistic movement. There are two f'undamental aspects 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4-
R. w. Sellars, Evolutionary Naturalism, p . 261. 
Brightman, An Introduction to Philosop?y, p. 276. 
Ibid. 
Archie J. Bahm, "Evolutionary Naturalism" Philosopht ani 
Phenomenological Research 15 (September, ul954), p.l. 
o.f Kierkegaard 1 s thought related to realism, in spite o.f 
basic di.f.ferences between the two views. First, Hegel's 
concept o.f the "real is the rational"l has been rejected 
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by Kierkegaard and realists alike. Kierkegaard and realists 
hold that being is other than thought. According to Hegel, 
it is the rationally critical thought o.f experience, which 
gives an adequate version o.f actuality. Hegel considered 
experience the source o.f all knowledge and being, yet this 
experience must be mediated through the rational .faculty o.f 
man. As Kierkegaard viewed it, Hegel 1 s philosophy o.f being 
makes existence only a concept. Kierkegaard ·said, "But the 
concept existence is an ideality and the di.f.ficulty is, of 
course, whether existence can be reduced to a concept."2 
Although Kierkegaard maintained that being is other than 
thought with the realists, he would deny the realistic 
position that being is neither mental nor physical, but 
"neutral entities."3 According to Kierkegaard, experience 
is to be described in personal categories, rather than the 
cognitive categories of Hegel, or the impersonal categories 
of the neo-realist. In .further disagreement, Kierkegaard 
does not emphasize with the realist that the scientific 
method o.f analysis is superior to the synoptic, dialectical 
1. Knox, Hegel's Philosophy o.f Right, PP• 14-15. 
2. Kierkegaard, Journals, sec. 1027. 
3. Perry, Present . Philosophical Tendencies, P• 315. 
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view of Hegel. But he stresses religious faith as the only 
position for the existing individual. 
Secondly, Kierkegaard 1 s epistemology has a coloring of 
realistic tendencies. In his treatment of the ontological 
argument in the Fragments, Kierkegaard distinguishes in a 
realistic way between factual e~istence and ideal existence. 
He defines the former in the following way, 
Factual existence is subject to the 
lectic of Hamlet: to be or not to be. 
existence is wholly indifferent to any 
all variations in essence.l 
dia-
Factual 
and 
Conversely~ ideal being is identical with the essence. For, 
"The moment I speak of being in the ideal sense I no longer 
speak of being, but of essence."2 Kierkegaard strikes .fur-
ther a realistic note in his criticism of the idealist: 
There is no special difficulty connected 
with being an idealist in the imagination; 
but to exist as an idealist is an extremely 
strenuous task, because existence itself 
constitutes a hindrance and an objection.3 
Kierkegaard opposes Hegel's view that knowledge is 
based upon the coherent evidence of reasons and facts. In 
the following passage, Kierkegaard upholds the very spirit 
o.f the realists. 
The knowledge that speculative philosophy 
represents is thus dif.ferent from knowledge 
generally, where the knowledge as such is 
1. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 33n. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Kierkegaard, Concluding unscientitic Postscript, P• 315. 
asswned to be indifferent to the object known~ 
so that the latter is not altered by being 
known, but remains the· same. No, the knowledge 
of speculative philosophy is itself the object 
known, and the latter is no longer the same as 
it was before becoming known; it has come into 
being at the same tfme with speculative philos-
ophy and its truth. 
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Here Kierkegaard is criticizing the idealistic view that 
knowledge depends on mind for its existence and character. 
Over against this view, he makes this realistic contention. 
"Immediate sensation and immediate cognition cannot de-
ceive."2 Accordingly~ the world is real for Kierkegaard~ 
but not as thought by God, since "God does not think, he 
creates."3 
Although Kierkegaard 1 s epistemology has aspects of the 
realistic position, yet his view falls short of epistemologi-
cal realimn from two fundamental perspectives. First, Kier-
kegaard views the scientific method as being approximate~ 
which means it is always hypothetical. It leads away from 
subject to a mere abstraction and unreality of life. Ki er-
kegaard thinks that the scientific method is needed in the 
area of objective truth, but not in the sphere of existing 
subjectivity.4 Secondly, unlike the realists, Kierkegaard 
1. Ibid., P• 200. 
2. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments~ P• 67. 
3. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific PostscriEt, p. 296. 
4• Ibid. 
doea not analyze the nature of the physical object. His 
philosophy deals with the existence of the individual and 
God, but he does not present a clear point of view concern-
ing the existence of things. Moreover, Kierkegaard appears 
to lack a close acquaintance with the scientific tradition 
of his day. 
The purpose of this basic sketch of the relationship 
of the realistic movement to Hegel and Kierkegaard has been 
to suggest the following view: If one of the richest lega-
cies Hegel bequeathed to contemporary philosophy be the prin-
ciple of negativity, which means broadly every identity has 
its opposite, then sharply one-sided philosophies appear to 
Hegel with equal justifications. The analytic studies of 
the chief realists and the extreme anti-intellectualism of 
Kierkegaard are two cases that illustrate this point of view. 
D. Post•Kierkegaardian existentialism 
In An .:tntrod.U.ction to .Phiiosopbi, Brightman states the 
following definition of existentialism: 
Existentialism is broadly the theory that 
one should always keep in mind the bearing of 
all one's thought and feeling on one's personal 
existence or •salvation.•l 
Brightman's definitiGn indicates that existentialism is con-
ce~ned ~ii;:h p~~~on~~ existence of the individual. In post-
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Kierkegaardian existentialism, there are three ways in which 
existence is defined, in accordance with the usage of the 
following three German words: Existenz, Dasein, and Vorhan-
densein.1 Existenz means true existence, or the individual•s 
realization of his highest possibilities. Kierkegaard was 
the first to use Existenz in this creative way. Dasein is 
mere existence in opposition to Existenz. The former is 
rudimentary, fleeting, and grounded within the biological 
processes. Vorhandensein is the existence of an inanimate 
object, and this term is used by Heidegger to supplement 
the terms Existenz ard Dasein. 2 
Contemporary existentialists make another main distinc-
tion between existence and essence . Essence is the intrin-
sic nature of an object in virtue of which a thing is What 
it is. Existence is the subjective, irrational element in 
life, in faith, and in personality. Existence is different 
from essence as choice, decision, and subjective awareness 
are different from a rational scheme of reality. In this 
way, existence does not only precede essence, but only the 
living, immediate experience is real. Thus, most existen-
1. Guido De Ruggiero, Existentialism (New York: Social 
Sciences PUblishers, Inc., 1945), p. 36. 
2. Ibid. 
tialis t s would agree with Longfellow that: "Life is real, 
life is earnest."l 
Though there are basic agreements between Kierkegaard 
and post-Klerkegaardian existentialism, it is a debatable 
fact whether contemporary existentialism is a unified phi-
losophical movement, influenced mainly by Kierkegaard. Un-
doubtedly, Kierkegaard has influenced many of the modern 
existentialists. However, Kierkegaard's thought does not 
provide a common factor for the atheism of Heidegger and 
Sartre, the Catholic mysticism of Marcel, and the semi-
Christian E.xistm~ philosophy of Jaspers. Specifically, 
Klerkegaard maintains that the true individual's existence 
demands a faith in God. 
Subjectively ••• is directed to the ques-
tion whether the individual is related to a 
something in such a manner tha t his relation-
ship is in truth a God-relationship.2 
But existentialists, like Sartre, deny the very beli ef in 
the existence of God. Sartre 1 s existentialism is atheistic: 
Atheistic existentialism, which I repre-
sent ••• states that if God does not exist, 
there is at l east one being in whom existence 
precedes essence, a being who exists before 
he can be defined by any concept, and that 
this being is man, or, as Heidegger says, 
hum~I_l reality.3 
1. Cf. Longfellow's famous poem, "The P·salm of Life." 
-
2. Kierkegaard, Concluding ~nseientific Postscript, p. 178. 
3. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism (New York: Philosophi-
cal Library, 1947), P• 18. 
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In comparing the thought of Hegel and Kierkegaard to 
the post-Kierkegaardian existentialism, the atheistic school 
of Sartre will form the basis of the discussion. In the phil-
osophy of Sartre, Hegelian elements are present. Like Hegel, 
Sartre teaches that man is an unhappy consciousness. Accord-
ing to Hegel's doctrine, human subjectivity is restless and 
essentially unsatisfied with its human situation. In scepti-
cism of its mundane existence, consciousness ge~to know it-
self and "really doubles itself. nl Hegel states: 
But the unity of the two elements is not 
yet present. Hence the Unhaphy Conscious-
ness, the Alienated Soul whrc is the con-
sciousness of self as a divided nature, a 
doubled and merely contradictory being. 2 
Hegel adds: 
Consciousness of Life, of its existence 
and action, is merely pain and sorrow over 
this existence ani activity; for therein 
consciousness finds only consciousness of 
its opposite3as its essence and of its own nothingness. 
Sartre depicts the condition of the individual exist-
ent in terminology ani method which owes much to Hegelian 
idealism. Sartre's distimtion or consciousness as being-
in-itsel~ and being-~or-itself is analogous to Hegel's doc-
trine or unhappy consciousness. According to Sartre,being-
1. Baillie, op. cit., p. 251. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid.' p. 252. 
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in-itsel£ is pure, timeless sel£-identity whereas being-£or-
itsel£ is a continual £lux, which never is~ It is this 
being-£or-itsel£ that is synonomous with nothingness. It 
is never possible to say to the fleeting sel£, "Tarry, that 
I may possess you. nl Thus it may be said that, "The being 
by whom the Nothing arrives in the world is a being for whom, 
in his being, it is a question of the Nothingness of his 
being."2 But the nothingness is a necessity for the being-
in-self. Sartre says, "Consciousness, a gnawing worm in 
the very heart of being, is also an activity that stirs up 
human reality to produce rich works. u3 Here Sartre is say-
ing, what Hegel maintains throughout his Ph§nomenologie des 
Geistes, that consciousness is productive only to the extent 
that the power and richness of the principle of negativity 
operate in and through it. 
But it is here that Hegel and Sartre go separate ways. 
Sartre disagrees that there can be the synthesis of being-
in-itself and being-for-itself in an Absolute Idea, which is 
Hegel•s Absolute. Instead, Sartre asserts the nothingness 
1. Sartre, L•Etre et le Neant, p. 40. The statement is 
translated by E. L. Allen in Existentialism From Within 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul lTD, 1953), p. 53. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Sartre, Etre, p. 57. James Collins translated the quota-
tion in ~Existentialists, P. 57. Collins develops a 
similar point of view, and states: "Hegel•s hymn to the 
omnipotent richness af ~gativity in the Phenomenology 
of the Mind is repeated in a minor key by Sartre." 
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o£ existence even to the categorical denial o£ a belief in 
God. To Sartre, Hegel would say your concept of the nature 
of being got stuck in the antithesis. Sartre's view con-
cludes with the irrational position of a striving within 
the human consciousness without a creative intelligence to 
redeem. 
Both Kierkegaard and Sartre have much in common, al-
though the former would repudiate the godless universe o£ 
the latter. Sartre' s saying that there is no God, and 11 even 
if God existed, that would change nothing,"1 Kierkegaard 
would deny. According to Kierkegaard, the glorification 
of Religious B in the three stages of life is that God has 
appeared as the Absolute Paradox within history. 
But Kierkegaard would agree with Sartre•s despair over 
human finitude, the littleness of man, his limitation of 
necessity and death, and the despair of irresponsibility. 
Kierkegaard writes concerning the universality of despair 
in Sickness Unto Death: · 
There has lived no one and there lives 
no one outside of Christendom who is not in 
despair, and no one in Christendom, unless 
he be a true Christian, and if he is not 
quit~ thaJt , he is somewhat in despair a£ter 
all. 
1. Sartre, Existentialism trans. Bernard Frechtman (New 
York: Philosophical Library, 1947), p. 61. 
2. Kiarkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, p. 32 -~ 
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This passage implies the attitude ofKierkegaard and Sartre 
toward the human situation. Both thinkers are concerned with 
the despair which is conveyed by the finitude of existence. 
Sartre contends that man is a "futile passion."1 According 
to Sartre, man is in a futile pursuit of his flighty and 
fugitive self, which is "not what he is, and he is what he is 
not~"2 Sartre is convinced that human beings are "existents 
who can never catch up with themselves."3 Kierkegaard and 
Sartre agree that there is a tragic flaw at the heart of ex-
istence. Sartre adds, "Man is the being by whom the Nothing 
comes into the world."4 Again, "That we are able to say no, 
requires as its necessary condition, that non-being should 
be a perpetual presence, within us and beyond us. n5 
Although Kierkegaard and Sartre agree on the diagnosis 
of the problem of human existence, they differ in their so-
lution. Kierkegaard denies Sartre's main view that freedom 
and responsibility must be erected upon a Stoic ethic of 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
~ I 8 Of. Sartre, L•etre et le neant, p. 70 • The passage is 
translated in Kurt F. Reinhardt, The Existentialist Re-
volt (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1952), 
p:-!'61. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
S~:tre, op. cit .• , p. 40. The passage is translated in E. 
L~ 411en•s Existentialism. From Within (London: Routledge 
Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953), p. 52. 
Ibid. 
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despair,l since there is no supreme being. Against Sartre•s 
contention that "there is no God, and man is alone in an emp-
ty world, 112 Kierkegaard asserts that despair must lead to 
divine assistance, as sin must lead the individual to seek 
salvation.3 According to Kierkegaard, in spite of the "abso-
lute qualitative distinction" between man and God, the basic 
fact of the individual's existence is his relation to God. 
Kierkegaard states, "Essentially it is the God-relationship 
that makes a man a man. n4 Thus: "Faith is: that the self in 
being itself and in willing to be itself is grounded transpar-
ently in God. n5 Moreover, Kierkegaard anticipated the weak-
ness of atheism in most of the characters in Sartre•s novels. 
Kierkegaard asserts, "Without God I am too strong for myself, 
and perhaps in the most agonizing of all ways am broken. 116 
In stating the problem of the finitude of existence and 
man's need for divine assistance, Kierkegaard was closer to 
Hegel than to contemporary existentialism. As Sartre is clear 
1. Paul Ramsey, "Existenz and the Existence of God - A Study 
of Kierke~Saard and Hegel," The Joumal of Religion 28 
(July, 1948), pp. 157-160. 
2. Allen, op. cit., p. 77. 
3. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 230. 
4- Ibid., p. 219. 
5. Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, p. 132. 
6. Kierkegaard, The Point of View, p. 10. 
in denying the existence of God, Hegel and Kierkegaard are 
as equally pointed in affirming the man-God relationship. 
Hegel developed the theory of the "self-annulling finite,"1 
which means the finite's recognition of the Infinite in which 
alone its being consists. According to Hegel, finite "being 
is not true reality, the absolutely necessary is. 112 Again, 
"The finite passes away, but it is now."3 Like Kierkegaard, 
Hegel is aware of the.finitude of human existence. And in 
agreement with Kierkegaard, Hegel saw the solution in the 
individual's relationship with God. Hegel says: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
I am thus the relation of these two sides, 
which are not abstract determinations, as 
finite and infinite. On the contrary, each 
is a totality. Each of the two extremes is 
itself I, what relates them; and the holding 
together the relating, is itself this which 
is at once in conflict with itself, and brings 
itself to unity in conflict. Or to put it 
differently, I am the conflict, for the con-
flict is just this antagonism, which is not 
any indifference of the two as different, but 
in their being bound together. I am not one 
of those taking part in the strife, but I am 
both the combatants, and am the strife itself. 
I am the fire and the water which touch each 
other, and am the contact and union of what 
flies apart, and this very contact itself is 
this double, essentially conflicting relation, 
as the relation or what is now separated, sev-
ered, apd now reconciled and in unity with 
itself.'+ 
Hegel, Philosophy of ReliHion, trans. K. Paul Trench 
(London: Trubner & Co., 1 95) III, 263. 
Ibid., 285. 
Ibid., 300. 
Ibid., I, 64. 
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As this statement indicates, Hegel held, like Kierke-
gaard, to the finite-infinite nature of man. This statement 
is not opposed to the following statement of Kierkegaard in 
The Sickness Unto Death. Kierkegaard writes, ttMan is a 
synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal 
and the eternal, of freedom and necessity."1 This statement 
of Kierkegaard appears Hegelian, especially in his use of 
the ter.m synthesis. And a further reading reveals that this 
synthesis is a dynamic relationship in contradiction to it-
self that is not unlike Hegel's identity in difference. 
Again, Kierkegaard says, "Existence is the child that is 
born of the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the tem-
poral.112 And man is defined as· a "synthesis of soul and body 
supported by spirit. 113 
Finally, Hegel and Kierkegaard agree that the unity of 
meaningfulness in life is based upon the God-man relation-
ship. The essence of it is found in worship. Hegel says, 
"It is the very nature of the contingent to revert back to 
1. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 17. 
2. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 85. 
3. Kierkegaard, Concept of Dread, p. 109. 
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its truth and the elevation of our spirit to God."l This 
"elevation of our spirit toward God,n which Hegel seeks to 
defend against "the fault finding of understanding,n2 Kier-
kegaard calls "worship." 
Not precisely by reason of my virtue, but 
rather of my fault--I have become very thor-
oughly acquainted with the mysteries of exist-
ence, and also with its mysteriousnesses, which 
for many persons certainly have no existence •••• 
I endeavor to use this knowledge to illuminate 
the humanly good, and I use it again to draw 
attention if possible to the Holy ••• this is 
something that no man can comprehend, that in 
the relationship the beginning and end is 
worship.3 
The position arrived at so far in the interpretation 
of Hegel, Kierlcegaard, and modern existentialists, to sum-
marize, is this: The question remains concerning the extent 
of Hegel's and Kierkegaard's influences on contemporary ex-
istentialists. Though Kierkegaard is considered the father 
of the school and his influence has been impressive, yet 
existential elements can be traced back to Hegel, Kant, 
Pascal, and Socrates. The philosophy of existence derives 
its name from the traditional distinction of existence and 
essence. Existence may be considered simply immediate ex-
perience in opposition to essence, which is a rationalistic 
1. Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, III, 300. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, P• 138. 
scheme o£ reality. Although the characterization o£ ~e­
diate experience is dif£erent for each thinker, Kierkegaard 
and existentialists agree that existence is prior to essence. 
Kierkegaard opposes the atheistic humanism £ound in 
some o£ the existentialists. Instead Kierkegaard holds with 
Hegel that the human person is £inite, yet his soul is rooted 
in God, and designed to live in harmony with Him. It has 
been demonstrated that both Hegel and Kierkegaard maintain 
a theistic position. 
E. Idealism 
All idealism is characterized by belief in 
the ultimate reality or cosmic signi£icanee 
either of mind ••• oro£ the ideals and values 
revealed to and prized by mind.l 
2 Historically, there are at least four main types of idealism. 
First, Platonic idealism maintains the objectivity of value. 
Secondly, Berkeleian idealism is the position that all know-
able reality is of the nature of consciousness. Thirdly, 
Hegelian idealism holds to the coherence of one absolute sys-
tem as the only true value. Lotzean idealism is the fourth 
form, which finds in personality the key to reality. Person-
alism and Panpsychism are also £or.ms o£ idealism, which com-
1. Brightman, A Pbilosopgj o£ Ideals, p. 172. 
2. Ibid., PP• 170-171. 
bine some of the central features from the above four types. 
In the thinking of Geismar, "Kierkegaard' s thought is through 
and through idea.listic."l This latter reasoning m.a.y not be 
as far-fetched, as it first appears, if a person accepts the 
definition of the neo-realist, Perry. According to him~ 
idealism "consists essentially in the assertion of the pri-
ority of spirit over matter." 2 In Perry's definition, Kier-
kega.ard1s philosophy of existence qualifies as a for.m of i-
dealism. Even in Hegel's qualification for idealism, Kierke-
gaard's position would be included. 
Every philosophy is an idealism, or at 
least has idealism for its principle; every 
genuine philosophy is idealism, because the 
ideal:J.ty of th~ finite is the chief maxim 
of philosophy. 
By -"the ideality of the finite," Hegel means that the 
finite is of ideal nature. A similar view is basic inKier-
kegaard's philosophy of existence. Kierkegaard holds, "The 
real subject is the ethically existing subject. 114 Again, 
"The only reality that exists for an existing individual is 
his own et~cal reality.n5 Kierkegaard states clearly qis 
1. Eduard Geismar, Lectures on the Reiigious ThOught of 
S5ren Kierkegaard (Minneapolis, Augsburg Publishing 
House, 1937), P• 45. 
2. R. B. Perry, OE• · cit., P• 310. 
3. Johnston and Struthers, The Science of Logic, I, 168 
4• Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific PostscriEt• p. 281. 
5. ~., p. 280. 
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ethical idealism in the ~ollowing passages: "The ethical 
is t he absolute, and in all eternity the highest."1 Further-
more, ttThe ethical is and remains the highest task for every 
human being."2 Specifically, the ethical is the expression 
for the God relationship.) Perhaps Geismar has ample justifi-
ca tion for the following statement of Kierkegaard's view: 
Kierkegaard's thought is through and 
through idealistic. But while taking his 
point of departure from an ethical ideal-
ism, he nevertheless ends by presenting 
Christianity as4the direct opposite o~ all human idealism. 
If Geismar's statement be true, then Kierkegaard•s view 
takes its poi nt of departure from an ethical idealism in con-
trast to Hegel's absolute idealism. By absolute idealism~ 
Hegel means that reality is an Absolute Spirit, or Absolute 
Idea. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4· 
The position taken up by the notion is 
that o~ absolute idealism. Philosophy is 
a knowledge through notions because it sees 
that what on other grades o~ consciousness 
is taken to have Being, and to be naturally 
or immediately independent, is but a con-
stituent stage in the Idea. In the logic 
of understanding, the notion is generally 
reckoned a mere for.m o~ thought, and treated 
as a general conception. It is to this in-
ferior view of the notion that the assertion 
refers, so often urged on behalf of the 
he~rt and sent~ment, that notions as such 
Ibid., p. 133. 
Ibid., p. 135. 
ill£·' P• 122. 
Geismar, . - cit., 45. OJ2• P• 
are something dead, ampty, and abstract. 
The case is really quite the reverse. The 
notion is, on the contrary, the principle 
of all life, and thus possesses at the same 
time a character of thorough concreteness. 
That it is so follows from the whole logical 
movement up to this point, and need not be 
here proved •••• The notion, in short, is what 
contains all fhe earlier categories of thought 
merged in it. 
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As the above statement indicates, Hegel's idealism is a dia-
lectical process, and all contradictions are comprehended 
within the Absolute. But even within the Absolute, there 
are contradictory relations, since the Absolute is an identity 
within differences. 
Turning to present-day idealistic movements, the Hegel-
Kierkegaard debate will be considered in line with the 
-
rational-irrational controversy. English and American Abso-
lute idealism, voluntaristic idealism, panpsychic idealism, 
and personal idealism are the schools to be analyzed. 
Absolute idealism in England and America is a neo-
Hegelian school. Being under Hegelian influence largely, 
it regards the universe as one absolute system and a co-
,., 
herent whole.~ In England, a few of the outstanding represen-
tatives of this school have been T. H. Green, Edward Caird, 
John Caird, and F. H. Bradley. Equally in America, there 
1. Wallace, The Logic of Hegel, p. 287. 
2. Brightman, 11Religious Values and Recent Philosophy," 
Boston University Bulletin X (August, 1921), 12. 
C.{'-} 
have been outstanding absolute idealists such as Josiah 
Royce, Mary K. Calkins, and J. E. Creighton. Historically 
speaking, Hegel is considered the rounder of Absolute ideal-
ism, yet different idealistic types can be found in the 
philosophies of Plato, Descartes, Leibnitz, Berkeley, and 
Kant. The common thesis of all idealism is that the mind 
is real, and matter is derivative or secondary. Idealists 
stress the dignity and significance of the personal, mental, 
and spiritual. 
As it has been stated earlier, the salient characteris-
tics of the idealistic movement will be discussed as an ex-
tension of the debate between rationalism and irrationalism. 
In this area of the argument, four terms will be used in the 
following way: Rationalism will mean the "doctrine of' 1h e 
supremacy of reason. 111 In this definition, reality will be 
understood as a coherent system, and the intellect by virtue 
of its inherent rationality will be considered capable of 
grasping to some extent the nature of that system. Irration-
alism will be used "as a belief or philosophy that is not 
grounded in reason; the denial or disbelief of rationalism. 112 
Anti-rationalism will be understood to imply that empirical 
1. Brightman, "Rationalism," An Encyclopedia of Reli.gion 
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1945), o35. 
2. Cf. rationalism in Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dic-
tionary of the English Language. 
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evidence is not runenable to reason or logic.l Non-rational-
ism will imply a negative principle that limits the activity 
o:f the rationa.l.2 
One o~ the ablest dialecticians o:f English neo-Hegelians 
is Bradley. Bradley's Hegelianism is clearly stated. Accord-
ing to him, the Absolute is the only real, and any determi-
nation short of the Absolute is unreal. Bradley conceives a 
coherent, absolutistic theory of the universe. He clabns: 
Perfect truth ••• must realize the idea of a 
systematic whole •••• And such a whole, we saw, 
possessed the two characters or coherence and 
comprehensiveness.) 
Bradley agrees with Hegelian idealism that metaphysics is an 
attempt to "comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or 
by fragments, but somehow as a whole."4 The emphasis upon a 
coherent system accounts for the rational cast of Bradley's 
view. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Ultimate reality is such that it does 
not contradict itself; here is an Absolute 
criterion. And it is proved by the fact 
that, either in endeavoring to deny it, or 
even in attempting tg doubt it, we tacitly 
assume its validity. 
Cf. ratt onalism in Chamber's Encyclopedia. 
Robert L. Patterson, Irrationalism and Rationalism in 
Religion (Durham, Duke University Press, 1954), p. 67. 
F. M. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1883), p. 223. 
Bradley, Appearance and Reality (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1897), p. 1. 
Ibid., pp. 132-133. 
2()1 
In a f'urther statement, Bradley af'f'irms, "Anything the mean-
ing of' which is inconsistent and Qnintelligible is appearance 
and not reality."l 
Although there is a coherent rational approach in 
Bradley's work, a closer reading reveals also an appeal to 
immediate experience. Bradley has a double standard, which 
is a polarity betvJeen rationalism and im..rnediate experience. 
He insists, "A lingering scruple still f'o~bids us to believe 
that reality . can be purely rational."2 Bradley appeals to 
imm.ediate experience in order to satisfy that aspect of 
reality that is not thought. According to Bradley, immediate 
experience is felt, and it grasps reality. 
The relation of immedia.te experience to its 
felt contents ••• must be taken simply as a 
f'act ••• our attempt (to describe it) is justi-
f'ied so far as the description seems true, that 
is, although inadequate it does not positively 
jar, and again is felt positively to agree with 
our f'elt experience.3 
Again: 
For if, seeking f'or reality, we go to ex-
perience, what we certainly do not f'ind is a 
subject or object or indeed any other thing 
whatever, standing separate and on its bottom. 
What we discover rather is a whole in which 
distinctions can be made, but in which divi-
1. Ibid., p. 76. 
2. Bradley, Principles of' Logic, p. 533. 
3. Bradley, EssaY-~ on Truth and Reality, p. 177. 
sions do not exist. And this is the point on 
which I insist, and is the very ground on 
which I stand, when, 1 I urge that reality is sentient experience. 
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Bradley agrees with Kierkegaard that reality consists 
2 
of immediate experience. Bradley says: 
Sentient experience, in short, is reality, 
and what is not this is not real ••• there is 
no being or fact outside of that which is 
commonly called psychological existence. The 
Absolute ••• is one system and its co~tents 
are nothing but sentient experience. 
As Kierkegaard, Bradley is convinced that philosophical con-
cepts of finite existence are inherent in contradiction.4 All 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4-
Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 146. 
!bid., pp. 428-429. Cf. also Paul Tillich•s "Existential 
Philosophy," Journal of the History of Ideas V (1944), p. 
45. The author expresses a similar point of view in the 
following passage: "Like Bergson, Bradley, James, and Dew-
ey, the Existential philosophers are appealing from the 
conclusions of rationalistic thinking, which equates Real-
ity with the object of thought, with relations or essence, 
to Reality as men experience it ~ediately in their ac-
tual living. They consequently take their place with all 
of those who have regarded man's immediate experience as 
revealing more completely the nature and traits c:£ Reality 
than man•s cognitive experience. The philosophy of •Exis-
tence• is hence one version of that wide spread appeal to 
immediate experience which has been so marked a feature of 
recent thought." 
Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 144. 
Robert L. Patterson, Irrationalism and Rationalism in Relig-
ion (Durham: Duke University Press, 1954), p. 115. The au-
thor expresses a si.milar view in the following passage: "One 
of the most ingenious attempts to establish the incapacity 
of reason to know the Absolute is that of Bradley, to which 
I have already referred. Thought, inasmuch as it connects 
subject with object, is relational; and relation, like every 
other category, maintains Bradl5,1, involves us in cont radic-
tion •••• His conclusion is that relation is only appearance, 
that ultimate reality is nonrel ational, and that thought, be-
ing infected with unreality, camot conceive it as it is." 
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finite relations, like all metaphysical concepts, are incura-
bly contradictory. The contradictions of this life are recon-
ciled only in the Absolute. Perhaps Bradley concedes to hu-
man reason no more than Kierkegaard. 1 Like Kierkegaard, he 
denies that it can demonstrate the existence of God, and im-
2 
mortality. Moreover, in agreement with Kierkegaard, Brad-
ley criticizes Hegel's Logic in his Principles of Logic as 
a spectral woof of impalpable abstraction, and ballet of 
bloodless categories.3 In accord with Kierkegaard, rather 
than Hegel, is Bradley's insistence upon the inability of 
reason to know the Absolute. The entrance to philosophy and 
the Absolute is through immediate experience, rather than 
reason.4 "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for 
what we believe upon instinct." But Bradley adds, "To find 
these reasons is no less an instinct.".5 
The American counterpart to Bradley in the Absolute 
idealistic tradition is Josiah Royce. Like Bradley, Royce 
was influenced profoundly by Hegel. 6 Both Bradley and Royce 
agree upon the organic unity of reality as found in the Abso-
lute, which is a characteristic coherent rational tendency 
1. Patterson, op. cit., PP• 81-82. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Bradley, Principles of Logic, p • .5.53. 
4. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. XIV. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 27. 
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of Hegelian philosophy. Unlike Bradley, however, Royce 
speaks of the Absolute in a more personalistic manner. 
Royce's Absolute is a personal Self, whereas Bradley speaks 
or the Absolute as more than the personal.l The central 
doctrine of Royce's idealism may be summarized as follows: 
Either idealism, we said, or the unknow-
able. What we have now said Ii that the ab-
solutely unknowable is essentially an absurd-
ity, a non-existent. For any fair and stat-
able problem admits of an answer. If the 
world exists yonder, its essence is~en al-
ready capable of being known by some mind. 
If capable of being known by a mind, this es-
sence is then already essentially ideal and 
mental •••• A mind knowing the real world 
would again find in it relations, such as 
equality and inequality, attraction and repul-
sion, likeness and unlikeness. But such rela-
tions have no meaning except as objects of a 
mind. In brief, then, the world as known 
would be fouri.d to be a world that bad all the 
while been ideal and mental, even before it 
bec~e known to the particular mind that we 
are to conceive as coming into connection with 
it. Thus, then, we are driven to the second 
alternative. The real wo~ld must be a mind, 
or else a group of minds. 
From this position, Royce is driven to a third alterna-
tive, that is, the finite individual is a part of a larger 
self. According to Royce: 
Flee where we will, then, the net of the larger 
Self ensnares us. We are lost and ~prison-
ad in ~he _ thic~ets of its tangled labyrinth. 
1. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, PP• 531-533. 
2. Royce, The Spirit of Modern Phii6sop~ (Boston: River-
side Press, Cambridge, 1892), P• 367. 
The moments are not at all in themselves, for 
as moments they have no meaning; they exist 
only in relation to the beyond. The larger 
Self alone is, and they are by reason of it, 
organic parts of it. They perish, but it re-
mains;~ they have truth £r error only in its 
overshadowing presence. 
Again, 
There is, then at last, but one Self, 
organically, reflectively, consciously, in-
clusive of all the selves, and so of all 
truth. I have called this ~elf, Logos, 
problem-solver, all-knower. 
Like Hegel, Josiah Royce emphasizes man•s systematic 
rational powers, yet he agrees with Kierkegaard that it is 
impossible to grasp the actually existent individual by 
reason. According to Royce, even in the case of our most 
trusted friends, ·after having known them for many years, "if' 
you attempt to define by your thought the unique, it trans-
forms itself into an unsatisfactory abstraction,--a type 
and not a person. n3 The person becomes a ''mere fashion of 
possible existence, that might as well be shared by a legion 
as confined to the case of a single being."4 For this reason, 
Royce claims that the individual object of the most cherished 
friendships is not only a psychological problem, but also a 
1. Ibid.' p. 379. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Royce, The Conce;Etion of Immortalitz (Boston: Riverside 
Press, 1900)' ·p. 27. 
4. Ibid.' p. 26. 
metaphysical mystery.1 In striking Kierkegaardian notes, 
Royce argues that it is impossible for the individual to 
think what he is. 
As for yourself, you notoriously are such 
that the self is, and is a real individual. 
But who amongst us defines by his abstract 
statement of his own type, or finds by dwell-
ing upon his familiar masses of mere organic 
sensation, what his own unique self may be? 
Or who amongst us conceives himself in his . 
uniqueness except as the remote goal of some 
ideal process of coming to himself and of 
awakening to the truth about his own life? 
Onl2 an infinite process can show me who I 
am. 
c.uo 
This latter statement is in agreement with Kierke-
gaardts insistence that what constitutes the individual is 
the G~d-relationship.3 In further agreement, Royce con-
fesses, '~e cannot tell wherein our friend is s o individ-
ual. n4 "This,'' he asserts, "is something so baffling, so 
stimulating, and in a way so absurd. u5 Royce c9ncludes, 
"Love and loyalty never directly find their unique objects, 
but remain faithful to them although unseen."6 
To summarize briefly in harmony with the initial prob-
lem of the relationship of Hegel and Kierkegaard: Bradley 
1. Ibid., P• 27. 
2. Ibid., P• 28. 
3. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific PostscriEt, p. 178. 
4· Royce, The Conception of Immortalit:l, p. 29. 
5. Ibid.' p . 31. 
6. Ibid.' p. 40. 
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and Royce stress organic relations and maintain that the 
aim or knowledge is to give systematic expression to all 
areas of experience. These factors can be considered the 
rational aspects of their methods, which had a Hegelian 
shade in contrast to Kierkegaard 1 s romantic revolt against 
reason. Yet Bradley and Royce agree that there is in real-
ity that which is other than the cognitive, since the dif-
ficulties of immediate experience are the "stumbling block" 
of all systamatic thinking. Perhaps the non-rational ele-
ments of experience led the two thinkers to emphasize an 
element of Kierkegaard's side of the debate with the cri-
terion of immediate experience. The central result is 
that neither Royce, nor Bradley, achieves perhaps an in-
clusive harmony of the twa standards of rationalism and 
non-rationalism as their master Hegel.1 
A second school of idealism is Voluntaristic idealism. 
It is the view that reality consists of will. Although 
Schopenhauer is the chief representative of this school, 
Bergson's philosophy of intuition may be considered a for.m 
1. Frank Thilly-Ledger Wood, A Risto~ of - Philoso~El (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 195 , P• 578. t is 
suggested that the opposition to the limitation of the 
intellect is not confined to positivists, pragmatists, 
voluntarists, but also the idealists. •strong anti-
intellectualistic or anti-rationalistic .. tendencies are 
also discussible within the ranks of the idealistic 
school' for exrumple, in Lotze, Eucken, Bradley, and 
Royce. 
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of it.1 Bergson•s frunous work, Creative Evolution, has not 
a single mention of Hegel. In opposition to Hegelian ration-
alism, Bergson urges tre importance c£ intuition. He sees 
the intellect as falsifying reality. Like Kierkegaard, 
Bergson fails to see the empirical and scientific sides 
within Hegelian idealism. However, in agreement with Hegel, 
Bergson concedes that spirit is higher than matter, and his 
consideration of the nature of development has affinity with 
Hegel, and voluntaristic romanticism of German idealism as 
a whole. 
It is Bergson•s view that reason can not give insight 
into the life-force, or elan vital. The :lan vital is sub-
rational and supra-material. As the intellect deals with 
spatial juxtaposition and arrangements, it is conditioned 
by tbe frozen, static, fixed elements. Conversely, intui-
~on deals with the warm, dynamic, living elements of real 
life. Bergson is in common agreement with Kierkegaard in 
reacting to the alleged, overstress ~ rationalism in Hegel's 
system. Like Bergson, Kierkegaard struggles with the problem 
of the personal, or non-objective thinking and its expression. 
Immediate experience is the door to the creative source of 
reality. As Kierkegaard cites in Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript: 
1. W. Wright, A Histort of Modern Philosophy, (New York: 
Macmillan Company, ~4!), p. 363. 
The way of objective reflection makes the 
subject accidental, and thereby transforms 
existence into something indifferent--truth 
also becomes impersonal and this impersonal 
character is precisely its objective validity 
for all interest, like all decision, is rooted 
in personal experience.l 
Both Kierkegaard and Bergson appear radical anti-
rationalists. Like Kierkegaard, Bergson reacts against 
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Hegelian rationalism, mechanism, determinism, and teleology. 
Urging the primacy of intuition over intellect, Bergson in-
sists upon direct contact with the irrational, surging 
/ process of the elan vital. With Kierkegaard, Bergson 
holds to a violent opposition to logic,2 although both use 
in their philosophy the dynamic activism charapteristic of 
Hegel's developmental idea in philosophy. 
Another area of agreement of Bergson and Kierkegaard 
is that of duration and time. As Kierkegaard, Bergson con-
ceives of duration and time in personal terms. He speaks 
of the feeling of duration. 
To touch the reality of spirit one must 
place oneself at the point at which an in-
1. Kierkeg~ard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 173. 
2. Thilly-Wood, op. cit., p. 579. The author expresses the 
opinion that Bergson is the most interesting and popular 
figure in the anti-rationalistic movement of the present 
century. "l·Jith the romanticists, pragmatists, and 
mystics Bergson proclaims the incapacity of science and 
logic to penetrate ultimate reality; in the presence of 
lif'e and movement conceptual thinkin~ stands helpless." 
A similar comparison of Bergson and Kierkegaard is found 
in G. Cattaui, "Bergson, Kierkegaard and Mysticism," 
trans. Alexander Dru, Dublin Review 192 (Jan. 1933). 
dividual consciousness prolongs, and pre-
servea the past.l 
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In another instance, Bergson speaks of time as coinciding 
with my 1mpatience.2 Again, in Creative EVolution, Bergson 
insists: 
We perceive ourselves and what do we find? 
I find that I pass from state to state. I am 
hot, or cold, gay or sad, I work or I do noth-
ing ••• Thus I change unceasingly. Real dura-
tion is lived time, rather than time that is 
thought.3 
These impressions of Bergson of time as a for.m of person-
al experience can be multiplied indefinitely in Kierkegaard'a 
view. With Bergson, Kierkegaard seeks to eacape rrom the 
grip of reasoned and objective t1me.4 In Kierkegaard's 
thinking, duration and becoming belong to man, as eternity 
belongs to God. According to Kierkegaard, pure thought 
is a lunatic postulate and a recent invention.5 Although 
the negation of a preceding syntheais requirea time, the 
latter cannot find a place in pure thought. Thus, in the 
realm of the stages of life's way, Kierkegaard deala 
with time in terms of the different levels of life. Time, 
l. Bergson, Ma·tter . and Memolj {New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1912), P• 263. 
Bergson, dreative .EVoiution, P• 10. 
ibid., P• l. 
C.attani, op~ cit. 1 P• 71. 
Kierkegaard, donclud.irig unse1ent1tic Postscript, P• 278. 
~or the aesthete, is a succession of moments, unconnected 
and ~illed with voidness and dread. On the ethical stage, 
time is continuous without coming to anw decision. But on 
the religious level, time is fullness; it is the instant in 
which time and eternity meet. 
Although Hegel does not emphasize time as much as Berg-
son and Kierkegaard, he did not deny time. In the Phenome-
nology of Mind, 1 he makes one of the series of the mathemat-
ical judgmental processes temporal. Hegel says: 
Immanent or so-called pure mathematics, 
again, does not oppose time qua time to 
space, as a second subject-matter for con-
sideration. Applied mathematics, no doubt, 
treats of time, as also of motion, arrl other 
concrete things as well; but it picks up 
~rom experience synthetic propositions--i.e. 
statements of their relations, which2are de-termined by their conceptual nature. 
Though time is a crucial problem in Hegel's philosophy, one 
thing is clear, ~rom the above passage, that he does not 
deny time. 
Hegel agrees with Kierkegaard and Bergson in speru~ing 
o~ history in personal terms as interests, passions, and 
those driving forces which tm Cunning Reason uses for its 
purposes. The term Cunning Reason means for Hegel that God 
allows men to direct their own passions and interests, yet 
1. Baillie, Phenomenology of Mind., p. 104. 
2. Ibid. 
the result is the aoco.mplishment of His plans. 
Reason is as cunning as it is powerful. Cun-
ning may be said to lie in the inter-mediative 
action, which, while it permits the objects to 
follow their own bent and act upon one another, 
till they waste away, and does not itself di-
rectly interfere in the process, is nevertheless 
only working out the execution of its_ own aims.l 
This analysis of the Cunning Reason brings out Hegel's 
central thesis concerning God and history. 
God lets men do as they please with their 
particular passions and interests; but the re-
sult is the accomplishment of--not their plans, 
but His, and these differ decidedly from the 
ends primarily sought by those whom He employs. 2 
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The above statements could well be passages fram Bergson'a 
Creative· ·Evolution and Kierkegaard' s unscientific Post-
script, especially since both would agree with Hegel that 
history reveals the working and unfolding of a World Spirit. 
Then, too, it must be pointed out that Hegel antici-
pated the problem of intuition and reason. His view of in-
tuition and reason is ~qually aimed to give both due consid-
eration. Hegel does so by maintaining two things: First, sen-
sation should be regarded as a moment within thought, which as 
a moment constitutes thought's other. Secondly, Hegel insists 
1. 
2. 
Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, P• 350. 
Ibid. 
-
that thought has more than one form. He cites three forms 
of thought$ the thought of common sense, scientific thought, 
and philosophical thought.l The first two are classified as 
the result of the understanding, while the third is consid-
ered the product ·of reason. Common sense is intuitive, 
that is, picture thinking, or thought that is immature. 2 
Scientific thinking is discursive, that is, thought contains 
only abstract concepts.3 Although scientific thinking is 
distinct from sensing, being the reflection on the data of 
sense, it is still not competent enough to attain knowledge. 
A third for.m of idealism is panpsychic idealism. It 
considers organic nature, as well as physical nature, to 
consist of psychoids or cells.4 Whitehead, a :- leading expon-
ent of this view, calls his units actual occasions, and char-
acteriaes each occasion as embodying feeling with a mental 
pole, a physical pole, and a subjective aim. Whitehead as-
serts that each occasion prehends or feels all other occas-
ions. While Whitehead thinks of his position as realistic, 
his theory of occasions puts him in the camp of panpsychis-
tic idealism. 
1. Hegel, The Logic of . Hegel, pp. 36-38. 
2. l£13· 
3. Ibid. 
4. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 292. 
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In spite of ~Vhitehead•s claim in Essays in Science and 
Philosophy, "I have never been able to read Hegel;'' he shares 
with Hegel many common affinities in his philosophy o£ organ-
ism. An analysis of tre logical sequence of these two sys-
tems reveals two conclusions abundantly evidenced in Process 
and Reality. First, both Hegel and Whitehead assert that 
reality is dynamic and organic. Whitehead says: 
It is the theme of some of the best Hebrew 
poetry in the Psalms; it appears as one of 
the first generalizations of Greek philosophy 
in the form of the saying of Heraclitus; amid 
the later barbarism of Anglo-Saxon thought it 
reappears in the story of the sparrow flitting 
through the banqueting hall of Northhumbrian 
king; and in all stages of civilization its 
recollection lends its pathos to poetry. With-
out doubt, if we are to go back to that ulti-
mate, integral experience, unwarped by the 
sophistications of theory, that experience 
whose elucidation is the final aim of philos-
ophy, the flux of things is one ultimate gen-
eralization around whfch we must weave our 
philosophical system. 
As Whitehead's Process and Reality, Hegel's Phenome-
nology and Science of Logic involve the stress upon the dy-
namic flow of reality. Hegel's consideration of process, 
becoming, and development has logical continuity with White-
head 1 s de.fini tion o.f process as "the growth and attainment 
of a final end."2 Or, "Process is the becoming of ex.perience."3 
1. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1929), p. 317. 
2. Ibid., p. 227. 
3. Ibid., P• 252. 
This Whiteheadian process has a common agreement with Hegel's 
explanation o~ dialectic in such dynamic ter.ms as life's 
"moving principles,"! or "immanent progress."2 Likewise, 
~or the two thinkers, the dynamic reality involves an or-
ganic outlook. To quote ~rom Hegel: 
Each o~ the parts o~ philosophy is a phil-
osophical whole, a circle rounded and complete 
in itsel~. In each o~ these parts, however, 
the philosophical Idea is ~ound in a particu-
lar speci~icality or medium. The single circle, 
because it is a reel totality, bursts through 
the limits imposed by its special medium, and 
gives rise to a wider circle. The whole o~ 
philosophy in this way resembles a circle o~ 
circles. The Idea appears in each single 
circle, but, at the same time, the whole Idea 
is constituted by the system o~ these peculiar 
phases, and e~ch is a necessary member o~ the 
organisation.J . 
Whitehead's position is in harmony with the organic 
emphasis in philosophy, as well as the view that reality is 
a developmental process. In The Rgythm o~ · Education, 
Whitehead admits even the truth o~ Hegel's -dialectic. He 
says, "I think that Hegel was right when b.e analyzed progress 
into three stages, which he called thesis, antithesis, and 
synthesis."4 Whitehead identifies his view with Hegel: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4· 
Knox, Hegel's Philoso~hy of Right, P• 34. 
Ibid. 
Wallace, The Logic of Hegel, PP• 24-25. 
\.Vhi tehead, The Rhythm · o~ Education (London: Christophers, 
1922), tak~n from The Aims of Education and Other Essays 
(New ~ York: The Macmillan Company, 1929), pp. 27-28. 
On one aide, the one becomes maD1; and on 
the other side, the many become one. But what 
becomes is always a res vera, and the concres-
cence of a r ·es -vera is the development of a 
subjective aim. Tbis development is nothing 
else than the Hegelian development of an idea.1 
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But in spite of Whitehead's many concessions to Hegel, 
there is also in his philosophy the appeal to immediate 
experience, which is close to Klerkegaard's position.2 
Speaking of immediate experience, Whitehead says that "all 
knowledge is derived tram and verified by, directive intui-
tive observation. 8 3 Though Hegel would agree that all knowl-
edge is derived tram immediate experience, he wou.ld not hold 
the last portion of Whitehead's phrase, Rand verified by ••• 
intuitive observation." Neither wou.ld Hegel agree with 
Whitehead that though God functions as a principle of ration-
ality in the universe, "His existence is the ultimate irra-
tionality,n4 since "God-is the ultimate 11m1tation.n5 But 
. -
there can be no metaphysical reason for what is determined. 
However, "there is a principle of concretion which is not 
6 discoverable by abstract reason," but rests on a particular 
experience. This particular view is close to Kierkegaard•s. 
A fourth form is personalistic idealism. Brightman 
de~~~e~ pe~~on~list~o idealism in the following wa-y: 
Whitehead, Process and. -Reaiiti, P• 254. 
Tillioh, op~ ·cit. 
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, PP• 227-228. 
whitehead, science and -the Modern worid, P• 257. 
Ibid.·. 
-
Mind, spirit, or personality is the real 
energy of the universe, and that concern for 
values and their development in every conscioU:J 
being is at the root of every natural proceis, 
all life, all evolution, the entire cosmos. 
c...."/ I 
Personalists oppose both Absolute monigm of Hegelianism and 
mechanistic naturalism. Reality is a system of selves, hence 
personalism may be called pluralistic idealism. Nature is an 
objective order, and the energizing of the Divine Will of Go~ 
The common thesis of this school is the reality, worth, and 
freedom of moral persons. Borden Parker Bowne is the founder 
of American personalism. A fUrther development of his views 
has been carried on by Albert C. Knudson, Ralph T. Flewelling, 
Edgar S. Brightman, L. Harold Dew-olf, Peter A. Bertocci, 
Richard M. Millard, and John H. Lavely. 
What is the relationship of personalism to Kierkegaardts 
philosophy of existence? Brightman summarizes the position 
of the two schools of thought in the following passage: 
Existentialists vary greatly in their 
appraisal of objective knowledge; they agree 
in their view of the vital importance of 
mants inner life. As a reaction against ab-
stract and impersonal thought m d oppressive 
authority, or against trivial and meaningless 
subjective interests, existentialism is the 
mood of exalting personality. But it is not 
a clear-cut system or philosophy. It is a 
mood of protest rather than a rational struc-
ture of thought •••• Philosophically, existen-
tialism is nearer to personalism than to any 
1. Brightman, Nature and Value, p. 90. 
other system; but it lacks the co,herence, the 
inclusiveness, and the structure requisite to 
a system. In fact, in Kierkegaard especially, 
it is a revolt against system.l 
C:.'-}0 
Brightman's foregoing description of the relationship 
of personalism to existentialism reveals that elements of 
Hegel's coherent doctrine and existentialism survive in 
personalism. With existentialism, personalism insists upon 
exalting persons as primarily ethical and spiritual agents, 
while receiving considerable support from Hegel's systematic 
coherence as the criterion of truth. Specifically, person-
alism maintains a clear-cut coherent system that existential-
ism lacks. This fact is attested in the works of Bowne, one 
of the leading exponents of personalistic thought. Although 
the coherence of Bowne is not as logical as Hegel's, or as 
empirical as Brightman's, yet a coherent view is present in 
Bowne's philosophy. Bowne says: 
Our interpreting activity presupposes the 
intelligibility and hence the rationality of 
all existence. It presupposes that the ob-
jective reality is cast in the molds of 
thought, so that the irrational is impossible.2 
Though Bowne maintains in his writings the emphasis 
on logical evidence, there is an element of his thought that 
defends the existential right of life to determine the 
surging issues. Bowne says: 
1. Brightman, An Introduction to PhilosoPhy, pp. 314-315. 
2. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 23. 
Man is still, conscience, emotion, aspira-
tion, and these are far more powerful factors 
than logical ~nderstanding ••• Before he argues, 
he must live. 
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By making feeling, emotions, aspiration, the primary factors, 
Bowne agrees with the subjectivity of Kierkegaard in opposi-
tion to his rationalistic method. As for Kierkegaard the 
great sources of evidence for metaphysical truth were in 
life rather than logic; so is this also the case for Bowne. 
Bowne says clearly: 
If there were any beings who had nothing 
to do but to syllogize and for whom belief 
had no practical bearing, they might safely 
adopt the method •••• But man is not only ••• 
an abstract spectator. He is also a living 
being with practical interests and necessi-
ties to which he must adjust himself in or-
der to live at all. It has been one of the 
perennial shortcomings of intellectualism 
that man has been considered solely as an 
intelligent or understanding; whereas he is 
a great deal mora. Man is will, conscience, 
emotion, aspiration, and these are far more 
powerful factors than the logical intellect .2 
Although Bowne and Kierkegaard insist upon an existen-
tial, subjective factor in existence, Bowne does not agree 
with Kierkegaard•s insistency that life determines all is-
sues of existence. Parallel to the subjective factor, there 
is the stress upon the rationalistic method in Bowne. Yet 
the existential approach is prevalent. Bowne asserts: 
1. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 376. 
2. Bowne, Theism (New York: The American Book Company, 
1902), PP• 17-18. 
Whatever the mind demands ror the satisrac-
tion or its subjective interests and tendencies 
may be assumed a.s real in derault or positive 
disproor.l 
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Brightman, a consistent opponent or irrationalism and 
an outstanding representative or personalism, points out 
that, "Bowne's willingness to assume the mind's demands as 
real 'in derault or positive disproorr seems to be too lax 
a. standard. 112 This view, Brightman says, nHegel would call 
abstract."3 In a clear-cut opposition to Bowne and Kierke-
gaard, Brightman states his respect ror Hegel: 
I might add that my increasing respect ror 
Hegel is partly an outcome or a revolt against 
the inadequate and unrair account o~ Hegel that 
is round in Lotze and Ritschl 1 James and Bowne, 
the nee-realists, and many modern logicians-
not to mention Kierkegaard and the neo-orthodox.4 
Brightman thinks that the positive contribution of He-
gel's rationalism and coherence must be upheld, since "mind 
is a whole, and truth is a whole."5 Again1 Brightman says: 
1. 
2. 
4· 
To demand coherence is to demand full at-
tention to all the facts of experience, to 
neglect none, in short, to 1: save the appear-
ances,' as Simplicius said in his commentary 
on Aristotle's De Coelo. Coherence is no 
Ibid., P• 18. 
Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 185. 
Ibid. 
Brightman, "The Review o~ Reviews," The Philosophical 
Forum IX(Spring, 1951), P• 4. 
Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 186. 
repudiation of empiricism. It is simply an 
insistence that empiricism must be complete, 
well-orderedi clearly defined, and rationally 
interpreted. 
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It is necessary to point out that Brightman uses Hegel's 
coherent method, not as a form of absolutistic metaphysics, 
but as a criterion of truth.2 
Turning now to Kierkegaard, what is Brightman's rela-
tionship to this thinker? As Bowne, Brightman would accept 
Kierkegaard•s stress on the dignity and significance of per-
sonality. With Kierkegaard, ' Brightman agrees that all knowl-
edge starts in the here and now of an existing person. How-
ever, he insists that, "The much-discussed existentialism ••• 
has overemphasized this truth. ••3 Furthermore, Br~gh tme.n 
opposes the Kierkegaardian stress that no system can exist 
for the fin1te.4 Kierkegaard denies the trustworthiness of 
f'in~te reason, but Brightman upholds its validity. 
Absolute proof is impossible. Such prob-
able proof as we can attain and must demand 
for our fundamental convictions requires 
that no psychological claim, however . native 
and inherent it may be in the mind, can be 
accepted as true until its coherence, its 
systematic connection with a rational view 
of the ~est of experience, has been estab-
lished./ 
1. Ibid., pp. 192-193. 
2. Ibid., P• 186. 
3. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 13n. 
4. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 107. 
5. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 185. 
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As the statement indicates, Brightman argues for the 
trustworthiness of human reason, but this point of view is 
reached at the expense of the total rationality of God. 
Brightman claims that there is a non-rational given in the 
nature of God.l 
The Given consists of the eternal, un-
created laws of reason and also of equally 
eternal and uncreated processes of non-
rational consciousness which exhibit all 
the ultimate qualities of sense objects 
(qualia), disorderly impulses and desires, 
such experiences as pain and suffering, · 
the forms of space and time, and w~tever 
in God is the source of surd evil. 
Out of this limitation in God•s nature, Brightman de-
velops the theory of the finite God. 
The present writer began in The Problem 
of God .•• the development of the idea of a 
personal finite God whose finiteness consis~ 
in his own internal structure: an eternal 
unitary personal consciousness whose creative 
will is limited both by eternal necessities 
of reason and by eternal experiences of brute 
fact. These limits he called The Given--an 
aspect of God's consciousness which eternally 
enters into every moment of the divine experi-
ence and into everything that is, either as 
3 obstacle or as instrument to the will of God. 
A clue to Brightman's theory is found in P1~to and He-
gel. Plato introduced the philosophical concept or the 
1. Ibid., p . 333. 
2. Ibid., · i> · 337. 
3. Ibid., p. 330. 
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rinite God. In the Timaeus, the Artisan God contains a ra-
tional pattern and an irrational1 receptacle which were ex-
ternal rectors of God's activity. Hegel had expounded in 
his theory of dialectic that in the Absolute, there was 
identity amid negativities, conrlicts, and anti-theses. 
Combining essentially these two views, Brightman develops 
the theory that there is a Given within God's nature against 
which He is struggling. In this theory, Brightman sees the 
possibility of giving a complete and rational account of 
2 
all of the experiences of man, as well as making a "ra-
tional, open-eyed faith possible."3 
One basic criticism should be briefly mentioned of this 
view. L. Harold DeWolf asserts that Brightman's view is more 
irrational than Kierkegaard 1 s. He writes, "Kierkegaard has 
in the name of revolt against reason been more rationalistic 
than have such 'rationalists• as Dr. Brightman."4 DeWolf in-
sists that Brightman sacririces the complete rationality or 
God. "Metaphysical explanation is thus thrown ultimately 
outside the bounds of reason, even the divine reason. tt5 
1. E. s. Brightman, "Finite God," in An Encyclopedia o:f Re-
liffion, ec. v. Fer.m (New York, The Philosophical Library, 
19 5), P• 279. 
2. Ibid., p. 314. 
3. Ibid., P• 334. 
4. L. Harold DeWolf, The Reli ious Revolt A 
(New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 
5. Ibid., P• 94. 
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Referring to Kierkegaard 1 s statement, "Reality itself is a 
system-for God,"l DeWolf asserts that "Kierkegaard ••• places 
l ess reliance in human reason because he trusts more fully 
the complete rationality of God."2 DeWolf views theistic 
finitism as the projection of confusion and frustration with-
in our experience into the being of God, which Kierkegaard 
denies vigorously.3 In a shift of attack from Brightman to 
Kierkegaard, DeWolf asserts tha t by making reality a system 
for God, and not for man, Kierkegaard1 s God becomes a deceiv-
er. L!. He concludes that both Kierkegaard and Brightman agree 
tha t "there is much in the .world which man cannot fit into the 
system of rational purpose as he conceives it.n5 
To summarize: Kierkegaard holds to the dignity and 
worth of the person in harmony with personalistic tendencies, 
though the personalists avoid the extreme subjectivity of 
the former in their insistencies upon a rational method. A 
specific inste.nce of the foregoing view is Brightman's 
theory of coherence. Brightman's position has been greatly 
influenced by Hegel's view that the true is the whole. 
There are non-rationalistic tendencies in all three 
systems of thought, yet Hegel and personalists seek to give 
1. Kierkegaard, :Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 107. 
2. DeWolf, op. cit., p. 95. 
3. ~., P• 172. 
4• Ibid., P• 130. 
5. Ibid., p 95. 
full dimension to all elements of existence. Hegel has main-
tained that the dialectic approach is grounded in experience. 
To overcome the limitation of Bowne's insistence that "life 
is deeper than logic," Brightman holds to the synoptic ap-
preach. But in the latter's view of the finite God, there 
are both rational and non-rational tendencies. ~eWolf 
criticizes the non-rationalistic tendencies of Brightman's 
view, while emphasizing the positive merits of Brightman's 
system. 
F. An evaluation and summary 
The aim of this chapter has been twofold: First to 
show Hegelian and Kierkegaardian trends in contemporary 
thought. Secondly, the attempt has been made to study 
Hegel and Kierkegaard in relation to some contemporary phi-
losophies so that relevant similarities and differences may 
become clearer. If it is true, as this investigation has 
insisted, that Hegel's philosophy has been a formative in-
- 1 
fluence upon almost every subsequent philosophy, then this 
would suggest the possibility that Kierkegaard was influ-
enced by the German thinker. Morton White is doing ample 
justice in writing of Hegel: 
1. Morton White, The Age of Analysis (New York: Published 
as a Mentor Book, 1955), p. 13. 
Not only did he influence the originators 
of marxism, existentialism, and instrumental-
ism--now three of the most popular philosophies 
in the 'l.vorld-but at one time or another he 
dominated the founders of the more technical 
movements, logical positivism, realism, and 
analytic philosophy. The point is that Karl 
Marx, Ki erkegaard the existentialist, John 
Dewey, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore were 
at one time or another close students of He-
gel's thought and some of their most distinc-
tive doctrines reveal the imprint of the scars 
of previous contact or struggle with that 
strange genius.! 
jOb 
White's point is well taken that Hegel has had a molding in-
fluence on almost every movement of consequence in contemp-
orary thought. The well known historical tenability2 of the 
1. Ibid. 
2. Philosophers of different schools agree that Hegel has 
been a formative inf~uence upon contemporary philosophy. 
In The Philosophy of Heijel, Carl J. Friedrich expresses 
this view as follows: It is indeed startling to reflect 
upon the fact that Hegel has been credited with and dis-
credited by his evident connection with Communism and 
Fascism, with the moderate socialism of a T.H.Green, or 
the conservative constitutionalism of a Hocking. The cul-
tural anthropologists of contemporary An1erica are as much 
indebted to him as are the philosophers of history in the 
style of Toynbee ••• the impact of Hegel in the work of the 
Neo-Hegelians in England and the Hegelians of Italy, not-
ably Benedetto Croce, makes such a construction more than 
doubtful. Hegel's influence on existentialism, on Kierke-
gaard and Jasp ers, on Heidegger and Sartre, is tremendous. 
His influence on Dewey is well known; it is less generally 
appreciated that as the first philosopher stressing pro-
cess, he must be seen as the precursor not only of Dewey, 
but also of Bergson and Whi tehead.u p. XVI. The Philosophy 
of Hegel (New York: The Modern Library, 1953). 
~--· 
Quoted passage, which is not contrary to the evidence of 
this study, reveals that Kierkegaard has also been in-
fluenced by Hegel in both a positive and negative way. If 
the main findings of this chapter are true, then they appear 
to clarify the issues of any main differences and similari-
ties that have been found between Hegel and Kierkegaard. 
lows: 
The central conclusions of this chapter as as fol-
1. It has been seen that not only had Kierkegaard 
been disenchanted with Hegel's idealism, but 
pragmatism, realism, and personal idealism re-
volted against different phases of it. Most 
of Hegel's critics have felt that his philoso-
phy lacks an empirical core, and this fact has 
encouraged reactionary tendencies against him. 
2. The pragmatists and realists have emphasized 
the weakness of Hegel in the areas ot science 
and epistemology, yet many ot them expound his 
idea of development and theory of coherence 
within a pragmatic and realistic setting. 
3. If, in Absolute idealism, one of the basic 
problems has been the conflict between a double 
criterion of truth, as this study insists, then 
reality consists of feeling coupled with the 
other view that reality is a cognitive experi-
ence which can be interpreted as a systematic 
whole. 
4. Most personalists would deny the Absolute monism 
o~ Hegel, even while maintaining that the true 
is the whole, and reality is spiritual. 
5. Perhaps it is the grand sweep of Hegel's organic 
approach that challenges the contemporary scene 
as no other philosophy. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of this study has been to determine the 
nature of the relation between Hegel and Kierkegaard. The 
term "relation" has been defined to mean two central things 
in this study: 1) some possible influences of Hegel on 
Kierkegaard, and 2) the presentati on, in some detail, of 
similarities and differences between the two thinkers. Three 
distinct methods have been used together as related and inter-
dependent: the historical, the comparative, and the critical. 
The historical-comparative-critical method may be defined by 
the following principles: 1) to give an account of Hegel's 
and Kierkegaard 1 s views of their historical predecessors, of 
their systems, and of their influences on same contemporary 
trends of thought; 2) to compare the two respective systems 
in accordance with similarities and differences; 3) to cri-
ticize Kierkegaard 1 s view in light of Hegel's philosophy. 
Having completed the study, the main results may be brought 
together as follows: 
A. Indirect evidence of the relation between Hegel 
and Kierkegaard 
The existence of a relation between Hegel and Kierke-
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gaard has often been suggested, but there is no full agree-
ment as to the extent of the relation. Douglas Steere is 
convinced that both Kierkegaard 1 s philosophical style and 
his terminology show the influence of Hegel, though Kierke-
gaard was never able to acknowledge the validity of Hegel's 
central idea.l Many other biographers, writers, theologians, 
and philosophers have made similar claims. Though the nu-
merous writers point out that there is a relation, the con-
nection between Hegel and Kierkegaard has escaped systematic 
investigation in the English speaking countries. The reason 
for this oversight is basically twofold: First, it has been 
assumed in some quarters that Hegel is the abstract thinker 
isolated from reality, whereas Kierkegaard is the subjective 
thinker connected with life and reality. Secondly, the 
position has been taken generally among philosophical circles 
that Kierkegaard is an irrational religious thinker, and he 
is not enough of a philosopher to bother about investigating 
his thought. Both of the foregoing views are equally mis-
leading, as this study has sought to show. This fact was re-
vealed in the existential insights of Hegel's view, and the 
keen theoretical analysis of man 1 s cognitive experience in a 
most subtle way in Kierkegaard 1 s thinking. 
1. Cf. Introduction. 
2. Ibid. 
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The indirect relation of Hegel to Kierkegaard through 
the Danish Hegelians, Heiberg and Martensen, is a matter ot 
historical record.1 In Germany, as well as Denmark, Hegelian-
ism was the classic philosophy of that day. As pupil of these 
two leading Danish thinkers on Hegelianism, Kierkegaard was 
submitted to Hegel's parmnount influence. The establishing 
of the relation b.etween Hegel and Kierkegaard through Hei-
berg and Martensen is valuable tor two basic considerations. 
1) It makes clear a link between Hegel and Kierkegaard. It 
reveals that at his earliest acquaintance with Hegel, Kierke-
gaard held him to be a profound philosopher. 2) It explains 
the controversy between Kierkegaard and the Hegelians. In 
his attack on the Hegelian philosophy,. Kierkegaard was not 
always criticizing Hegel, but the Hegelians who thought they 
could go beyond the master. 
The anti-Hegelian revolt that was going on is another 
indirect connection between Hegel and Kierkegaard. Kierke-
gaard•s rebellion against Hegel had been encouraged by the 
Berlin lectures of the German philosopher Schelling. Schel-
ling had in the last stage of his thinking turned against 
some of the main principles of idealism. He maintained that 
Hegel's pure being is nothing. · According to Schelling, Hegel 
bas a negative philosophJ. But SChelling holds that a posi-
1. Ct. Chapter I, sec., B. 
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tive philosophy should go £rom existence to thought; it Should 
not like Hegel's system go £rom thought to existence. In 1841, 
Kierkegaard journeyed to Berlin, and he was impressed for a 
time with Schelling's attack upon Hegel. Later Kierkegaard 
became disgusted with Schelling. But it cannot be denied 
that Kierkegaard•s Berlin visit inspired his revolt against 
Hegel, which led to his publication o£ two philosophical mas-
terpieces, Philosophical Fragments in 1844, and Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript in 1846. The indirect evidence re-
veals that there is a close and strong early devotion o£ 
Kierkegaard to Hegel, even though he was inspired in a con-
clusive anti-Hegelian strain a£ter the Berlin visit. 
B. Direct evidence of the relation between Hegel 
and Kierkegaard 
Turning to the basic direct evidence of the relation 
between Hegel and Kierkegaard, there is the cumulative evi-
dence o£ numerous references to Hegel in Kierkegaard•s writ-
ings. These references reveal that Hegel is one o£ the phil-
osophers whom Kierkegaard criticizes the most, and praises 
the most. Toward Hegel, ~erkegaard felt at the same t~e 
both scorn and admiration. The extent to which Kierkegaard 
was well versed in the writings of Hegel can be seen in two 
of his early works. In 1838, Kierkegaard published .a book, 
which is entitled From the Papers o£ One Still Living. This 
first work deals with Hans Andersen as a novelist, and it is 
.).J..C... 
so Hegelian in inspiration that one of his acquaintances 
claimed that K1erkegaard had translated it "out of the orig-
inal Hegelian," and had written it in "a mood of critical 
admiration. ttl Kierkegaard' s dissertation for the 'Master of 
Arts,'' called 'rb.e Concept of Irony, reveals further his use 
or his Heg.elian heritage. Here Kierkegaard is not so much 
concerned with the living subjectivity or irony, as he is 
with the Concept of Irony. 
In addition to these early works, there are four basic 
works: Concept of Dread, Philosophical Fragments, Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, and the Journals, which show the 
Hegelian impact upon Kierkegaard. In these works there are 
more than a hundred specific references to Hegel and his 
works. Two famous scholars of Kierkegaard's thougnt collab-
orate the findings of this study that Kierkegaard was well-
versed in Hegel's works. In Something About Kierkegaard, 
D. F. Swenson explains that Kierkegaard read and re-read 
the Log!k of Hegel. Kierkegaard translated some of the 
passages from German to Danish in order to understand than 
better.2 In Kierkegaard-Studien, Emanuel Hirsch has dated 
Kierkegaard•s development in Hegelian studies in the follow-
ing way: 1837-1838, Lectures on Esthetics; 1838-1841, History 
1. Cf. Chapter I, sec., B. 
2. Ibid. 
of Philosopgj, Philosophy of History, and Phiiosophy .of 
Right; after 1841, Science .of Logie, and Encyclopaedia of 
the Philosophical Sciences.l 
Though Kierkegaard 1 s references to Hegel are often in 
the spirit of negative criticisms which are expressed with 
vigor, there is also a profound respect for Hegel. Kierke-
gaard could well hold this ambiguous and contradictory rela-
tion with Hegel, since the Danish thinker seeks to advance 
himself in his polemical writings masked as a Janus Bifron. 
Thus there is always this ambiguous relation of admiration 
and scorn for Hegel found throughout Kierkegaard's writings. 
But behind this mask there is an authentic philosophical 
style, terminology, and interest which reveal the formative 
influence of Hegel upon the Danish philosopher. It is not 
without reason that Kierkegaard said of the German philos-
opher, "I have learnt much from him."2 
C. A final evaluation and summary 
In the statement of the problem, it was said that there 
are three basic questions this study seeks to answer: 1) What 
is the extent or the relation between Hegel and Kierkegaard? 
2) What is to be assumed from similarities between the two 
thinkers? )) What is to be inferred from differences? The 
1. Cf. Chapter I, sec., B. 
2. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, P• 558. 
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above paragraph has answered these three q~estions as fol-
lows: Kierkegaard's relation to Hegel is ambig~o~s con-
taining admiration and scorn often at the same t1me. Per-
haps this relation accounts for both likenesses and dif-
ferences which may occur between the two philosophers. 
Moreover. both Kierkegaard's style and terminology show the 
f'ormative int'l~ence of' Hegel. This formative inf'lu.ence does 
not take away from the Danish thinker the fact that he ~sed 
his Hegelian heritage creatively and critically. 
The final summary of' the study is the summation of' the 
tindings in each chapter as f'ollows: 
1. If Hegel's many-sided philosophy casts its spell 
on those -who move toward the right or left. as 
this study s~gests. then Kierkegaard•s interpre-
tation contains the positive impact of Hegelian-
ism as well as the divergent trends. Partic~ar­
ly. this !'actor appears tr~e in Hegel's and 
K1erkegaard 1 s views of' their philosophical pred-
ecessors. 
2. K1erkegaard 1 s division of the three stages of life 
a~gests the inspiration of' Hegel's triadic de• 
sign. Up to a certain point. the . religio~s stage 
of' the Danish philosopher is the synthesis of the 
two preceding stages. An analysis of Kierke-
gaard's stages reveals them to be related steps 
in a Hegelian mode• in spite of the former em-
phasis that the movements from step to step were 
unrelated. The significance of the dialectic 
lies for Kierkegaard in the third stage o:r re-
ligion which gives meaning to the whole. 
3• If it be tr~e that Kierkegaard 1 s view of ethics 
emphasizes the unity of the inner and o~ter. 
then he is close to Hegel's idealistic tradition. 
However• Kierkegaard's theory of' the teleological 
suspension of the ethical is ·an attack upon 
Hegel's universal morality. 
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4• Hegel's idealistic theory of knowledge is far more 
adequate than Kierkegaard's realistic position of 
immediate intuition. 
5. Kierkegaard's objection to Hegel's identification 
of logic and metaphysics as an abstract identity 
misses the empirical side of Hegel's thought. He-
gel's view of essence is formulated to give ex-
istence its due respect, since the point of de-
parture for thought and philosophy is fram ex-
perience. 
6. Kierkegaard opposes Hegel's position that nature 
is an object oi' thought. .But the formal' agrees 
with Hegel that natui"e sei"ves as a medium which 
reveals the Absolute. 
7. Kierkegaai"d's philosophy of ai"t lacks the compre-
hensiveness -of Hegel's view, since the Danish 
thinker does not deal with the development of his-
torical theoi"ies and schools. Kiei"kegaai"d's basic 
contribution to art is an analysis of the aes-
thetic moment, while Hegel is famous for his evo-
lutionary theory of ai"t. 
8. In psychology, Hegel holds that will, feeling, and 
intellect have a common root in the one life of 
mind. Kierkegaard would seek to separate and de-
partmentalize these three aspects of mind. 
9. The existential aspects of Hegel's religiolls 
thought, especially his early theological writings, 
reveal Kierkegaardian insights. 
10. Kierkegaard's I"evolt against Hegel's category of 
pure being is related to the identification of a 
tbinkei" 1s view with a being-in thought. Kiei"ke-
gaard1s -effort is not an essential destl:'uction of 
Hegel~s ontological category, rather the category 
is merely placed in a new position. Hegel's onto-
logical category of pui"e being is close to .. Kierke-
gaard's view of eternity. 
11. Though Kierkegaard reacted severely against Hegel's 
conception of freedom and necessity, his ai"gwnent -
demonstrates the Hegelian terminology. Yet Kierke-
gaard maintains contradictorily both Hegelian and 
j.Lb 
unHegelian meanings. He agrees with Hegel that 
there is a core of necessity in all true freedom. 
Both thinkers agree that true freedom is self-
determination. Kierkegaard 1 s basic departure 
from Hegel is at the point where Kierkegaard in-
sists that freedom and necessity are not ration-
ally ·eonceivable. 
12. Hegel's system was other than Kierkegaard•s 
characterization of it as a logical abstraction 
without contact with reality and lite. Hegel's 
organic emphasis has within it a consideration 
for existential insights, which are close in 
many instances to Kierkegaard 1 s conclusions. 
13. Kierkegaard1 s sharp contrast of existential 
thinking with speculative and objective thinking 
does not do justice to Hegel's total world view, 
because the for.mer omits the ampirieal base of 
the latter's philosophy. 
14. Hegel and Kierkegaard are existential thinkers, 
since neither philosopher writes anything of 
significance which is not tilled with his par-
tieipation ·and feeling. 
15. Hegel, like Kierkegaard, considers reality to be 
dynamic and spiritual. For both thinkers all 
becaming involves striving. 
16. Kierkegaard's definition of Christianity as sub-jectivity is very close to Hegel's view of the 
Christian religion. 
17. There are rational and irrational elements in the 
philosophies of both thinkers. Hegel seeks to 
unity the irrational and rational, while holding 
that the for.mer is necessary for the latter. 
Basically, Kierkegaard chooses the irrational 
elements as a criterion of the Christian life, 
but he uses reason to defend this view. 
18. Both Kierkegaard and Hegel were aware of the sig-
nificance and value of the individual. Although 
Hegel did not place sufficient stress upon the 
individual, Kierkegaard•s accusation against He-
gel that he did not treat the individual is un-
true. Kierkegaard's over-~phasis upon the indi-
vidual leads to a false individualism which He-
gel's doctrine overcomes. 
19. It has been seen that not only had Kierkegaard 
been disenchanted with Hegel's idealism, but 
pragmatism, realimn, and personal idealism re-
volted against different phases or it. Most 
of Hegel's critics hsve felt that his philoso-
phy lacks an empirical care, and this fact has 
encouraged reactionary tendencies against him. 
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20. The pragmatists and realists have emphasized the 
weakness of Hegel in the area of science and 
epis tem.ology, yet man:y' of them expound his idea 
or development and theory or coherence within 
a pragmatic and realistic setting. 
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1. The Problem of the Dissertation 
The problem of the dissertation is to determine the 
nature of Kierkegaardts relation to Hegel in areas of 
agreements and differences. This investigation attempts t o 
penetrate beneath Kierkegaard•s polemical writings to the 
basis of his philosophy. The central contention is that 
Hegel exerted a formative influence upon Kierkegaard. 
2. The Method of Study 
The method of the dissertat ion is threefold: historical, 
comparative, and critical. The historical-comparative-
critical method, as used 1n this study, involves the follow-
ing principles: 1) to give an account of Hegel's and Kier-
kegaard•s views of their historical predecessors, of their 
systems, and of their in~luences on some contemporary trends 
of thought; 2) to compare the two respective systems in 
terms of both similarities and differences; 3) to criticize 
Kierkegaardts view in light of Hegel's philosophy. 
3. A Final Summary 
Kierkegaardts relation to Hegel has been shown to be 
twofold: First, .Kierkegaard uses Hegel • s terminology and 
meanings in the development of his own thought as well as 
in his critique of Hegel. Thus Kierkegaard•s relation to 
Hegel is always paradoxical; that is, the Danish philosopher 
uses at the same tine Hegelian and anti-Hegelian views. 
3;3.8 
Secondly, Kierkegaard's philosophy lacks the comprehensiveness 
of Hegel's, yet there are some essential points on which the 
thinkers agree. Oftentimes the agreement suggests a profound 
influence of Hegel on Kierkegaard . However, even on basic 
points of agreement, Kierkegaard 1 s use of Hegelianism is not 
free from vast diff erences and hesitancies. 
The following statements are the outstanding conclusions 
of this study : 
~. Hegel and Kierkegaard share in common a dialecti cal 
m·ethodology. In Ki erkegaard' s denial of smooth 
tra~sition from one stage to another there is 
opposition t o Hegel's view. But there i s at times 
a counter-tendency in Kierkegaard's attitude to 
affi rm smooth transitions in agreement with Hegel 's 
p·osition. 
2.,. Like Kierkegaard, Hegel is also an existential 
thinker, since both thinkers write nothing of 
significance that is not f illed with emphasis 
up:on participation, feeling and i nvolv ement . 
Hegel was not unaware of existence as Kierkegaard 
seemed to believe. 
Like Hegel, Kierkegaard 
dynamic, and spiritual. 
i s an ethical idealist, 
idealist. 
considers life to be 
Perhaps Kierkegaard 
as Hegel is an absolut e 
~ Kierkegaard, along with Hegel, maintai n s that 
the abstract is the unreal. Kierkegaard is not 
fair to Hegel's system in making it the acme of 
abstraction. 
5. Some aspects of Hegel's r eligious thought, 
esp.ecially his early th eological writings and 
his view of sub jective religion, are close to 
Kierkegaard' s position . 
a. Kierkegaard, opposing Hegel' s over-emphasis upon 
essence, affirms the priority of existence ove 
essence . 
7. The follow:ing basic crit i c ism's by Kierkegaard of 
Hegel's system have been Shown to be n ot to tal ly 
j:u stified:. 1) Kierkegaard i s anti- metaphysical , 
and opposes Hegel's identification of being and 
t hou ght, since it makes for pure abstraction. 
2) Kierkegaard is anti-historical, end a ttacks 
speculative thought whi ch imports necessity into 
the historical process. 3.} Kierkegaard is anti-
syst emat ic, and criticizes the systematic tendency 
of Hegelianism, . since an existential system is 
i~possible. The central weakness in most of Kier-
kegaard's criticisms of Hegel is that Kierkegaard 
misses the empirical side of the lat t er. 
8. Both Hegelian and Kierkegaardian concepts are 
found in the salient conflicts in pragn~tism, 
realism, post-Kierkegaardian exist en tial:tam, 
and idealism. 
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